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Abstract 
This thesis contains three empirical essays. It is mainly motivated by the economic situations (low 
economic growth and high economic inequality) of many developing countries including Thailand. 
Nonetheless, the labour supply literature regarding developing countries necessary to address these 
issues is very limited.  
The first empirical chapter investigates the determinants of labour supply at the extensive margin in 
the formal labour market of Thailand as a developing country. This chapter applies the structural 
binary probit to model behaviour of labour supply participation using the Household Socio-Economic 
Survey (HSES) of Thailand covering 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. The key focuses are the role of the 
informal sector, the effect of income restructure policies in 2012, and the impact of debt constraints 
on labour force participation. The results show that the informal sector has a negative effect on labour 
supply participation; the set of income restructure policies affects labour supply at the extensive 
margin negatively; and the amount of debts encourages people to participate in the labour market.  
The subsequent chapter studies individual and household labour supply using a structural discrete 
hours approach. This essay adopts Thailand HSES covering 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 to estimate 
different model specifications based on the degrees of model flexibility and applies five criteria to 
select the preferred model at individual and household level. The results suggest that the most flexible 
model are preferred for individual and family labour supply.  
The final essay focuses on applying the microsimulation technique to explore the effects of three 
different policy reforms including the perfect compliance of the national minimum wage, increases in 
non-transferable allowances, and a proposed personal income tax package. This chapter applies 
Thailand HSES in 2013 and 2015. The results of the first policy suggest that the minimum wage with 
perfect compliance helps promote household income at the bottom end of the distribution; the policy 
therefore ameliorates the poverty and income inequality problems. Increases in non-transferable 
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allowances as implemented in 2017 marginally impact labour supply response as well as gross and 
disposable incomes; however, the reform decreases the tax burden significantly. The results of the 
final simulation (the proposed tax package) reveal that it causes negative effects on labour supply and 
financial factors overall. Introducing this policy intensifies poverty and income inequality problems.  
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 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Labour supply behaviour is one of the most intensive economic research areas. The number of 
empirical studies on labour supply has been increasing exponentially, making labour supply behaviour 
arguably the largest area of labour economics research in terms of the number of empirical papers in 
the last 30 years. The increase is because many public policies such as minimum wage, income tax, 
and social welfare programs impact people’s decision to work (Cahuc et al., 2014).  
A comprehensive understanding of labour supply behaviour is therefore crucial since changes in 
government policies and economic contexts theoretically lead to structural changes (e.g., economic 
growth and income distribution) through labour supply behaviour. However, most empirical studies 
on labour supply focus on developed countries; knowledge related to labour supply behaviour in 
developing countries is limited.  
This thesis examines labour supply in Thailand1, a country in South East Asia with a population of about 
66.2 million at the end of 2017 (Department of Provincial Administration, 2017), similar to the 
population of the United Kingdom which is 65.65 millions (Office of National Statistics, 2017). 
However, Thailand is more than twice as large as the United Kingdom in terms of geographical area 
(513,120 vs 243,305 square kilometres, respectively). As a developing country, Thailand is facing some 
major economic concerns which can be ameliorated with a better understanding of labour supply and 
policy consequences.  
                                                            
1 This thesis focuses on the informal labour market. Hence, the words “labour force participation”, “labour 
supply”, and “labour market” usually refer to “activities in the formal labour market”. The word “informal” is 
specifically used when the content refers to activities in the informal market. 
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The first economic concern is low economic growth which is an economic issue for many developing 
countries. FIGURE 1.1 shows the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of Thailand over 
the last 56 years.  
FIGURE 1.1: Thailand’s GDP annual growth rate (1961 – 2017) 
 
Source: Data from the World Bank 
From FIGURE 1.1, it can be seen that Thailand had a high but relatively stable economic growth from 
1961 to 1995. Due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the growth rate plunged into negative numbers 
in 1997 and 1998. After that the recovery in 1999, Thailand’s economic growth has remained low. 
Between 2008 and 2017, there were only two years in which the rate of growth exceeded five percent: 
2009, the year after the world economic crisis due to the collapse of the mortgage loans market in the 
United States; and 2012, the year after historic flooding in Thailand which caused economic damages 
and losses totalling approximately 1.425 trillion baht. In fact, Thailand’s medium-term economic 
growth rate was about 7 percent during 1957 to 1991; however, since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
it has been approximately 4 percent (Jitsuchon, 2012). 
Slow economic growth leads to the second concern, the middle-income trap, which was coined by Gill 
et al. (2007). Thailand has been mentioned as a synonym of a middle-income trap country 
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(Eichengreen et al., 2013). Agénor and Canuto (2015) also indicate Thailand as a typical example of 
many countries suffering from the middle-income trap. The middle-income trap term is usually 
defined by absolute and relative thresholds (Im and Rosenblatt, 2015). The absolute level of income 
is applied to approximate the number of years an economy takes to move from one income category 
to another (Felipe et al., 2012). Regarding the absolute level of income, World Bank data show that 
Thailand has been a lower-middle income country since 1987 (the beginning period of the available 
data); however, Thailand was still a middle income country in 2016 (the latest available year), 
however, it was in the higher-middle income sub-category. In other words, Thailand has been a 
middle-income country for at least 29 years. The relative threshold is defined as a number of years 
that a country takes to catch up to the income levels of the United States or other developed country 
(Lin and Rosenblatt, 2012). Im and Rosenblatt (2015) apply the relative income thresholds and 
concluded that Thailand would take about 50 years to reach half of the income level of the United 
States.  
FIGURE 1.2: Thailand's Gini index from 1981 to 2013 
 
Source: Data from the World Bank (2016) 
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Another economic concern is income inequality which is defined as the gap between groups of people 
(for example the rich and the poor) in a country. FIGURE 1.2 shows the Gini coefficient, a measure of 
economic inequality, for Thailand from 1981 to 2013 in percentage terms. After a gradual decrease in 
the 1980s, the coefficient increased and peaked at 47.9 during the final period of Asia’s Economic 
Miracle in 1992. Since then, the coefficient has gradually declined and has fluctuated between 37.4 
and 40.0 since 2009. Nevertheless, it remains just below 40.0, which is commonly taken as the 
threshold for high income inequality (Zhuang, 2014). To summarise, due to the economic boom from 
the 1990s and onwards, income inequality in Thailand has increased sharply. However, over the past 
15 years, the situation has alleviated, although Thailand still remains one of the countries in Asia with 
the highest inequality index (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2015).  
There are several important consequences resulting from income inequality. Firstly, Brueckner and 
Lederman (2015) assert that income inequality has a negative impact on GDP growth per capita, which 
implies that income inequality may have partly caused Thailand to fall into the middle-income trap. 
Secondly, income inequality is closely correlated with inequality in education and health leading to 
other social problems (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Additionally, economic crises are possibly caused 
by a consequence of changes in income distribution (Kumhof et al., 2015). Finally, income inequality 
is also positively related to national and international conflicts (Cramer, 2003; Phongpaichit and Baker, 
2015; Sen, 1973). 
In summary, understanding labour supply behaviour is important for academics and policy makers. In 
fact, knowledge of labour supply behaviour helps governments of developing countries deal with 
serious economic issues. However, the number of empirical papers in this area is scarce. This thesis 
therefore aims to explore three different aspects of labour supply and policy simulation in Thailand as 
an example for other developing countries. The next section provides brief information about this 
thesis.  
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1.2 Objectives and overview of the thesis 
 Chapter 2 overview 
Besides the economic concerns mentioned in the previous section, the first essay in Chapter 2 is also 
motivated by the economic contexts in Thailand. This includes a large proportion of the informal sector 
(i.e., agricultural sector in this study), the introduction of the income-restructuring policy package in 
2012, and the increasing amount of household debt. Apart from exploring the overall behavioural of 
labour supply at the extensive margin, this chapter aims to investigate labour force participation of 
the formal labour market in a developing country by accounting for these economic circumstances.  
The informal sector plays an important role in the Thai labour market. The Thai government reports 
that the informal sector accounts for 62.6 percent of the working labour force in 2012; in addition, the 
farming sector accounts for 62.5 percent of the working labour force in the informal sector2. Due to 
its unique characteristics, a large informal sector is expected to negatively affect labour force 
participation in the formal sector. In fact, a farming business is usually considered as a family business; 
hence, income from farming is usually shared among all household members, including those who are 
not participating in the farm and they consider shared income from farming as part of their non-wage 
income. A theoretical prediction and existing empirical studies indicate that an increase in non-wage 
income discourages labour force participation. This empirical essay incorporates a factor capturing 
whether any other household member besides the respondent doing farming business into the model 
of labour supply at the extensive margin. 
In 2012, income restructuring policies in Thailand were completely launched. The government 
increased minimum wages by about 70 percent and salaries for undergraduate workers in the public 
sector by over 70 percent. The rice-pledging scheme raised rice prices by at least 50 percent. While 
increasing wages and salaries can encourage labour force participation in the formal labour market, 
                                                            
2 The data from http://www.nso.go.th/. 
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rising agricultural prices can have the opposite effect. To capture the effects of the policies launched 
in 2012, this chapter includes a year variable which compares the years before (2009 and 2011) and 
after (2013 and 2015) the policies became effective3. 
Theoretical prediction and empirical evidence suggest that financial obligations encourage people to 
participate in the labour market. In Thailand, the household debts increased from 51.7 percent of GDP 
in 2007 to 81.2 percent in 2015. In 2019, the household debt to GDP ratio of Thailand is still high; it 
ranks in the top 10 list worldwide (as well as top 3 among Asian countries). This chapter investigates 
the extent to which different types of debt (housing, consumption, and education) affect labour force 
participation in a developing country.  
The analysis uses data from the HSES in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. The surveys include a large range 
of household sizes (from one member to twenty-three members). Households with a small number of 
members usually represent nuclear families whilst those with a large number indicate extended 
families which are common in many developing countries. This chapter applies the structural probit 
model to estimate labour force participation in the formal labour market for males and females 
separately. The selection bias due to absence of wages for non-workers is approached by a two-stage 
Heckman selection model.  
The findings show that labour supply at the extensive margin in Thailand is overall consistent with 
theoretical predictions and existing literature. Regarding the informal sector, the results reveal that 
when a family has a farming business that is operated by another member besides the respondent, 
females are less likely to participate in the labour market. This is because farming income is considered 
as unearned household income from a respondent’s perspective. The year effect, which captures the 
income structural policies, indicates that the policies negatively affected the labour force participation 
of both males and females. The results regarding debt constraints suggest that the amount of debts 
                                                            
3 The results should be interpreted with caution as other events, e.g., economic growth and inflation, may be 
confounders.  
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generally has a positive effect on labour force participation of people. Different types of debt affect 
labour supply at the extensive margin of males and females differently.  
 Chapter 3 overview 
Chapter 3 studies labour supply at the individual and family levels using structural discrete hours 
labour supply models. The motivation of this chapter is mainly because various governmental policies 
usually affect labour supply; however, the literature from developing countries is scarce. The main 
objective of this chapter is to estimate different discrete hours labour supply models with different 
degrees of model flexibility and to identify the preferred model for individual and household labour 
supply. Labour supply behaviour at the individual and household level can also be observed through 
the estimated results.   
The initial dataset used in this chapter is the same as the one used in the previous chapter; however, 
the number of observations differ. In fact, this chapter focuses on households that comprise a single 
individual with no children or a married couple (either with or without children). This is because the 
model specification becomes extremely complex for other types of households, e.g. those containing 
two couples, three dependent adults, or one couple with two dependent adults. In the models 
estimation a two-stage Heckman selection approach is adopted to predict hourly wage rates for all 
adults. This chapter also includes a personal income tax calculation to obtain household disposable 
income for different hours points. There are four models for individual labour supply and each model 
is estimated for males and females separately. Six models for household labour supply are estimated 
for all married couples. Different estimation methods (conditional/multinomial logit4 and mixed logit 
models) are applied depending on the flexibility of the model specifications.  
                                                            
4 What I refer to as the conditional logit model is the model developed by McFadden (1973). Greene (2012) 
discusses that the McFadden conditional logit model is often referred as the multinomial logit model; however, 
the multinomial logit model can also refer to a discrete choice model applied when data are only individual 
specific. 
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The estimation results show that labour supply behaviour in Thailand is overall consistent with theory 
and existing literature. This chapter considers five aspects5 to select the preferred models for male 
and female labour supply and the household labour supply. The results indicate that the most flexible 
model at both individual and household levels is the most preferable. At the end of the analysis, a 
number of checks for robustness are performed to examine the consistency of the preferred models 
across different settings. The results of these robustness checks are consistent with the preferred 
models at both levels. The estimation using the dataset covering 2013 and 2015 suggests that the 
models fit the data better than the previous period (2009 and 2011) as well as the whole sample (from 
2009 to 2015). Hence, the models estimated from year 2013 and 2015 data are adopted as a 
simulation platform for the last empirical essay.    
 Chapter 4 overview 
Chapter 4 extends the previous chapter. The first objective is to investigate, using microsimulation 
models (MSMs), the effects of factual and counterfactual policies on labour supply as well as economic 
factors including gross income, tax burden, and disposable income. The second objective is to 
determine the effect of each policy at a broader extent. This chapter, hence, presents a "winners-
losers" analysis as well as the effects of simulated policies on poverty and income redistribution.   
This chapter applies the HSES datasets from the 2013 and 2015 surveys because the results from 
Chapter 3 suggest that the preferred models fit the data from these surveys better than the others. In 
addition, this most recent dataset allows policy simulation with least divergence from changes in 
labour supply preferences. Besides a micro-dataset, MSMs are usually composed of two parts, namely, 
the arithmetical model and the behavioural model. The former applies personal tax rules and benefits 
                                                            
5 They include the proportion of negative marginal utility of income, the proportion of the sample satisfying the 
quasi-concave condition, the proportion of the observations satisfying the monotonicity condition, the log-
likelihood ratio test, and the consistency between individual and household labour supply levels. 
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to calculate disposable income under different policy scenarios. The latter allows households to 
maximise their levels of utility after disposable income adjustment due to a policy reform.  
Before the policy simulation is undertaken, the chapter presents labour supply elasticities of the gross 
wage rate. The results are consistent with most of the existing studies; for example, in general female 
labour supply is more elastic than male labour supply. The chapter then simulates three different 
policies, namely, the perfect compliance of the minimum wage policy in 2015, changes in non-
transferable allowances based on tax rule adjustment in 2017, and the restructuring of the personal 
income tax package proposed in September 2018. The results of the first policy suggest that law 
enforcement is a key factor of policy success; the national minimum wage with a perfect rate of 
compliance improves income of people at the bottom end of the household disposable income per 
adult capita (HDIPAC) distribution. The simulated policy can reduce the number of people living below 
the national poverty line and increase income equality. The results of the second simulated policy 
show that increasing non-transferable allowances affects labour supply and income only marginally; 
however, it causes significant reductions in the household tax burden. This policy does not significantly 
affect the poverty and income inequality situations. The results of the final policy simulation reveal 
that restructuring tax brackets and tax rates generally has a negative impact on household gross 
income, tax burden, and disposable income. The policy exacerbates the poverty problem and possibly 
expands the income gap between both ends of the income distribution.  
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter presents the introduction. The second chapter, 
the first empirical work in this thesis, studies the determinants of labour supply at the extensive 
margin in Thailand. Chapter 3, the second empirical study, presents an analysis of different discrete 
hours labour supply models to determine the preferred models for individual and household labour 
supply. The next essay, presented in Chapter 4 (i.e., the final empirical study), focuses on applying the 
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microsimulation technique to investigate the effects of policies through the models obtained from 
Chapter 3. The conclusion of the thesis is given in chapter 5. 
Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the importance of a labour supply at the extensive margin in a 
developing country. This sections shows limitations of labour supply studies in developing economies 
which share some general contexts. It also provides interesting contexts in Thailand.  The next section 
reviews existing literature which includes the random utility maximisation (RUM) model in labour 
force participation, theoretical predictions of different factors (e.g. wages, unearned income, and debt 
constraints) on labour supply at the extensive margin, and the selection bias possibly due to missing 
wages of non-workers. Then, the chapter provides a clear explanation on the data cleaning process as 
well as descriptive statistics pointing out the socio-economic contexts. The next section discusses 
empirical methodology which is how the structural binary probit model with incorporation of the two-
stage Heckman selection model is specified. Model specification requires consideration of exclusion 
restriction in the selection model. The following section reports the results. First, it presents the results 
of the predicted wages which show the accuracy of prediction. Second, it provides marginal effects of 
labour force participation, discussing general and focused factors. The last section concludes the first 
essay with the summary of the chapter’s findings as well as providing the extension from a labour 
force participation study in Chapter 2 to an hours labour supply study in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 3 begins by presenting the background of the empirical essay. It refers back to the first chapter 
regarding the importance of labour supply in an economy. It also indicates the lack of literature 
focusing on labour supply in developing countries, especially studies applying discrete hours labour 
supply models. Then, a clear discussion about theoretical and empirical methodology in studying 
labour supply is provided. It starts with basic concepts of a discrete hours labour supply model, its 
advantages and disadvantages. Empirical models consider many aspects including predicted wages, 
utility functional forms, observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity, non-participation 
incorporation, and maximum simulated likelihood in estimation. At the end, this section explains 
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different models with different degrees of flexibility included in this chapter. The third section 
describes the process of disposable income calculation (i.e., the arithmetical model) as well as 
descriptive statistics for unmarried individuals and married couples. It presents results for both males 
and females separately for individuals. For married couples, it considers both gender and household 
size factors. In the next section, the results are reported at both individual and household labour 
supply levels. Then, the preferred model for each level is selected using different criteria. The last part 
presents a number of robustness checks. The final section provides a summary of findings and 
indicates that the estimated results are important for policy simulation.     
The final empirical essay, presented in Chapter 4, begins with brief information about MSMs which 
have been applied in various branches of science and social science. In economics, many studies apply 
MSMs for simulating different policies and they are frequently applied through labour supply settings.  
However, most existing studies focus on developed countries. Three simulated policies, namely, 
perfect compliance of the national minimum wage, increases in non-transferable allowances, and the 
proposed tax package are explained. The next section gives a background on different reforms, such 
as income elasticities of labour supply, minimum wages, and tax-benefit policies, which have been 
simulated using the microsimulation approach in previous studies. The next section characterises the 
sample composition, pecuniary factors, and the situation of the minimum wage. The empirical 
methodology is provided in the fourth section. It covers technical information about MSMs including 
the arithmetical model and the behavioural model. Then, the section describes procedures of different 
simulations as well as policy evaluations in practice. The fifth section reports the results of the 
simulations beginning with the results of labour supply elasticities when gross wages increase by 10 
percent, reporting labour supply response as well as transition metrics which explain behavioural 
changes. Regarding simulated policies, changes in hours worked and financial factors are presented in 
different ways. Lastly, effects on poverty and income redistribution are provided for each policy. The 
conclusion section completes the chapter by providing a summary of the findings. 
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This thesis concludes in the final chapter, Chapter 5, which includes two main sections. The first 
section reports the main findings as well as economic interpretations for each chapter. The second 
section provides discussion on policy implications, limitations, and the possibility for future research 
by chapter. In Chapter 2 some highlights are addressed. Interconnection between formal and informal 
sectors as well as debt constraints need to be taken into account when a policy related labour force 
participation is formulated. In Chapter 3 some policy implications can be directly drawn from the 
results of the estimations. Some policies are suggested to motivate people regarding labour supply 
behaviour. With respect to the fourth chapter, different policies are proposed to stimulate economic 
growth and promote income equality.   
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 Thailand Labour Supply at the 
Extensive Margin 
2.1 Introduction 
 Background 
As mentioned in the section 1.1, labour supply is one of the most intensely researched areas. With 
regard to labour supply at the extensive margin, many studies have been conducted using data from 
developed countries, and they have focused on either men or women. For example, Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986) reported the empirical study done by Bowen and Finegan (1969) which investigate 
labour force participation for different age groups of females in U.S. Pencavel (1986) used the same 
dataset as Bowen and Finegan (1969) to study labour force participation across different age groups 
of males. Some other examples of research on labour supply at the extensive margin in developed 
countries are  Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003), Bottazzi 
(2004), Belkar et al. (2007), and (Benczur et al., 2014).  
However, a limited number of empirical studies regarding labour force participation in developing 
countries are available. In addition, many studies apply data in the distant past. Cameron et al. (2001) 
focus on woman labour force participation in five Asia developing countries, including Thailand, in 
1975-76. Sahn and Alderman (1988) apply a dataset from Sri Lanka in 1980/81 to study determinants 
of wages and labour participation for males and females. Existing studies concerning labour supply at 
the extensive margin in developing countries using recent datasets usually investigate only on female 
labour supply although their focuses are specific. Chen et al. (2014) investigate labour force 
participation of married females living in urban and rural areas in China using data from 2006. 
Majbouri (2019) uses data from 2000 to investigate the effects of twins and family size on female 
labour force participation in Iran. Karaoglan and Okten (2015) use data from 2005 to 2010 to 
investigate labour force participation with added and discouraged worker effects of married females 
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in Turkey. The study presented in this thesis uses a recent dataset (from 2009 to 2015) to investigate 
labour supply at the extensive margin of both males and females in Thailand.  
This chapter aims to extend the labour supply literature regarding labour force participation in the 
formal labour market of a developing country since the economic structures between developed and 
developing countries are different. In general, developing countries have a larger informal sector than 
advanced economies. For example, Thailand informal sector shares about 62.60 percent of total 
working labour force in 2012. Regarding the literature associated with labour force participation in 
the informal sector, many previous studies, such as those by Telles (1992), Pradhan and van Soest 
(1995), and Dogrul (2012), investigate determinants of formal-informal labour market participation in 
Brazil, Bolivia, and Turkey, respectively. Other studies investigate formal labour market participation 
of households in the informal sector using datasets covering only farming households. However, most 
investigate labour supply behaviour in developed countries. Kimhi (2004) studies off-farm work 
participation of farming households in Israel. Corsi and Salvioni (2012) investigate labour allocation 
choices (between on-farm and off-farm working) of farming households in Italy. Existing literature 
suggests that on-farm and off-farm working in households are correlated. This leaves a gap in the 
literature for this thesis which investigates labour supply at the extensive margin in a developing 
country.   
There are a couple of reasons why a large informal sector could affect labour force participation in the 
formal labour market. Firstly, with a large informal sector, people have a larger choice set for their 
occupations (e.g., employee, employer, and self-employed). Previous empirical studies such as those 
by Pradhan and van Soest (1995) and Dogrul (2012) allow people to select among non-participation, 
formal market participation, and informal market participation. . Unfortunately, this chapter does not 
cover this aspect due to limitations of the dataset; HSES does not collect data related to working days 
and hours worked for employees and own-account people. Secondly, farming income in many 
countries including Thailand is usually shared among members due to the nature of farming 
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businesses (i.e., they are usually family-owned). Income from farming is hence reported in HSES at the 
household level. It can be assumed that non-farming household members take a shared amount of 
farming income as their non-wage income (i.e. unearned income). The theoretical prediction shows 
that an increase in unearned income discourages labour force participation in the formal labour 
market (detailed discussion in Section 2.2.2).   
Since this chapter covers households with and without farming businesses, it incorporates a factor 
capturing whether a household is in the agricultural sector (i.e., if another member besides the 
respondent has a farm business) into labour supply of the formal sector at the extensive margin. The 
agricultural sector is important because it shares the largest proportion of the informal sector (i.e., 
62.50 percent of informal labour force in 2012). 
Furthermore, income restructuring policies launched in 2012 makes Thailand an interesting case. They 
led to an enormous jump in the average minimum wage by over 70 percent and a huge salary increase 
in the public sector (up to 70.63 percent) are expected to have effects on labour force participation. 
In addition, the government also launched a policy to increase the prices of various rices, the main 
agricultural products requiring the largest proportion of labour inputs, by at least 50 percent above 
the market prices. This policy is also expected to have some impacts on labour force participation 
especially through the informal sector (i.e., when a household has any farm business but a respondent 
does not take part in any business).  
Debt constraints are another key focus in this chapter because of the high household leverage in 
Thailand. According to CEIC6, the household debt per GDP in percentage terms has increased from 
51.70 percent in 2007 to 81.17 percent in 2015. In 2019, a government office, Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Council, reports that, based on a household debt to GDP ratio, 
Thailand is one of the largest number in the world (Top 10) and in Asian (Top 3). However, the labour 
                                                            
6 CEIC is a listed private company based in Hong Kong which provides data of more than 195 countries around 
the world.  
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force participation rates have slightly decreased during the same period mainly due to an increasing 
rate of unemployment. The proportions of labour market participation in the formal sector to that in 
the informal sector remain quite consistent over time. These numbers seems to be contrary with the 
theoretical explanations and most of empirical studies. In fact, theoretical predictions based on a life-
cycle model indicate that household debts tighten up budget constraints. Providing labour supply in 
the labour market helps maintain the levels of consumption under debt constraints. In addition, 
working reduces the negative effects of income and expenditure disturbances. Previous empirical 
work usually finds a positive relationship between debt constraints and labour market participation 
(i.e., debt constraints encourage labour force participation). Nonetheless, most of the available 
literature focuses on the effect of housing debts on labour in advanced economies, for example, 
O'Brien and Hawley (1986) and Shack-Marquez and Wascher (1987) in the US; Fortin (1995) in Canada; 
Aldershof et al. (1999) in the Netherlands; Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) in Italy; Bottazzi (2004) in the 
UK; Belkar et al. (2007) and Atalay et al. (2016) in Australia. This chapter aims to explore to what extent 
household debt constraints affect decisions on labour force participation in Thailand as a developing 
country. This study thus covers the effects of financial obligations, including not only housing debt but 
also consumption and student loan debts. 
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate labour supply behaviour at the extensive margin, 
i.e., the labour force participation, in the formal labour market context of Thailand as a developing 
country. Considering both genders with a comprehensive range of socio-economic characteristics and 
applying recent data (2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015) in this chapter enhances the body of literature and 
offers further understanding of labour force participation in developing countries, especially Thailand. 
In addition, inclusion of some interesting factors, i.e., farming households, a variable capturing before 
and after the income restructuring policies, and indebtedness, helps extend the scope of the labour 
supply literature. This essay focuses only labour force in the formal labour market; hence, it does not 
include own-account workers which are usually in the informal sector. The main reason is that these 
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workers do not have wage rates. It is also practically complicated to predict wage rates for own-
account workers because the HSES does not contain information about working days or hours worked.  
 Organisation of Chapter 2 
This chapter consists of six sections. Follow the introduction (Section 2.1), Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature including the random utility maximisation model of labour market participation, theoretical 
explanations on the determinants of labour force participation, discussion on specific economic 
contexts (i.e., the informal sector, government policies, and debt constraints), and the selection bias 
in labour supply. Section 2.3 presents details of empirical data which includes the sample construction 
processes for generating variable and estimating the empirical model. Section 2.4 discusses the 
econometric model, i.e., the structural probit model in detail. It also explain the two-stage Heckman 
selection model in this empirical setting. Section 2.5 reports the main estimation results which are 
predicted wage and marginal effects of the binary probit model for labour force participation. Section 
2.6 presents the conclusion of this chapter as well as indicating the extension which is covered in the 
following chapter.   
2.2 Literature review 
 Random utility maximisation (RUM) model of labour market participation  
Early labour supply studies, between 1930s and early 1970s, defined as the first generation of labour 
supply studies (Killingsworth, 1983), they relied solely on the ordinary least squares technique in which 
the functional forms were not explicitly derived from a direct or indirect utility function. Moreover, 
the first generation research is criticised because of its econometric limitations. 
The second generation of labour supply studies evolved to resolve the drawbacks of the previous 
generation, namely, interchangeable application of alternative labour supply measures, unobservable 
variables, sample selection bias, and non-linear budget constraints (Berndt, 1991). In fact, the second 
generation researchers put more attention on functional forms, e.g. the explicit application of utility 
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functions, and econometric techniques e.g. estimation allowing unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, 
RUM models have been adopted in empirical research since the second generation. Furthermore, this 
generation starts introducing policies, especially taxes, into the labour supply model leading to 
investigation on non-linear budget constraints.  
This chapter based on The RUM model of discrete choice which offers the most common platform for 
discrete choice analysis (Greene, 2009). With regard to labour market participation, each individual 
makes a decision by choosing between two discrete alternatives i.e., participating and not 
participating in the formal labour market based on the utility maximisation process.  
The utility comparison between alternatives is undertaken and the decision maker selects the 
alternative which yields greater expected utility. In practice, the observed choice between two choices 
reveals which one offers a greater level of utility; nonetheless, the utility is not directly observed. The 
observed index (𝑦𝑖) equals to 1 if a respondent is employed; i.e. 𝑈𝑖𝑎 > 𝑈𝑖𝑏 and 0 otherwise, where 
𝑈𝑖𝑎 and 𝑈𝑖𝑏 designate the expected utility from being employed and inactive in the labour market 
respectively.  
Based on Greene (2012), a random utility framework for the binary choice model in labour supply 
decision is shown as follows: 
 
 𝑈𝑖𝑎 = 𝑊𝑖𝛽𝑎 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆𝑎 + ԑ𝑖𝑎 
𝑈𝑖𝑏 = 𝑊𝑖𝛽𝑏 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆𝑏 + ԑ𝑖𝑏 (2 - 1) 
where 𝑊𝑖 is wage offered to individual 𝑖; 𝑍𝑖 designates socio-economic characteristics of individual 𝑖. 
Column vectors of parameters, namely, 𝛽𝑎, 𝛽𝑏, 𝜆𝑎,and 𝜆𝑏, are included. The random terms ԑ𝑖𝑎 and 
ԑ𝑖𝑏 designate unobservable stochastic components. The term “unobservable” indicates that the error 
terms are known by the decision maker only; they might denote an intangible and general preference 
for each alternative.  
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In labour market participation setting, a person compares utility between being active and inactive in 
the labour market. Since all other socio-economic factors are identical, that person decides whether 
the offered market wage (i.e., the return from working per time unit) is higher than the shadow wage 
(i.e. the opportunity cost of taking part in the labour market or the value of leisure per time unit). In 
other words, when the market wage exceeds the reservation wage, utility of participating in the 
market is greater than not participating (𝑦𝑖 = 1 or 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0) and vice versa (𝑦𝑖 = 0 or 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0), where 
𝑦𝑖
∗ is a latent variable which represent difference between market wage and the reservation wage.      
The main theoretical and empirical focuses of labour supply at the extensive margin are not only 
wages and unearned incomes but also other socio-economic characteristics in the vector 𝑍𝑖. The next 
section explains different factors affecting decisions on labour market participation and discusses on 
related empirical studies.  
 Source of income, determinants, and labour force participation 
The first factor regarding labour supply at the extensive margin is a change in the market wage rate. 
FIGURE 2.1 shows how people in the labour force react to a change in the wage. Panel (a) assumes 
that a person participates in the labour market and earns the wage with slope −𝑊0; hence, he obtains 
the utility at 𝑈1. The utility at 𝑈1is clearly greater that the utility level if he decides to be a non-
participant (𝑈0). If the wage increase from 𝑊0 to 𝑊1, the level of utility he receives increases to be 
𝑈2. The combination of working and leisure hours may change (comparing between 𝐸0 and 𝐸1) due 
to income and substitution effects; however, with a greater level of utility this person stays in the 
labour market definitely. If the wage decreases until there is a tangent point with the utility curve 𝑈0, 
a person withdraws from the labour market because the offered wage rate is lower than their 
reservation wage.  
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FIGURE 2.1: The Effect of a Wage Change on Participation 
(a) The effect on a participant 
 
(b) The effect on a non-participant 
 
Source: Benjamin et al. (2002) 
For a non-participant as shown in Panel (b), assuming that a non-worker would earn the wage at 𝑊0 
if he worked. In this case he decides to be non-participant and obtains utility at 𝑈0.  When the wage 
increases from 𝑊0 to 𝑊1, a person does not make the decision to work in the market since the level 
of utility from working is still less than that from being a non-worker, i.e., an offered wage is less than 
the reservation wage. This person will participate in the labour market if and only if the wage rate is 
high enough to escalate the level of utility above 𝑈0. For example, at 𝑊2, a person can earn utility at 
𝑈1 if he decides to enter the market; in this case, he will decide to be a worker in order to yield a 
higher level of utility because an offered wage rate exceeds the reservation wage. On the other hand, 
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a decrease in the market wage rate makes a non-participant stays away from the labour market 
because the level of utility from working is lower than that from spending the total time endowment 
for leisure.  
Most of the empirical studies generally fine that females have a substantially larger labour supply 
response due to changes in wage rate than males (Killingsworth, 1983). Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) 
investigate labour supply in the United States by gender and marital status. By using the structural 
fixed effects probit model, they found that the elasticity of being employed for women is much larger 
than that for men. Benczur et al. (2014) study aggregated labour supply at the extensive margin of 
Hungarians by using the structural probit model. They concluded that wage had a positive effect on 
labour force participation of both genders. They also indicate that wage elasticity is larger for females 
in relative to males. 
With regard to non-labour income, the results of an increase in non-labour income are opposite to 
the effects of wage escalation. In fact, by assuming leisure as a normal good, a rise in unearned income 
never causes a non-participant to enter the market but it is possible that a participant exits the market.  
The intuition is that an increase in non-labour income provides a pure income effect or increase in the 
reservation wage. If leisure is considered as a normal good and a person is active in the market, a pure 
income effect causes a person to spend a larger amount of time on non-market activities; and with a 
sufficiently large amount of non-labour income (the reservation wage exceeds the market wage), a 
person will leave the market. For non-participants, the amount of time spent on non-labour activities 
does not decline because the person has already reached the maximum leisure point, i.e. non-
participants remain inactive in the market because their reservation wages have initially been above 
the market wage. In case of a decrease in non-labour income, the theoretical explanation is opposite 
to an increase in non-labour income, yielding the reverse results.  
In this chapter, a spouse’s income is assumed as another source of non-labour income. In that case, a 
spouse’s wage is assumed to have only the income effect on a person (Pencavel, 1986). In other words, 
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if income of a spouse is higher it results in a greater reservation wage, and a respondent is less likely 
to participate in the labour market. Some examples of previous works are provided as follows. 
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) report the results of Bowen and Finegan (1969) indicating that, 
based on cross-sectional data from the 1960 Census of Population, unearned income reduce the 
participation probability of females. Pencavel (1986) uses the linear probability model to reproduce 
the work of Bowen and Finegan (1969) for males; the result is consistent with the theory that 
unearned income reduces the participation probability. Benczur et al. (2014) find that non-labour 
income impacts the participation decision negatively; the results of both genders verified that females 
have much larger  income elasticities than do males. Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003) 
indicate that non-labour income have negative effects on labour force participation for all countries.  
In general, all of the determinants including wage, non-labour income, and other socio-economic 
variables, of an individual’s decision for participating in the labour market can be generally categorised 
as any variable influencing the reservation or the market wage. For a factor that affects the offered 
wage rate only, the economic prediction is clarified in detail as above. Theoretical prediction of these 
factors is that if they are positively influence the market wage, they are positively associated with 
labour force participation and vice versa.   
Ceteris paribus, a factor raising the individual’s reservation wage causes a reduction in the probability 
of labour market participation theoretically and vice versa. Besides non-labour income, such variables 
that cause change in the individual’s reservation wage could be either observable characteristics, e.g., 
the presence of very young children, and a number of elderly people in the households; or an 
unobservable characteristic such as the personal preference for domestic duties. For example, 
Karaoglan and Okten (2015) indicate that having children under 11 years old discourage labour force 
participation of married females in Turkey. It is worthwhile mentioning here that with regard to 
gender each characteristic could affect changes in the individual’s reservation wage differently.  
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Some variables could affect both reservation and market wages of individuals leading to an uncertain 
effect on their decision for labour force participation. An increase in an individual’s age is a distinct 
example. While it is possibly related to a higher market wage which makes a person more likely to 
participate in labour market activities, it also escalates the reservation wage, decreasing the 
probability of labour force participation because of a greater level of disutility relative to leisure. In 
turn, an individual will decide to retire from the labour force if the reservation wage surpasses the 
market wage.   
In practice, non-budget constraint variables have had inconsistent effects since different labour supply 
studies, even focusing on the same gender, apply various sets of these control variables. Labour supply 
determinants such as socio-economic characteristics affect labour decision differently across settings. 
First, different genders have different household responsibilities; this makes males and females 
respond to factors, including budget constraints and non-budget constraints, differently. Second, the 
effects of determinants may differ across countries because of contexts, e.g., cultures and degrees of 
economic development. Eberharter (2001) studies labour market participation of people having 
incomes above and under the poverty line in German; the results by genders and economic statuses 
are different suggesting that these two factors influence market participation of both genders 
differently.  
Studies across countries usually provide different results for some factors. Cameron et al. (2001) study 
female labour participation in five Asian countries, four of which are developing countries. They 
include many socio-economic factors; however, income factors are excluded from the model. They 
find some differences across countries e.g. location, education, and children characteristics. Prieto-
Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003) investigate labour participation of married women in 11 
European countries. Some factors show different effects such as age, husband’s education, husband’s 
work status, and having young children. Al-Qudsi (1998) focuses on fertility in labour participation in 
developing Arab countries. The study includes many demographic factors but includes only one 
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variable indicating total household income; due to lack of data. The probit results across countries 
show that most of factors affect labour participation similarly because culture factors and degrees of 
economic development are very comparable.  
This chapter hence tries to provide a comprehensive perspective towards labour supply at the 
extensive margin by including various factors such as income variables, socio-economic characteristics 
(individual, spouse, and household ones), as well as controlled variables (e.g., year and location) in 
order to see the results of specific factors. Chen et al. (2014) indicate that different characteristics 
affect labour force participation of married females living in urban and rural areas differently.  
 Informal sector and labour market participation  
Regarding the informal sector, most of existing empirical attempts to understand or explain the 
characteristics of the informal sector. For instance, Maloney (2004) gathers data from developing 
countries in Latin America to indicates that the informal sector is an unregulated microentrepreneurial 
sector rather than a disadvantaged residual of segmented labour markets. Rothenberg et al. (2016) 
describes the characteristics of Indonesia’s informal sector; they indicate the reasons why the informal 
sector is so persistent.  
Existing literature associated with labour force participation in the informal sector generally covers 
determinants of formal and informal market participation. For example, Telles (1992) investigates the 
effects of different characteristics on labour market participation between formal and informal sectors 
in Brazil. Pradhan and van Soest (1995) use a 1989 dataset from urban areas in Bolivia to study formal 
and informal sector employment. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008) use Turkish data from 1998 to 
study occupational choices including formal and informal labour market participation of married 
women. Dogrul (2012) investigates determinants of formal and informal labour market participation 
in urban areas of Turkey using data from 2006.  
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These studies provide interesting results indicating how different characteristics affect people’s 
decisions on formal-informal labour market participation; however, they do not include any factors 
capturing the correlation between formal and informal sectors. This is because many existing studies 
assumes the informal sector as an inferior sector in a segmented market framework; however, recent 
empirical evidence has shown that labour markets in formal and informal sectors are linked (Albrecht 
et al., 2009). 
Some other studies account for correlation between two sectors by focusing on formal labour market 
(off-farm) participation of households in the informal sector (i.e., their datasets contain farming 
households only). Kimhi (2004) studies off-farm labour participation of Israel farming families. 
Although the main focus is the effect of family composition on labour supply at the extensive margin, 
it suggests that on-farm and off-farm labour participation are linked. Corsi and Salvioni (2012) 
investigate the linkage between off-farm and on-farm labour participation of farm households in Italy. 
The results show that labour allocation choices of household members in a farm family are affected 
by on-farm and off-farm activities. The results also show a correlation of labour participation among 
member because most farms are operated as family businesses. However, these studies investigate 
labour supply behaviour in developed countries whilst studies associated with developing countries 
are far unattended.   
This chapter aim to fill the literature gap by covering households in both formal and informal markets. 
It extends previous works by including a factor to captures linkage between on-farm and off-farm 
sector. In fact, an agricultural sector is one of the main informal industries, especially in Thailand. In 
addition, farmers in the informal sector usually work as a family (i.e., each member is responsible to 
some assigned tasks depending on skills and cultural factors). Therefore, some members in a farming 
family may be inactive in the formal labour market because there are assigned to do domestic duties 
in the household; moreover, they receive a portion of farming income which is considered as unearned 
income.  
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 Effects of policies on labour market participation 
Another main focus in the labour supply literature is public policy. Theoretically, as mentioned in 
Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the labour supply is a function of non-labour income, the marginal wage rate 
(i.e., the amount of earned income from an extra hour worked), and certain characteristics. Many 
policies affect labour supply decisions through the wage or reservation wages of people. For instance, 
if a government increases non-working benefits for non-workers, this will increase reservation wages. 
In other words, unearned income is greater due to the policy and so leads to a reduction in the 
probability of labour market participation.  
Most studies focus their attention on the effects of income tax-benefit policies on the labour supply. 
Income tax-benefit normally introduce a difference between average and marginal after-tax wage 
(Berndt, 1991). In fact, people’s work effort and earnings can be significantly distorted and stimulated 
by those policies (Meghir and Phillips, 2010). Some examples of early studies on the impacts of tax-
benefits on labour supply are Rosen (1976); Burtless and Hausman (1978); and Hausman (1980). Some 
other studies investigate impacts of welfare programs due to the fact that some transfers, e.g. in-work 
transfer and child benefits, could influence unearned income. Hoynes (1993) study whether welfare 
transfer programs have an impact on the labour supply of two-parent families in U.S. and indicated 
that the labour supply is highly responsive to changes in these programs. Bingley and Walker (1997) 
show that an increase in in-work transfer scheme affects the probability of working in a part-time job 
largely, and impacts the probability of working full-time moderately. Moreover, without the stigma 
associated with the in-work program, the probability of lone mother labour market participation 
increases due to the transfer scheme.  
Among policies focused in previous literature, the number of studies on the effect of minimum wage 
policies on the labour force participation is limited.  Schaafsma and Walsh (1983) explored the effect 
of the minimum wage policy on the labour supply in Canada. They applied pooled time-series 
provincial data and found a significant negative impact of the minimum wage on the labour supply for 
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males but an non-significant positive result for female labour supply. Müller and Steiner (2010) 
investigated the impacts of a legal minimum wage policy on labour market and income in Germany by 
using a microsimulation technique; they suggested that the policy was ineffective in increasing 
household income and reducing the inequality gap. In this study, a minimum wage and salary policies 
are taken in to account in order to investigate the effects of them on labour force participation in Thai 
contexts.  
 Debt constraints and labour market participation 
One of the main focuses on this chapter is the effect of debt constraints (i.e., ceteris paribus, people 
with debts have less possibility to access to funds) on the labour market participation. This is because 
the literature finds decisions on labour force participation is generally more responsive to wage and 
income factors than do hours-of-work decisions for workers (Heckman, 1993). In recent years, the 
degree of indebtedness, which is identified by different factors across studies such as an amount of 
debt outstanding and a debt-service ratio, has become a factor of interest determining labour supply. 
The effect of debt constraints on labour force participation is usually based on a life-cycle model. The 
complete life-cycle model, which consists of endogenous consumption goods and leisure, predicts that 
debt constraints not only reduce current consumption but increase current labour supply as well 
(O'Brien and Hawley, 1986). The intuition of this is that an increase in labour supply eases such 
constraints; on top of that, in presence of debt constraints, working can ameliorate the income and 
expenditure shocks (Belkar et al., 2007).   
Several existing empirical studies investigate the relationship between labour supply and debt using 
cross-sectional and panel data from a range of developed countries. Most of the studies conclude that 
debt and its servicing obligations positively impact labour supply with statistical significance.  
O'Brien and Hawley (1986) as well as Shack-Marquez and Wascher (1987) investigate the borrowing 
constraints as a determinant of married women’s labour force participation in the US. Both studies 
applied the binary probit model with very similar model specifications; however, with different 
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predicted credit constraint variables the estimation results are contrasting. Whilst O'Brien and Hawley 
(1986) finds a positive and significant impact on labour force participation of married women, Shack-
Marquez and Wascher (1987) reports a negative and significant impact of debt constraints on labour 
market participation. 
Bottazzi (2004) applies a binary fixed effect logit model to estimate a static labour force participation 
model with unobservable heterogeneity. The result indicates a positive effect of mortgage 
commitments, calculated by the division of monthly mortgage repayment by household income 
excluding female’s labour income, on female labour market participation in the UK. Fortin (1995), 
which introduces a credit constraint based on earnings, and Aldershof et al. (1999), who incorporate 
a more general borrowing constraint, emphasise similar results about the significance of debts on the 
labour supply. Both studies showed the similar results that debt positively influences the labour supply 
decision of female while the presence of young children leads to the opposite result. 
Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) adopt non-simultaneous and simultaneous specifications in estimating 
the relation between female labour force participation and financial obligations in Italy. They indicates 
that the mortgage debt has a positive and significant effect on the labour force participation decision.   
Previous studies mentioned above focus on female labour supply except Belkar et al. (2007) which 
investigate the effects of different indebtedness variables on male and female labour supply at the 
extensive margin in Australia. They cover mortgage debts as well as other debts. Both cross-sectional 
and panel estimation results indicate similar results that indebtedness statistically increases or 
decreases an individual’s probability of labour market participation.  
Many empirical studies have been done for developed countries, to my knowledge, this chapter is the 
first study covering financial obligations in a developing country setting. This chapter investigates both 
male and female labour supply at the extensive margin. On top of that, whilst the existing empirical 
research usually focuses on overall household debts or housing debts, this essay also includes two 
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additional types of debt, namely, consumption and student loan debts.  These factors had not been 
included into any previous work. These two additional factors are the main financial obligations 
expected to have effects on labour market participation, since they have been increasing overtime 
and have been a major concern to in many economies in recent years. 
 Selection bias in labour supply  
Labour supply estimation requires an offered wage of each individual as an explanatory variable; 
however, a major issue is that actual (ex-post) wages for non-working individuals in the sample are 
unobserved, i.e., they are explicitly equivalent to zero (Hausman, 1978; Heckman, 1979; Heckman and 
Sedlacek, 1985; Lee, 1982). In particular, the observed wages are based on the labour force 
participation decision which is unlikely to be random. If those non-workers are employed, they will be 
paid and wages will be reported. In fact, the reason that a part of the wage distribution is unobserved 
is because the reservation wage is greater than the offered wage. Hence, any study on determinants 
of labour market participation requires predicted (ex-ante) wages for unemployed individuals. 
Ignoring the selection bias (i.e., applying the data without wages for non-workers) will lead to the 
biased results (Heckman, 1979). This is because a researcher either drops those observations or sets 
the wages for them equal to zero.   
Heckman (1979) offers a procedure, known as the Heckman selection model, to solve the problem of 
selection bias; hence it enables labour supply estimation, using predicted wages from the model, to 
be estimated. The approach obtains an average wage measure estimated from the entire wage 
distribution in the economy by subjecting to a selective adjustment, i.e., people with the observed 
certain characteristics are expected to have a same reservation wage and predicted to have the exact 
level of a potential wage regardless of the employment situation; the model assumes that people who 
are not working is because their potential wages are lower than those of working people who have 
the similar characteristics (Myck and Reed, 2006).  
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The Heckman selection model is usually applied in continuous hours and discrete hours labour supply 
studies. However, a limited number of empirical studies adopts this model in labour participation 
studies since many of them adopt reduced form probit models e.g. Al-Qudsi (1998) and Cameron et 
al. (2001). Some studies, for instance, Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003) predict wage 
through a wage equation without accounting for employment status; this could lead to over-predicted 
wage rates for unemployed people.  
Sahn and Alderman (1988) estimate predicted wages using Heckman two-step approach in order to 
study the determinants of labour participation. Benczur et al. (2014) apply a similar method, the two-
staged Heckman model, in their study of labour force participation. They use the model to predict 
total gains from work, which incorporate earned income, unearned income, and transfers, rather than 
earned wages. This chapter follows Sahn and Alderman (1988) and Benczur et al. (2014) by estimating  
the two-stage Heckman model to predict daily wage for all individuals in the sample; this can prevent 
the selection bias due to unobservability of wages for unemployed people.  
2.3 Empirical data 
This section provides a description of the HSES dataset used in this research. The HSES is cross-
sectional dataset providing household income, expenses, and other economic information e.g. 
household debts. It also contains information of individual and household characteristics.  The data 
for this research is acquired for four years (2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015) of the HSES carried out by the 
National Statistical Office (NSO); the data is not on a yearly basis because the HSES on revenue aspects 
used in the study is conducted every two years. 
According to the NSO of Thailand, the labour force is a group of people in a particular area, who are 
over 15 years old and not categorised in these following work statuses, namely, housewife or 
househusband, student, too young or too old, physical and mental disabilities or chronic illness, not 
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working by preferences, working for others without paying (not a member of a household), voluntary 
work (without payment) for any organisation, and not working due to other reasons.  
However, in this study the estimation sample size slightly differs from NSO’s definition. In fact, labour 
force participation in this study covers two groups of people. First, people who are active in the labour 
market as employees include government employees, state enterprise employees, and private 
employees. Second, people who can participate in the labour without physical or mental restriction 
but they decide to be non-participants includes housewives and kinds, job-seekers, and voluntary non-
participants. The reasons why the definition in this study is different from NSO’s definition are 
described in Section 2.3.2. 
 Data cleaning process 
From the four years of HSES datasets, the number of initial observations and households by year are 
shown in the table below. 
TABLE 2.1: A number of initial observations and households between 2009 and 2015 
Year Observations Households 
2009 139,590 43,844 
2011 128,071 42,083 
2013 126,261 42,738 
2015 125,346 43,400 
Total 519,268 172,065 
From TABLE 2.1, the number of observations and households are similar each year. The initial number 
of observations (everyone that is included in surveys) is 519,268 or 172,065 households. However, not 
every observation is included in the estimation. The comprehensive process of observation 
elimination is shown below. 
The HSES contains several records. During the merging of records, the total number of observations 
increased due to the fact that each respondent could report up to three jobs and two businesses in 
the last 12 months. After merging the individual information with working or business records, the 
sample size expands to be 524,244 observations without any change at the household level.  
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When any respondent reports more than one job, one business, or both job and business, the HSES 
does not record which labour activities (job and business) are the current ones. In other words, it is 
not possible to identify if those respondents allocate time for multiple labour activities or they quit a 
previous labour activity to start a new one. To prevent errors caused by multiple labour market 
activities (jobs and businesses), households containing at least one person reporting multiple labour 
activities are eliminated from the study. There are 13,671 observations or 1,887 households are 
dropped due to the multiple-job issue; and another 6,764 observations or 2,558 households are 
excluded from the sample because of reporting multiple businesses. Lastly, 9,972 observations or 
2,947 households are deleted because any of household members reports as both a worker and a 
businessman.  
In the HSES, there are two variables indicating individuals’ work status (ranging from 1 to 14: 1 to 7 
are active statuses and 8 to 14 define inactivity in the labour market). The first variable identifies a 
primary work status (i.e., a work status on which an individual spent most of the time in the last 12 
month); the second variable designates a secondary work status. Basically, if an individual reports a 
primary work status as inactive, a secondary work status will not be presented. Except observations 
with the exact same work status, all households containing any individual reporting non-identical work 
statuses on these two variables are dropped from the sample because it is impossible to identify the 
current work status; i.e., keeping these observations leads to the measurement error problem. 
Additionally, those households having any observation that reports as “not working for a wage” in a 
work status variable but appears in Record 13 (information about working people) are dropped from 
the dataset for estimation. As a result, 87,154 observations or 23,502 households are excluded from 
the sample.  
Some observations (316 observations) are dropped because the information for the length of working 
or doing business (months) in the last 12 months is not enough (less than one month and no 
information provided). The length of being active in the labour market is required in calculating a wage 
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per day; therefore, keeping these observations could cause incorrect calculated daily wage (also 
known as the measurement error). In addition, people who receive non-financial income are excluded 
from the study (132 observations) since it is very difficult to approximate the value of goods and 
services they are given in the financial term. 
The study also excludes 564 respondents working as servants or household workers because they are 
not actual members of the households. In fact, they have migrated from another family to work for 
and live in the considered household. Their income is hence an expense of the household. Some 
families with a polygamous characteristic of the household’s head are excluded from this research 
because they are uncommon; 267 observations or 53 households are dropped at this stage leading to 
the total amount of remaining observations at 405,395 (i.e., 140,993 households). The remaining 
sample size includes all members in the household without any issue explained above. These 
observations are applied in generating important variables such as log of real average daily wage, real 
monthly spouse earnings, real household unearned income, and the number of children for specific 
age ranges.  
 The sample construction process for estimation 
This sub-section provides explanation on how the sample size for the estimation process is obtained.  
TABLE 2.2 shown below shows the number of observations by work status. 
To define the labour force, this research initially applies a condition used by NSO that the labour force 
includes people who are older than 15 years old. Those respondents under 15 years old are excluded 
from the estimation; however, there is no upper age boundary in this chapter7. The numbers of 
observations are shown in the third column of TABLE 2.2.  
 
                                                            
7 The maximum age in the estimation sample is 96 years. The number of respondents aged over 60 years is 
11,185 or 8.17 percent of the estimation sample.   
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TABLE 2.2: The number of observations by work status 
 All observations Over 15 years old 
Work status Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Employers 8,294 2.05 8,294 2.52 
Own-account workers 72,449 17.87 72,436 21.99 
Contributing family workers 41,903 10.34 41,852 12.71 
Government employees 24,933 6.15 24,932 7.57 
State enterprise employees 2,081 0.51 2,081 0.63 
Private company employees 76,836 18.95 76,750 23.3 
Producer's cooperative 21 0.01 21 0.01 
Housewives & kinds 28,542 7.04 28,531 8.66 
Students 23,467 5.79 22,703 6.89 
Too young/old persons 34,420 8.49 34,340 10.43 
Ill/disabled persons 6,826 1.68 6,819 2.07 
Looking for a job 1,909 0.47 1,908 0.58 
Voluntarily unemployed 2,648 0.65 2,644 0.80 
Others 6,085 1.50 6,084 1.85 
N/A 74,981 18.50 - - 
Total 405,395 100 329,395 100 
From TABLE 2.2, as the main focus of this chapter is the decision to participate in the formal labour 
market, i.e., the decision to work as an employee; the estimation sample does not include those 
people who report being employers (8,294 observations) and own-account workers (72,436 
observations). Based on NSO’s definitions, employers are those who have at least one employee in 
their business whilst own-account workers (i.e., self-employed people such as farmers and 
freelancers) are those who work on their own without any employees. Individuals who work for their 
family businesses without pay (i.e. contributing family workers) are a special case because they have 
restriction in providing labour supply in the market; consequently, 41,852 observations are removed 
from the estimation sample. People who work as members of producers’ cooperatives (such as group 
farming) are also eliminated from the estimation sample since they are an exceptional case with a 
very small number of observations. The practical complexity is the other reason why these types of 
working status are excluded from the analysis. In fact, these people do not have enough information 
to calculate earned wage rates; in addition, it is very complicated to predict their wage rates.  
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Students (i.e. people who are full-time students) are restricted in making a decision for labour force 
participation due to law and culture. In consequence, observations reporting a work status as a 
student (22,703 observations) are not included in the estimation. Those who report that they are not 
active in the market because they are either too young or too old (34,340 observations) are also 
dropped from the estimation. The NSO’s definitions for too young and too old people are not clearly 
specified. NSO combines too young and too old respondents into one category. In general, 
respondents are categorised into this group due to their physical conditions. Additionally, NSO 
includes those who are retired due to organisations’ regulations into this category. In addition, people 
who are not working due to physical and psychological problems (i.e., ill or disabled people) are also 
not included in the labour force (6,819 observations).  
All observations indicating a work status as “others” (6,084 observations) are also excluded from the 
estimation since people who retired from working report this work status. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to identify whether the observations in this category make a choice independently to be inactive in 
the labour market. Before estimating the Heckman selection model, 7 observations are dropped due 
to the fact that those households have any member reporting as being employed but no information 
about daily wage available.  
The remaining observations (136,839), which are used in the estimation process, include several 
groups of people by work status. The first group is those individuals who work for government 
organisations (i.e., government employees such as public servants, judges, polices, and soldiers), 
public enterprises (i.e., state enterprise employees; state enterprises such as The Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand, Provincial Waterworks Authority, and Thailand Post Company), and 
private sectors (i.e., private company employees). The second group (housewives and kinds) includes 
people who decide to be housewives, househusbands, and kinds. The penultimate group consists of 
individuals searching for a job (they prefer to participate in the labour market they cannot do so due 
to some conditions). Lastly, the sample includes voluntary unemployed people i.e., individuals who 
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decide not to participate in the market; however, they may enter the labour market when conditions 
are satisfied.  
 Descriptive statistics  
This research accounts for both genders, but investigates their labour market participation decision 
separately. Each factor is presumed to affect the participation decision differently because each 
gender has different prior responsibilities in the household.  
TABLE 2.3: Work statuses by gender (based on the estimation sample size)   
Work status male (%) female (%) Total (%) 
government employees 12,027 20.23 12,904 16.67 24,931 18.22 
state enterprise employees 1,434 2.41 645 0.83 2,079 1.52 
private company employees 41,665 70.10 35,082 45.32 76,747 56.09 
housewives & kinds 1,290 2.17 27,241 35.20 28,531 20.85 
looking for a job 1,139 1.92 769 0.99 1,908 1.39 
voluntarily unemployed 1,882 3.17 761 0.98 2,643 1.9. 
Total 59,437 100.00 77,402 100.00 136,839 100.00 
 
Based on the estimation sample size, it is apparent that the largest group for both genders is people 
who are working in the private sector, 70.10 and 45.32 percent among males and females respectively. 
The second largest group for male is people working in the government sector which shares 20.23 
percent of males; the second large group for females is those doing housework without pay (35.20 
percent of total females). This differentiates general responsibilities between genders; in fact only 
2.17 percent of males stay home and do housework without pay. The percentage of males searching 
for a job is almost twice as large as that of females; and the percentage of males who are voluntarily 
unemployed are about three times larger than that of females.  
TABLE 2.4 shown below shows brief descriptive statistics of the variables in the study. The first variable 
is the employment status of respondents; it indicates whether each individual is employed. In 
particular, its value equals to one when an individual is employed and zero otherwise. It also implies 
that 92.4 and 62.6 percent of males and females are employed, respectively.  
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TABLE 2.4:  Descriptive statistics for variables by gender 
Variables Male Female 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
Employed labour force 59,437 0.924 0.26 77,402 0.626 0.48 
Real daily wage 54,926 563.96 703.78 48,444 533.42 594.71 
real yearly unearned income (‘000) 59,437 26.92 145.69 77,402 46.20 356.51 
Spouse’s income (‘000) 59,437 4.52 10.12 77,402 6.01 13.69 
Age 59,437 38.83 12.55 77,402 41.71 13.91 
Age group—under 25  59,437 0.164 0.370 77,402 0.132 0.339 
Age group—26-40  59,437 0.404 0.491 77,402 0.366 0.482 
Age group—41-59 59,437 0.385 0.487 77,402 0.393 0.488 
Age group—above 60 59,437 0.047 0.211 77,402 0.109 0.311 
Education level 1—pre-primary 59,437 0.149 0.357 77,402 0.238 0.426 
Education level 2—primary  59,437 0.192 0.393 77,402 0.150 0.357 
Education level 3—middle  59,437 0.176 0.381 77,402 0.129 0.335 
Education level 4—high  59,437 0.185 0.388 77,402 0.142 0.349 
Education level 5—post secondary 59,437 0.073 0.260 77,402 0.052 0.222 
Education level 6—undergraduate  59,437 0.160 0.367 77,402 0.211 0.408 
Education level 7—postgraduate 59,437 0.032 0.175 77,402 0.030 0.170 
Education level 8—others  59,437 0.034 0.181 77,402 0.050 0.217 
Marital status—single  59,437 0.288 0.453 77,402 0.198 0.398 
Marital status—married 59,437 0.647 0.478 77,402 0.660 0.474 
Marital status—windowed 59,437 0.016 0.126 77,402 0.076 0.265 
Marital status—divorced 59,437 0.021 0.142 77,402 0.031 0.174 
Marital status—separated 59,437 0.028 0.165 77,402 0.035 0.184 
Marital status—married (unconfirmed) 59,437 0.0001 0.011 77,402 0.0001 0.011 
Disability 59,437 0.010 0.10 77,402 0.009 0.096 
Spouse’s age 59,437 23.39 21.53 77,402 25.95 25.00 
Spouse’s age group—no spouse 59,437 0.415 0.493 77,402 0.434 0.496 
Spouse’s age group—under 25  59,437 0.062 0.241 77,402 0.031 0.174 
Spouse’s age group—26-40  59,437 0.249 0.433 77,402 0.189 0.392 
Spouse’s age group—41-59 59,437 0.251 0.433 77,402 0.249 0.433 
Spouse’s age group—above 60 59,437 0.023 0.150 77,402 0.096 0.294 
Spouse’s disability 59,437 0.005 0.71 77,402 0.011 0.10 
Lack of self-care ability of spouse 59,437 0.002 0.05 77,402 0.004 0.06 
Non-working spouse 59,437 0.16 0.36 77,402 0.074 0.26 
Children (< 3 years old) 59,437 0.075 0.28 77,402 0.087 0.30 
Children age 3-5 59,437 0.078 0.28 77,402 0.081 0.29 
Children age 6-9 59,437 0.105 0.34 77,402 0.106 0.34 
Children age 10-14 59,437 0.142 0.40 77,402 0.141 0.40 
Children age over 15  59,437 0.125 0.38 77,402 0.137 0.40 
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TABLE 2.4:  Descriptive statistics for variables by gender (Continue) 
Variables Male Female 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
Household size 59,437 3.52 1.77 77,402 3.55 1.75 
Dummy variable of having a farm 59,437 0.085 0.279 77,402 0.117 0.32 
Dependent members (< 3 years old) 59,437 0.012 0.12 77,402 0.020 0.15 
Dependent members age from 3-5 59,437 0.016 0.13 77,402 0.021 0.15 
Dependent members age from 6-9 59,437 0.022 0.16 77,402 0.028 0.18 
Dependent members age from 10-14 59,437 0.027 0.18 77,402 0.037 0.21 
Dependent members age from 15-60 59,437 0.081 0.35 77,402 0.112 0.42 
Members age from 60 years old 59,437 0.364 0.65 77,402 0.495 0.74 
Disabled members 59,437 0.059 0.31 77,402 0.066 0.33 
Real housing debt (‘000) 59,437 86.164 388.713 77,402 83.568 380.962 
Real educational debt (‘000) 59,437 4.271 49.773 77,402 4.434 50.137 
Real consumption debt (‘000) 59,437 92.380 287.546 77,402 86.410 281.537 
Non-municipal area 59,437 0.312 0.46 77,402 0.318 0.47 
Year 2009 59,437 0.258 0.438 77,402 0.261 0.439 
Year 2011 59,437 0.258 0.437 77,402 0.255 0.436 
Year 2013 59,437 0.242 0.429 77,402 0.242 0.428 
Year 2015 59,437 0.241 0.428 77,402 0.242 0.429 
 
The daily real wage is only available for people who are working; this is the reason why the number of 
observations is fewer than other variables. The average values for males and females are 563.96 and 
533.42 baht respectively. Previous research applied hourly wages such as those by Kimmel and 
Kniesner (1998), Nawata and Ii (2004), and Benczur et al. (2014); but in the context of Thailand, the 
daily wage is more suitable since the minimum wage is legally defined based on a daily basis. For 
example, in 2012 the Thai government announced the minimum wage at 300 baht national wide.   
This research designates two variables as unearned incomes, which are defined as other incomes 
besides respondents’ wage income; examples of unearned incomes are interests, dividends, and rents. 
In TABLE 2.4, the average values of real household unearned income (contains non-negative numbers) 
for males and females are 26.92 and 46.20 thousand baht respectively. In regards of spouse’s income, 
which also allows for negative values due to loss from doing business, the average values in thousand 
baht are 4.52 for males and 6.01 for females.   
A range of individual characteristics are included in this study.  The average age for males and females 
are 38.83 and 41.71 years respectively. Age-group variable are defined to take values between 1 and 
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4 (1: age from 15 to 25; 2: age from 26 to 40; 3: age from 40 to 59; and 4: age over 59); this variable 
allows for lifecycle indicators for labour force participation (as discussed in Section 2.4.3). TABLE 2.4 
exhibits the modified variables of age-group variable indicating the percentage of each group (from 1 
to 4); the age groups for males are equivalent to 16.4, 40.4, 38.5, and 4.7 percent respectively whilst 
the age groups for females are 13.2, 36.6, 39.3, and 10.9 percent respectively.  
This research divided levels of educational attainment into eight different categories (1: less than 
primary school; 2: primary school; 2: middle school; 4: high school; 5: high vocational; 6: 
undergraduate; 7: postgraduate; 8: other education types) which are more detailed than previous 
studies such as Benczur et al. (2014), Kabátek et al. (2014), and Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-
Gutiérrez (2003). Overall, males receive more education than females do in Thailand. TABLE 2.4 shows 
that the percentages of pre-primary school and other education for females are higher than those for 
males. Males have a better chance than females of receiving education from primary to post-
secondary (vocational) school. However, in regards to people holding a Bachelor’s degree, the 
percentage of females is higher than that of males. The proportions of males and females who are 
holding postgraduate degree are similar (3.2 and 3.0 percent respectively).  
With regards to marital status, this study covers six different groups of individuals including never 
married, married, widowed, divorced, separated, and married with unknown status. A larger number 
of marital statuses is expected to offer more in-depth analysis on the labour force participation than 
previous research e.g. Kabátek et al. (2014) which applies a dummy variable which indicates single or 
married status. From TABLE 2.4, most of respondents are categorised either single (28.8 percent for 
males and 19.8 percent for females) or married (64.7 percent for males and 66.03 percent for 
females). Nonetheless, this research also accounts for other marital statuses (3: widowed (1.6 and 7.6 
percent for males and females respectively); 4: divorced (2.1 and 3.1 percent for males and females 
respectively); 5: separated (2.8 percent for males and 3.5 percent for females); and 6: married but 
unknown status (about 0.01 percent for both genders)). The last marital status category includes 
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married as reported by a person other than the respondent himself or herself (i.e. the proxy 
respondent). In this case, the proxy respondent is certain that the subject got married but uncertain 
about his or her current marital status.  
A dummy variable indicating disability of respondents is equivalent to one when a respondent is 
disabled and zero otherwise. The average values are 0.01 and 0.009 for males and females 
respectively; they imply that disabled males are about 1 percent and disabled females are 0.9 percent.  
Some variables in TABLE 2.4 are included in order to capture characteristics for those couples living 
together. The average wife’s age is 23.39 while the mean of husband’s age is 25.95. A variable for 
spouse’s ages has 5 groups; the first category (a value equals zero) indicates whether a respondent 
having no spouse while the remaining groups (values from 1 to 4) reflect different age groups as 
different stages in the lifecycle. 41.5 percent of males and 43.4 percent of females do not live with a 
spouse. Spouse’ age between 41 and 59 shares about 25 percent of males and female observations 
while 24.9 and 18.9 percent of spouses for males and females respectively are between 26 and 40 
years old. The remaining groups are under 25 and over 60 years old spouses which share 6.2 and 2.3 
percent for males and 3.1 and 9.6 percent for females, respectively.  
Disabled wives and husbands share about 0.5 and 1.1 percent of the sample by gender, respectively; 
0.2 percent of wives and 0.4 percent of husbands lack self-caring ability; and 16 percent of wives and 
7.4 percent of husbands are unemployed.     
The numbers of children, which include only the respondents’ sons or daughters, at different age 
ranges (under 3 years old; 3 to 5; 6 to 9; 10 to 14; and over 15 years old) are included in this research; 
the average numbers of children for each group are 0.075, 0.078, 0.105, 0.142, and 0.125 for males 
and 0.087, 0.081, 0.106, 0.141, and 0.137 for females, respectively.      
In this study, household demographic characteristics are also taken into account as suggested by Myck 
and Reed (2006) as well as other empirical studies. The average household sizes for male and female 
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observations are 3.52 and 3.55 persons per household, respectively. The dummy variable for having a 
farm business equals to one when a household has a farm business and zero otherwise. About 8.5 
percent of males and 11.7 percent of females report that their families have at least one farm business.  
The number of dependent members are those who need special care due to their age or they do not 
have income. These variables capturing the number of dependent members by age are different from 
variables indicating the number of dependent children by age discussed earlier. Whilst the former 
captures other dependent members, who are not the respondents’ sons or daughters, in the 
household, the latter captures exclusively respondents’ sons or daughters. Hence, there is no overlap 
between the number of dependent children and the number of dependent members. They are 
categorised into five groups by age ranges (under 3 years old; 3 to 5; 6 to 9; 10 to 14; and 15 to 59 
years old); the average numbers are 0.012, 0.016, 0.022, 0.027, 0.081 persons for males and 0.020, 
0.021, 0.028, 0.037, 0.112 persons for females, respectively. The average numbers of retired-aged 
members are 0.364 persons for male respondents and 0.495 persons for female respondents. The 
average numbers of disabled members in a household are 0.059 and 0.066 persons for males and 
females respectively.  
Different financial obligations including housing debt, education debt, and household consumption 
debts are examined. Previous research such as those by Fortin (1995), Bottazzi (2004), and Butrica and 
Karamcheva (2014) focus on housing debts only; this research examiners not only housing debt but 
also education and household consumption debts in which their average real values are 86.16, 4.27, 
and 92.38 thousand baht for males and 83.57, 4.43, 86.41 thousand baht for females, respectively.  
Last but not least, this study includes three control variables, namely, non-municipal area, provinces, 
and year. The first two variables are presented in TABLE 2.4; but the information of a variable for 
provinces is fully provided in Appendix 2.II. The dummy variable capturing whether a respondent lives 
in a city (a municipal area), which takes the value 0, or in a rural area, (a non-municipal area), which 
takes the value 1. NSO defines a municipal area (i.e., a city) based on the governance areas called 
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municipalities (including city municipalities, town municipalities, and sub-district municipalities). They 
are established and categorised by the municipal act (volume 12) 20008. The average values of 
individuals living in rural areas are 31.2 and 31.8 percent for males and females respectively. There 
are about 25.8, 25.8, 24.2, and 24.1 percent of males and 26.1, 25.5, 24.2, and 24.2 percent of female 
respondents’ information which were collected in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 respectively. Since the 
income-restructuring policies were effective during year 2012, a year variable is included to capture 
the impact of these policies on the working probability of the Thai labour force. 
2.4 Methodology 
This research applies the structural probit model, similar to what used by Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) 
and Benczur et al. (2014). The model is based on the utility maximisation model and also provides 
some econometric advantages. Firstly, it allows for individual heterogeneity. Secondly, it is adjustable 
for the sample selection bias; i.e., incorporating the Heckman selection model into the model controls 
the problem. Thirdly, the structural probit allows the endogeneity of wage since the Heckman 
selection model can handle correlation between error terms of wage and selection equations. Lastly, 
using the predicted log of wage can prevent the measurement error of wage caused by incorrect or 
unreported information.    
 Structural equation for labour participation estimation 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, an individual decides to participate in the labour market if and only if 
the level of utility obtained from participation is greater than that from being inactive.  In other words, 
an individual chooses to be active in the market when the offered wage exceeds the shadow wage 
(i.e. the opportunity cost of taking part in the labour market). To estimate labour force participation 
behaviour, adopting either a binary logit or probit model is preferred over ordinary least squares (OLS) 
                                                            
8 A city municipality has a minimum population of 50,000 and has revenue to achieve all related responsibilities. 
A town municipality has a minimum population of 10,000 and has revenue to achieve all related responsibilities. 
A sub-district municipality is founded by a notification of the Ministry of Interior.   
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estimation because the dependent variable definitely takes the value within the zero-to-one range. 
The structural probit model is adopted because it can deal with sample selection and wage 
measurement errors as well as allowing for nonlinearity, individual heterogeneity, and policy 
simulation in the estimation process.   
The objective is to estimate a structural probit model when a person is employed given a wage and 
socio-economic characteristics. This model is based on the RUM, explained in Section 2.2.1, where an 
individual compares levels of utility between being active and inactive in the labour market and select 
an alternative offering a higher level of utility. In other words, when the offered wage exceeds the 
reservation wage, an individual participates in the labour market; when an offered wage is less than 
the reservation wage, that individual stays away from the market. The structural probit model is given 
by the following equation: 
 
Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖] = Ф(𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝜆) (2 - 2) 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the outcome variable indicating whether an individual is employed or not; 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̂?𝑖 
designates predicted value of the individual wage in the logarithmic form obtained from the Heckman 
selection mode; 𝑍𝑖 is the vector of explanatory variables determining labour force participation in the 
structural probit model and Ф designates the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution.  
The wage variable in equation (2 - 2) is the predicted term because 𝑊𝑖 is unobservable for non-working 
respondents. Some previous studies apply linear prediction models to obtain predicted wages9. 
However, the missing wages are not randomly defined; respondents’ labour force participation and 
wages are possibly correlated (Benczur et al., 2014). Hence, the Heckman selection model is applied 
                                                            
9 Predicted wages obtained from the Heckman model and a linear prediction model are quite consistent. The 
results are available upon request.   
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to predict wages in this context. In Heckman (1979), the wage equation takes the expression as 
follows: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑖
∗ = 𝑄𝑖𝛹 + 𝜖1𝑖 (2 - 3) 
where 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑖
∗ represents wage in the logarithmic form for all people (workers and non-workers) which 
depends on certain observed characteristics, 𝑄𝑖, and some unobservable characteristics, 𝜖1𝑖; 𝛹 is a 
column vector of coefficients. The actual wage, 𝑊𝑖, is observed only if a latent variable 𝑠𝑖
∗ > 0, which 
is given by the following: 
 
𝑠𝑖
∗ = 𝑅𝑖𝛼 + 𝜖2𝑖 (2 - 4) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is a vector of dependent variables which combines those factors determining wage (i.e., 𝑄𝑖) 
and those influencing labour force participation (i.e., 𝑍𝑖); 𝛼 is a column vector of parameters; 𝜖2𝑖 is an 
error term. Equation (2 - 4) is a selection equation of working in the labour market. It is important that 
the vector 𝑅𝑖 must contain all variables in 𝑄𝑖. In addition, 𝜖1𝑖 and 𝜖2𝑖 are assumed to be jointly normally 
distributed. In fact, the error terms yielded the wage equation (𝜖1𝑖) and those yielded from the 
indication equation (𝜖2𝑖) could be positively correlated. The theoretical explanation is that both the 
offered wage and the reservation wage influence the labour market participation; the decision on 
labour force participation depends upon the pecuniary return from working, ceteris paribus, persons 
with a lower financial working compensation will have less propensity to be active in the labour 
market. Thus, when unobservable factors influence the market participation and also help determine 
wages, given the identical observable characteristics, the predicted wages for non-participants are 
lower than those for employed individuals. 
The first stage of the structural probit model starts with estimating the equation (2 - 4) by using a 
reduced form probit model which is expressed as follows:   
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Pr[𝑦𝑖 = 1| 𝑅𝑖] = Ф(𝑅𝑖𝜆𝑟𝑓) (2 - 5) 
where 𝜆𝑟𝑓 is a column vector of coefficients of the reduced form probit. This equation is called the 
selection equation which applies a RUM to estimate the probability of being employed.  
At this stage, the inverse Mills ratio (𝛾𝑖) is obtained; it is designated as 𝛾𝑖 =
Ɵ(𝑅𝑖?̂?𝑟𝑓)
Ф(𝑅𝑖?̂?𝑟𝑓)
 where Ɵ(. ) and 
Ф(. ) represent the standard normal density function and standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, respectively. 
The second step is applying the inverse Mills ratio as well as the correlation information between the 
error terms in estimation of the wage equation, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑖; which accounts for market participation. This 
equation is subsequently applied to predict wages for the entire sample:   
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽1 + 𝜌𝛾𝑖(𝑅𝑖?̂?𝑟𝑓) + 𝑣𝑖 (2 - 6) 
The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio, 𝜌, captures two effects. First, it captures unobservable 
characteristics which identify that a higher wage causes a higher probability of being active in the 
market. Second, it captures the difference between variance of offered wages and the covariance 
between offered wages and reservation wages.   
The final step is plugging the predicted wages obtained from equation (2 - 6) into the structural probit 
model, i.e., equation (2 - 2), in order to obtain labour supply behaviour at the extensive margin. This 
instrumental variable probit model provides a remedy to endogeneity of 𝑊𝑖 (due to correlation 
between error terms in the wage and labour force participation equations) and a wage 
mismeasurement (e.g. unreported or incorrectly reported factors for calculating daily wage). 
This research estimates the two-stage Heckman selection model for males and females separately as 
done by Kabátek et al. (2014). This chapter investigates labour supply at the extensive margin for 
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males and females by estimating them separately as done in Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) and Benczur 
et al. (2014). This offers a comprehensive examination of labour force participation in Thailand. 
 Exclusion restriction in the Heckman’s procedure and variables descriptions  
Referring to the Heckman selection model in Section 2.4.1., Wooldridge (2015) suggests that any 
variable in 𝑄𝑖 should be contained in the list of explanatory variables in the reduced form probit model, 
i.e., elements appearing as explanatory variables in the wage equation of the Heckman selection 
model should be included as explanatory variables in the selection equation. Excluding some variables 
in 𝑄𝑖 from the variables list in the selection equation could cause inconsistency when they are 
incorrectly specified.  
Wooldridge (2015) also argues that exclusion restriction is required in the Heckman selection model 
in order to prevent multicollinearity due to high correlations between 𝑄𝑖and the inverse Mills ratio. In 
particular, explanatory variables in the reduced form probit model should be at least one element 
larger than 𝑄𝑖; in other words, at least a variable which influences labour force participation in the 
selection equation but does not have a partial effect on wage.  
This chapter follows both suggestions since the list of variables in the reduced form probit model (i.e., 
𝑅𝑖) include all variables in 𝑄𝑖and other additional variables which are the determinants of labour force 
participation (i.e., 𝑍𝑖). Since variables in 𝑄𝑖 are incorporated in the wage equation as well as the 
selection equation in Heckman (1979), other variables in 𝑅𝑖 but not in 𝑄𝑖  are considered as exclusion 
restriction.   
The complete list of variables in 𝑅𝑖, which include variables in 𝑄𝑖 and 𝑍𝑖, are provided in TABLE 2.5 as 
shown below. In this chapter, variables in 𝑄𝑖 are the determinants of wages, which include age, age-
squared, level of education, an interaction term between education and age, and interaction term 
between education and age-squared, disability condition, year, province, and municipal area.  
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TABLE 2.5: Variables in the estimation  
Abbreviation Description 
Variables in 𝑄𝑖: Variables included in both wage and labour force participation equations 
Age Age of respondent (in years) 
Age2 The square of the respondent's age 
edu Level of education attainment 
age * edu Interaction term between age and level of education 
age2 * edu Interaction term between age-square and level of education 
disable  Dummy variable for disabled respondents  
year Categorical variable for years 
province Categorical variable indicating different provinces 
area  Dummy variable for non-municipal areas 
Variables in 𝑍𝑖: those beside 𝑄𝑖 are exclusion restrictions in the Heckman selection model
10 
ln_real_y_unearned_inc Log of real yearly household income 
spouse_real_inc Real monthly income of spouse (‘000 THB) 
Ageband Age group dummies for lifecycle periods 
Edu Level of education attainment 
mstatus Marital status 
disable  Dummy variable for disabled respondents  
spouse_ageband Spouse’s age group dummies for lifecycle periods 
spouse_disable Dummy variable indicating disabled spouse 
spouse_selfcare Dummy variable indicating spouse with lack of self-caring ability 
spouse_notwork Dummy variable showing unemployed spouse 
child3 Number of children age under 3 
child6 Number of children age from 3-5 
child10 Number of children age from 6-9 
child15 Number of children age from 10-14 
childover15 Number of children age over 15  
hhsize Household size 
dfarm Dummy variable indicating if the household has any farm business 
other3 Number of dependent members (< 3 years old) 
other5 Number of dependent members age from 3-5 
other10 Number of dependent members age from 6-9 
other15 Number of dependent members age from 10-14 
other15_60 Number of dependent members age from 15-60 
hhover60  Number of household members older than 60 years 
hhdisable Number of disabled members in the household 
ln_real_ad12  Log of real household housing debt 
ln_real_ad13  Log of real household educational debt 
ln_real_ad14 Log of real household consumption debt 
year Categorical variable for years 
province Categorical variable indicating different provinces 
area  Dummy variable for non-municipal areas 
 
                                                            
10 Some variables, namely, level of education attainment and disable appear in both 𝑄𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖 because they 
determine both offered wages and reservation wages as described in Section 2.2.2.   
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From TABLE 2.5, variables for age and age-squared represent age and working experience; a variable 
for educational attainment and interaction terms are designated as human capital factors. Disability 
is expected to be negatively related to wages because it reduces labour productivity. Wages are 
usually adjusted at least once per year and minimum wages in Thailand are considered on a yearly 
basis; thus, a year variable is included in the wage equation. Locations possibly impact earned income; 
different provinces have different economic activities and before 2013, provinces determine 
variations in minimum wages in Thailand. A dummy variable for rural area is included as a wage 
determinant since wages in city areas tend to be higher than those in rural areas.   
Variables in 𝑍𝑖, which determine labour market participation, include unearned income (log of 
household income and spouse's income), individual characteristics (age group, level of education, 
marital status, and disability condition), spouse's characteristics (age group, disability condition, ability 
of self-caring, employment status), number of children for different age ranges, household 
characteristics (e.g., family size, number of dependent members by age range, number of retired-age 
members, and number of disabled members), financial obligations (housing, education, and 
household consumption debts), and other control variables (year, province, and non-municipal area). 
Unearned income (i.e., non-wage income) theoretically affects labour force participation as discussed 
in Section 2.2.2. A variable for age group represents different periods in an individual’s life-cycle. 
Educational attainment affects not only the wage but also the reservation wage of an individual; 
hence, 𝑍𝑖 includes a variable for levels of education attainment. Marital status leads to new 
responsibilities and shows a certain stage in a life-cycle. Disability is expected to have a negative 
relationship to the participation probability. Spouse’s characteristics and number of children are 
included in 𝑍𝑖 because individuals are likely to take these factors into account when they make a 
decision on labour force participation. Household characteristics also play an important role in labour 
market participation because a high proportion of households in Thailand contain extended families. 
People who live in this type of family allocate specific responsibilities to each member; hence, while 
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some members focus on working for an income, the rest can focus on raising young members and 
performing domestic duties. In summary, household characteristics included in the model are likely to 
influence the decision on the probability of working in the market. Different debt constraints have 
theoretical and empirical evidence supporting their significance to labour force participation 
decisions. Variables for year, province, and rural area are included as control variables since these 
factors affect the wage as well as the reservation wage of an individual.    
It is evident in TABLE 2.5 that age and age squared in 𝑄𝑖 are replaced by a variable for age group in 𝑍𝑖. 
The main reason for this is that age has two major effects on labour force participation decision; the 
first one is that age represents a different lifecycle position (captured by a variable age group); the 
other reason is that age reflects working experience which is expected to determine wages positively 
(captured by variables age and age-squared) (Benczur et al., 2014). In fact, one additional year has a 
negligible direct effect on the labour market participation, but it strongly influences wages and thus 
affects the decision to be active in the market indirectly.    
2.5 Results 
 Predicted wage  
The detailed results of the Heckman selection models are shown in Appendix 2.III. Overall, variables 
in the wage equation show result as expected for both genders but at different magnitudes. Regarding 
both genders, age as a proxy of working experience has a positive and significant impact on wages 
while a variable age-square indicates the negative sign implying that at some point the older people 
tend to receive the lesser wage.  
A variable for levels of educational attainment positively affects wages of respondents, i.e., human 
capital is one of the key factors in determining wage. The interaction terms (age and education as well 
as age-square and education) provides in-depth information that the higher level of educational 
attainment an individual acquires, the more value of an additional year of experience becomes.  
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Physical conditions have a negative and significant effect on wages for both genders. A year variable 
indicates that wage increase through time for both genders; other two controlled variables including 
province and rural area show significant results for both males and females.   
From the two-stage Heckman selection model, the predicted values of the dependent variable (log of 
real wage) are obtained. The research applies a log-transformation technique11 suggested by 
Wooldridge (2015) to calculate predicted real daily wages for employed and unemployed by gender 
as shown in TABLE 2.6 
TABLE 2.6: Predicted real daily wage 
Male Observations Mean Standard error 
Real daily wage 54926 563.9395 703.7848 
Real daily wage (1% outlier) 54926 572.3712 714.5338 
Predicted real wage (employed) 54926 559.2681 416.0912 
Predicted real wage (unemployed) 4511 438.5645 331.7991 
Female  Observations Mean Standard error 
Real daily wage 48444 533.4201 594.7114 
Real daily wage (1% outlier) 48444 541.6261 602.7164 
Predicted real wage (employed) 48447 528.2283 427.5697 
Predicted real wage (unemployed) 28955 320.3526 305.8158 
 
For males, the average actual daily real wage is 563.94 baht; by accounting for the extreme outlier (1 
percent), the average real daily wage from the HSES is 572.37 baht. The means of predicted wages 
from the Heckman selection model of employed and unemployed males are 559.27 and 438.56 baht 
respectively. 
On the other hand, the average actual daily real wage for the whole sample and the 99 percent of the 
whole dataset (accounting for 1 percent outlier) for females are 533.42 and 541.63 baht respectively. 
The average predicted wages are 528.23 and 320.35 for employed and unemployed females 
respectively.  
                                                            
11 I apply ?̂? = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜎 2̂/2) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦)̂ to obtain predicted real daily wages. 𝑦 represents the objective variable 
which is real daily wages in this chapter. 𝜎 2̂ refers the unbiased estimator of 𝜎2; and ?̂? is the standard error of 
the wage equation.  
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From TABLE 2.6, three main points can be addressed here. First, for both genders, average actual daily 
wages calculated from 99 percent of the dataset provides a higher value than a number calculated 
from the whole distribution. It implies that there are many people received very low daily earned 
income. Second, the predicted values for both genders are consistent with the theoretical prediction 
in which offered wages of employed people are higher than those of unemployed. Finally, the wage 
gaps between genders for is consistent as actual and predicted data shows that on average males 
earned higher than females.  
FIGURE 2.2: Kernel density plots for actual wages and predicted wages 
  
 
FIGURE 2.2 exhibits Kernel density plots12 to compare distributional densities between actual wages 
and predicted wages. The left and right panels present the Kernel density plots for males and female 
respectively. Overall, distributions of actual and predicted wages for both genders have a very similar 
pattern. Regarding a gender factor, there are some variations at the left hand of the distributions for 
males. The density plots of females are very similar; however, the variation in density can be observed 
at the top of the distributions. 
                                                            
12 The cut-off point is 3,000 baht per day in order to create the graph. There are 822 people who earn more than 
3,000 baht per day. They are excluded because of the visibility of the graph.  
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 Marginal effects from Labour force participation model 
 General factors 
The detailed results of the binary probit model and the marginal effects for labour force participation 
are provided in Appendix 2.IV and 2.V respectively. This section presents the average marginal effects 
(AMEs) of important variables in the labour force participation model as well as predicted probability 
of labour market participation at different age groups.  
TABLE 2.7: The marginal effects of incomes by gender  
Income Male Female 
Marginal effect Std. Err. Marginal effect Std. Err. 
Log of real daily wage 0.0485*** 0.00642 0.106*** 0.00779 
Log of real yearly unearned income -0.00658*** 0.000269 -0.0117*** 0.000375 
Spouse real income -0.000963*** 0.000130 -0.00203*** 0.000130 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
TABLE 2.7 exhibits marginal effects of the different income sources included in the study on the 
probability of labour market participation. Overall, the effect of every income factor on the probability 
of working is consistent with the theoretical prediction. In fact, the higher wage has the higher 
possibility to exceed the reservation wage leading to the higher probability of working. On the other 
hand, unearned incomes (yearly household income and spouse income) have a negative impact on 
the probability of being active in the labour market as theoretical expectation and previous empirical 
studies. This is because these incomes raised the reservation wage. All income factors affect the 
probability of working with statistical significance at the 1 percent level.  
An increase in real daily wages by 1 percent will raise the probability of working for males and females 
by 4.85 and 10.6 percentage points respectively. An increase in real yearly household unearned 
income by 1 percent decreases working probability of males and females by 0.658 and 1.17 
percentage point, respectively. When the spouse’s income increases by a thousand baht, it reduces 
the probability of working by 0.096 and 0.203 percentage point for males and females respectively.    
By comparison between genders, the results are also consistent with previous literature e.g. Benczur 
et al. (2014), Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), and Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003). In 
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fact, the income elasticity of labour supply at the extensive margin for females is generally greater 
than that for males. This is because of the larger proportion of working men, and the flattening slope 
of the probit curve at this upper range (Belkar et al., 2007). 
FIGURE 2.3: The predictive probabilities at different age ranges by gender  
  
Male Female 
FIGURE 2.3 presents predicted probability curves of both genders at different age groups in people 
working life; the Y-axis presents predicted probability whilst the X-axis indicate age group. Both 
genders provide a similar shape of predicted probability curves at different lifecycle periods. In fact, 
from the starting period of working lifecycle (age 15-25), the working probability increases in the 
second period (26-40 years old). Then, the probability of labour force participation continuously 
declines in the next two periods (40-59 and over 59 years old). This pattern is as expected; age 
between 26 and 40 is considered as a prime age for working. The finding is also consistent with 
previous research that find the inverse U-shape relationship, i.e., the probability of working increases 
when an individual becomes older until at some age the probability starts to decline (Cameron et al., 
2001; Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez, 2003). 
All predicted probabilities are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The probability of being 
employed for males remains very high in all lifecycle periods; the probabilities for period 1 to 4 (not 
over 25, 26-40, 41-59, from 60 years old) are 89.78, 96.10, 91.33, and 85.57 percent respectively; with 
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regards to females, those for each period are 65.30, 72.79, 59.95, and 35.19 percent respectively. It is 
clearly seen that probabilities of males are higher than those of females in every age group.  
TABLE 2.8: The average marginal effects for the levels of educational attainment  
Education 
Base case:  
under primary school 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
2.primary school -0.000863 0.00379 0.0257*** 0.00608 
3.middle school -0.0176*** 0.00446 0.00539 0.00728 
4.high school -0.0137*** 0.00520 0.0356*** 0.00836 
5.higher vocational -0.00842 0.00698 0.0859*** 0.0113 
6.bachelor’s degree -0.0294*** 0.00941 0.167*** 0.0130 
7.postgraduate degree 0.0165 0.0110 0.266*** 0.0161 
8.other education 0.00890 0.00551 0.0352*** 0.00795 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
From TABLE 2.8, by comparing males’ education levels to the base case—not completed primary 
school, most levels of the educational attainment indicate negative marginal effects (except 
postgraduate degree and other education); middle school, high school, and bachelor degree also show 
negative marginal effects with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Two levels of education 
have positive marginal effects but they are not statistically significant. Negative coefficients are 
different from some previous studies, e.g., Maloney (1991).  
However, Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003) which find the negative sign in higher 
education levels provide the theoretical prediction regarding the negative sign on education that 
people with higher levels of educational attainment have higher reservation wages, and an increase 
in offered wages possibly fails to catch up an increase in reservation wages. Consequently, the 
probability of being participating in the market reduces. In addition, Thailand has limited government 
supports for unemployed people. This could be another reason why low-educated individuals more 
likely to participate in the market more than those with a higher education in which they tend to live 
in higher economic status families with some additional financial supports. Negative coefficients of 
education levels have small effects on the probability of participation (less than 2 percentage points); 
only an undergraduate level reduces the probability by 2.94 percentage points at the 1 percent 
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significance level; this accords with the oversupply of undergraduate labour force in Thailand. The NSO 
statistics in recent years also indicate that the largest proportion of unemployed people in Thailand is 
usually among those who hold a university degree; for example, in December 2009 and December 
2015, this group account for 30.44 and 29.41 percent of the total number of unemployed people, 
respectively13.  
On the other hand, for females, the marginal effects of different education levels are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level except middle school which is not significant. In addition, 
except the middle school level, the probability of being active in the labour market increases with the 
level of educational attainment as expected. The reason is that a level of education theoretically 
determines reservation and offered wages of people; and it has a larger positive effect on offer wages 
than reservation wages for females. Once the former exceeds the latter due to a higher level of 
education, ceteris paribus, they decide to participate in the labour market.   
TABLE 2.9: The average marginal effects of the marital status by gender 
Marital status 
Base case: never married 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
Married 0.0475*** (0.00498) -0.0981*** (0.00609) 
Widowed 0.00214 (0.00902) -0.0418*** (0.00731) 
Divorced 0.0358*** (0.00712) 0.0447*** (0.00880) 
Separated 0.0367*** (0.00624) 0.0425*** (0.00813) 
married (unconfirmed) -0.0657 (0.112) 0.0201 (0.124) 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Considering marital status for males shown in TABLE 2.9, the working probability is higher (with 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level) relative to single men when they are married, divorced, 
and separated. This implies that when they have more responsibilities due to their marital statuses 
(married, divorced, and separated statuses), they tend to work in the formal labour market to support 
their spouse or ex-spouse as well as their children via child support and living allowance. However, 
                                                            
13 Data from  http://www.nso.go.th/sites/2014en/Survey/social/labour/LaborForce/  
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the probability of labour force participation is not significantly different to single men if they are 
widowed and married with unconfirmed status.  
The marginal effects by marital status for female respondents imply that when females are either 
married or widowed, the probability of participating in the formal labour market is lower than single 
women with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Nonetheless, when they have less support 
from their husbands due to divorce or separation, their probability of working increases in relative to 
single women with statistical significance at the 1 percent level.  
Disability is one of the major individual characteristics in determining the probability of labour market 
participation. Considering disabled people, the probability of participation is lower than non-disabled. 
For disabled males, the probability of working does not change significantly. On the other hand, the 
probability of working for disabled females declines by 6.99 percentage point with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level.  
FIGURE 2.4: The predictive probabilities for people with a spouse by age group  
  
Male Female 
The predicted probabilities of different age groups of spouse in FIGURE 2.4 suggest that the probability 
of labour force participation for both males and females declines when the age of spouse by age group 
is higher. All predicted probabilities are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Considering 
different spouse age groups (not over 25, 26-40, 41-59, and from 60 years old) for males are 95.98, 
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93.62, and 88.74 percent, respectively; the predicted probabilities of these groups for females are 
68.43, 68.32, 62.87, and 50.91 percent, respectively.     
TABLE 2.10: The average marginal effects of spouse’s characteristics by gender 
Spouse’s characteristics Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
disability -0.0345* 0.0184 0.0622*** 0.0157 
self-caring -0.0948*** 0.0314 -0.0423 0.0277 
inactive work status -0.0121*** 0.00417 -0.0535*** 0.00804 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The results shown in TABLE 2.10 suggest that disabled spouses lead to a lower probability of labour 
force participation by 3.45 percentage points with statistical significance at the 10 percent level for 
males but females are more likely to participate in the labour market by 6.22 percent with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. The explanation for different signs between genders is possibly due 
to different responsibilities in the households. In particular, it is possible that in Thailand males are 
usually responsible for working while females are more likely to do domestic duties; when they have 
a disabled spouse, males are likely to take care their own spouses but females tend to take their 
husbands’ responsibility of working for income.  
When spouses are unable to take care themselves, males have a lower probability of participation by 
9.48 percentage points with the statistical significance level of 1 percent; however, spouses are who 
unable to take came themselves does not affect females’ labour force participation statistically.  
When spouses are inactive in the labour market, both genders are less likely to be active in the market 
by 1.21 and 5.35 percentage points for males and females with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level, respectively. Some previous studies, e.g., Karaoglan and Okten (2015), find that the added work 
effect encourage married females to participate in the labour market. According to Prieto-Rodrıǵuez 
and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez (2003) there is no consensus on this particular variable, i.e., different 
countries have different signs for this variable. The results are theoretically counterintuitive; however, 
there is no conclusive agreement among empirical studies. The explanation of the negative 
 58 
 
relationship is that both spouses become unemployed at the same time due to they work in similar 
jobs and the labour demand declines (Prieto-Rodrıǵuez and Rodrıǵuez-Gutiérrez, 2003).  
TABLE 2.11: The average marginal effects of a number of children (son or daughter) by age range 
A number of children by 
age range 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
younger than 3 -0.00480 0.00519 -0.176*** 0.00512 
from 3 to 5 0.0123** 0.00544 -0.0486*** 0.00524 
from 6 to 9 0.0139*** 0.00459 -0.00138 0.00457 
from 10 to 14 0.0195*** 0.00375 0.0280*** 0.00390 
Older than 15 0.0192*** 0.00350 0.0100*** 0.00384 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Regarding TABLE 2.11, for males, a change in a number of very young children (less than three years 
old) does not statistically impact the probability of labour force participation. Then, if a number of 
older children (3-5; 6-9; 10-14; and over 15 years old) increases by one the working probability is 
significantly higher by 1.23, 1.39, 1.95, and 1.92 percentage points, respectively. Males are more likely 
to be active in the market except for very young children because they need a certain amount of 
money to raise their children. However, when children are very young, males may share some 
domestic duties and childcare responsibilities with their spouses.  
As females often have a major responsibility to raise their children, it is not surprising that a number 
of children for first two age ranges (younger than 3 and 3-5) cause reductions in the probability of the 
labour market participation by 17.6 and 4.86 percentage points with statistical significant at the 1 
percent level. This is consistent with previous literature e.g. Cameron et al. (2001) that indicated 
having young children caused a decrease in the probability of participation. With an older group of 
children (6-9 years old) the average marginal effect has a negative value without statistical 
significance. The probability of working turns positive by 2.8 percentage points with a statistical 
significance level of 1 percent when the children age ranges are from 10 to 14; and the probability of 
labour force participation increases by 1 percentage point with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level for children who are over 15 years old. This suggests that females with older children are more 
likely to be active in the labour market in order to help raise income.  
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TABLE 2.12: The average marginal effects for household’s characteristic variables by gender 
Household’s 
demographical 
characteristics 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
Household size -0.00896*** 0.000658 -0.0204*** 0.00106 
Younger than 3 years old 0.0604*** 0.0123 -0.0890*** 0.0221 
from 3 to 5 years 0.0544*** 0.0117 -0.00670 0.0218 
from 6 to 9 years old 0.0630*** 0.0114 0.0110 0.0214 
from 10 to 14 years old 0.0749*** 0.0112 0.0649*** 0.0211 
from 15 to 60 years old -0.0550*** 0.00980 -0.0361* 0.0196 
over 60 0.0104*** 0.00191 0.0453*** 0.00310 
Other disabled members 0.00734* 0.00381 0.00872 0.00600 
area 0.00971*** 0.00229 0.0236*** 0.00336 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Four different household’s demographical variables are included in the TABLE 2.12. Initially, when a 
household has one additional member, the probability of labour market participation decreases with 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level by 0.896 and 2.04 percentage points for males and 
females, respectively. 
Next, the composition of the household is also important for decision on labour force participation. 
Five different groups of a number of household members by age (excluding respondents’ sons and 
daughters) are included in TABLE 2.12. Having one more of pre-working age (younger than 3, 3-5, 6-9, 
and 10-14) dependent household members or post-working age (over 60 years old) members results 
in a higher probability of labour market participation for males by 6.04, 5.44, 6.30, 7.49, and 1.04 
percentage points respectively; all variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Regarding females, a number of other dependent young members, under 3 years old, negatively affect 
the probability of working for by 8.90 percentage points with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level. The similar result is found for other members (excluding respondents’ sons and daughters) who 
are from 15 to 60 years old; a number of this group decreases the probability of labour market 
participation by about 3.61 percentage point with statistical significance at the 10 percent level. 
Females are more likely to participate in the market by about 6.49 and 4.53 percentage point with a 
statistical significance level of 1 percent if a number of dependent members which are from 10 to 14 
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and over 60 years old increase by one, respectively. A numbers of dependent members in the 
remaining groups (from 3 to 5 and from 6 to 9) do not statistically affect females’ labour force 
participation. 
An increase in a number of disabled members has positive and significant relationship with the 
probability of participation by 0.734 percentage point with statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level for males. However, an increase in the number of disabled member does not have statistical 
significance on the probability of working for females.  
A dummy variable capturing whether a household is in a non-municipal area is included in the 
estimation as a control variable (entering in both wage and labour supply response equations). In 
comparison with living in a municipal area, males and females living in a rural area are more likely to 
participate in the formal labour market by 0.971 and 2.36 percentage points respectively with 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level. While marginal effects of provinces are not discussed in 
this section, they are included in the estimation as a control variable. 
 Specific factors in developing countries and Thailand  
As mentioned in section 2.1, there are three factors on which this analysis focuses due to the specific 
economic circumstances in developing countries and Thailand.  
TABLE 2.13: The average marginal effects for households with any farming business by gender 
Household’s 
demographical 
characteristics 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
Dummy of having any farm  -0.00579 0.00368 -0.0680*** 0.00523 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The estimation results indicate that when a household has any farm business (i.e., when any member 
besides the respondent has a farm business), the probability that a respondent is active in the formal 
labour market declines by 6.80 percentage points with statistical significant at the 1 percent level for 
females but having a farm business has no effect on the probability of participation for males. This is 
possibly because these households do farming businesses on a family basis. In other words, income 
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from farming is usually shared among all household members, and household members who are not 
working in the farm take shared farming income as their unearned income.   
TABLE 2.14: The average marginal effects for the year variable 
Year  
Base case: 2009 
Male Female 
Marginal effect Standard error Marginal effect Standard error 
2011 -0.00312 0.00267 -0.0101** 0.00405 
2013 -0.0111*** 0.00308 -0.0237*** 0.00445 
2015 -0.0167*** 0.00320 -0.0338*** 0.00456 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
According to marginal effects shown in TABLE 2.14, for both genders, by assigning 2009 as the base 
year, the probability of being employed gradually decreased throughout the studied period. After two 
income restructuring policies had officially launched in 2012, the probabilities of labour force 
participation in 2013 and 2015 are lower than the base year with statistical significance at the 1 
percent level for males and females, respectively. This possibly suggests that policies were not 
effective in raising the probability of labour market participation14. This policy package has three main 
policies, namely, raising minimum wages over 70 percent nationwide, increasing salary by about 70 
percent for public officers who earned an undergraduate degree, and the rice-pledging scheme which 
increases rice prices by at least 50 percent over the market price.  
Regarding the minimum wage policy, there are three possible explanations regarding the results. 
Firstly, immense increase in minimum wage negatively affects employment. Secondly, inefficiency of 
policy implication leads to low rate of minimum wage compliance (Leckcivilize, 2015). Thirdly, people 
with the minimum wage rate are usually participating in the labour market.  
The government increased salary in the public sector. However, this policy seems ineffective in the 
formal labour market because people who want to work in the public sector prioritise other factors, 
                                                            
14 The interpretation of the results should be done with caution as the variable for year captures not only the 
effects of policies in 2012 but also other events such as FDI, exchange rate fluctuation, and economic growth. 
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e.g., health and retirement welfare, over salary. In addition, a salary increase in the public sector does 
not spill over to the private sector due to oversupply of workforce with a Bachelor’s degree.  
Last but not least, an increase in the prices of rice possibly had a negative effect on labour force 
participation. A farming business is usually considered as a family business; therefore, members who 
are not working as farmers possibly take the farming income as their unearned income.  
TABLE 2.15: The average marginal effects for household’s debts by gender 
Household’s debts Male Female 
Marginal effect Std. err. Marginal effect Std. err. 
Log of real housing debt 0.00117*** 0.000307 0.000989** 0.000408 
Log of real education debt 0.000727 0.000615 0.00520*** 0.000910 
Log of real consumption debt 0.00219*** 0.000205 0.00485*** 0.000291 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Marginal effects shown in TABLE 2.15 present that, overall, debt constraints have a positive and 
significant (except the education debt on males’ working probability) impact on the probability of 
labour force participation for both genders. In addition, the results show differences between genders 
that males are more sensitive to housing debts whilst females are more sensitive to education and 
household consumption debts. 
One percent increase in the real housing debt causes the probability of being active in the labour 
market to rise by 0.117 and 0.099 percentage point for males and females with statistical significance 
levels of 1 and 5 percent, respectively. In terms of education debts, the working probability for females 
increases by 0.52 percentage point with statistical significance at the 1 percent level if the educational 
debts rise by 1 percent. However, these debts do not have statistical impact on the probability of being 
active in the market for males. An explanation on this is that females take main responsibilities on 
raising their children; hence, they care more about education debts. One percent increase in real debts 
for household consumption cause an increase in probability of labour force participation for males 
and females with statistical significance at the 1 percent level by 0.219 and 0.485 percentage points, 
respectively.  
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The findings from debt constraint variables are consistent with most existing literature that has 
studied the relationship between labour force participation and debt constants. Even though most of 
the previous empirical studies focused on housing debts, this chapter provides additional evidence 
that household consumption debts have the similar effects, and education debts also have positive 
impact on the labour force participation at least for females.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This empirical essay aims to understand the behaviour of labour force participation in Thailand as a 
developing country. The socio-economic structures in developing countries are generally different 
from developed countries that have been covered by most of the previous empirical studies. One 
distinct difference between developing and developed economies is that the former usually has a 
larger informal sector in relative to the latter. Additionally, many developing countries like Thailand 
have economic problems including low economic growth, which relates to the middle income trap, 
and income inequality. The Thai government has tried to address these problems by income 
restructuring policies. From academic and policy stand points, understanding Thailand force 
participation is therefore beneficial for other developing countries and Thailand itself. The amount of 
household debts in Thailand has also been increased and this is expected to have an effect on labour 
force participation.     
The study obtains four years of the HSES collected by Thailand NSO. A two-stage Heckman selection 
model is selected to deal with the sample selection bias; the log of predicted real wage is obtained at 
this stage; the predicted values are consistent with actual data and theoretical explanations. Then, the 
study applies the structural probit model to estimate the binary response model for formal labour 
market participation.  
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The results suggest that variables for earned and unearned incomes are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions and previous empirical studies, i.e., a variable for real wage has a positive and significant 
relationship with the probability of participation for both genders; non-labour incomes discourages 
both males and females from being active in the market. The Thai government should possibly 
consider allocating labour force from the informal sector to the formal labour market by increasing 
earned wage rates. In addition, labour force can be reallocated among industries through a policy of 
supporting earned income in the preferable industries. On the other hand, when the government 
considers introducing or increasing any welfare program, the policy needs to be studied in detail as it 
can affect labour supply at the extensive margin negatively.   
Some other findings e.g. age of respondent are also consistent with theoretical predictions and 
previous empirical studies. However, some findings are less common in the literature. For example, 
the results of educational attainment for males are different from much of the previous literature. 
Possible explanations are that the offered wage increases at a smaller rate than the reservation wage 
or Thailand has a very limited amount of social welfare for unemployed people forcing people with 
lower education (i.e., having lesser support from others) to participate in the market. In addition, the 
rate of unemployment in Thailand has been increasing recently; the largest proportion of unemployed 
people is usually those who are holding a university degree.  
Individual characteristics (e.g., marital status), spouse characteristics (e.g., spouse age, a number of 
children, and working status), and household characteristics (e.g., household size, a number of 
dependent members, and a number of retire-aged members), also affect the decision on labour force 
participation in Thailand for both genders. The results suggest that males and females have different 
responsibilities in the household leading to different behavioural responses regarding labour force 
participation.    
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A dummy variable indicating if any household member has a farm business, which captures an aspect 
of the informal sector in Thailand, indicates that when any member besides the respondent conducts 
a farm business, the females’ probability of being active in the formal labour market is lower. Also, 
people who live in a rural area have a higher probability of participating in the market. These results 
indicate the importance of the informal sector, especially the agricultural sector, in Thailand. A 
government can apply the results in forming a policy. In fact, a policy which affects the informal sector 
directly may affect labour force participation in the formal labour market indirectly.  
Evidence from the year variable suggests that policies lunched in 2012 were not effective in 
encouraging people to be active in the market. Regarding an increase in minimum wages, lack of policy 
effectiveness is possibly due to a negative effect on employment, ineffective policy implication and 
weak law enforcement, as well as a high labour force participation rate of minimum wage workers. An 
increase in the monthly salary in public sector does not affect labour force participation since people 
prefer to work for the government may consider other factors (e.g., health care and retirement 
welfares) rather than income. Additionally, the unemployment situation in Thailand reduces the 
effectiveness of the policy. With regard to the rice pledging policy, an increase in agricultural products’ 
prices due to the government policy may negatively influence labour force participation of people if 
they consider farming income as household unearned income.   
Last but not least, regarding housing debts, the results are consistent with theoretical predictions and 
previous empirical work in developed countries, and the educational and consumption debts also 
increase the probability of labour force participation in general. Whilst the housing debts have a larger 
effect on the probability of labour force participation for males, the other two types of debt have a 
larger impact on that for females. This has some policy implications. Whilst financial obligations could 
help encourage people to participate in the labour market, excessive household debts are possibly 
detrimental to productivity of workforce because of a skills to jobs mismatch (i.e., people with 
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excessive indebtedness tend to accept any available job regardless of their qualified skills and job 
specifications).  
The next chapter extends this chapter which focuses mainly on decision of labour force participation 
by applying a multinomial discrete choice model to investigate labour supply at both extensive and 
intensive margins. Additionally, the model address non-linear budget constraints by incorporating tax-
benefit rules.  
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2.7 Appendix 2.I: Recent income restructure in Thailand 
TABLE A2.1: Increase in the minimum wage due to the recent policy 
Province 
group 
No. 
Number 
of 
provinces 
Previous 
rate 
1 April 2012 1 January 2013 
Increase % 
increase 
New 
rate 
Increase % 
increase 
New 
rate 
1 1 221 79 35.7 300 - - 300 
2 6 215 85 39.5 300 - - 300 
3 1 196 77 39.5 273 27 9.7 300 
4 2 193 76 39.5 269 31 11.4 300 
5 1 190 75 39.5 265 35 13.2 300 
6 1 189 75 39.5 264 36 13.8 300 
7 1 186 73 39.5 259 41 1536 300 
8 1 185 73 39.5 258 42 16.2 300 
9 1 184 73 39.5 257 43 16.9 300 
10 2 183 72 39.5 255 45 17.5 300 
11 1 182 72 39.5 254 46 18.2 300 
12 1 181 71 39.5 252 48 18.8 300 
13 2 180 71 39.5 251 49 19.5 300 
14 2 179 71 39.5 250 50 20.1 300 
15 2 176 70 39.5 246 54 22.2 300 
16 1 175 69 39.5 244 56 22.9 300 
17 2 174 69 39.5 243 57 23.6 300 
18 5 173 68 39.5 241 59 24.3 300 
19 4 172 68 39.5 240 60 25.0 300 
20 3 171 68 39.5 239 61 25.8 300 
21 2 170 67 39.5 237 63 26.5 300 
22 4 169 67 39.5 236 64 27.3 300 
23 2 168 66 39.5 234 66 28.0 300 
24 4 167 66 39.5 233 67 28.8 300 
25 7 166 66 39.5 232 68 29.6 300 
26 5 165 65 39.5 230 70 30.3 300 
27 1 164 65 39.5 229 71 31.1 300 
28 7 163 64 39.5 227 73 31.9 300 
29 2 162 64 39.5 226 74 32.7 300 
30 1 161 64 39.5 225 75 33.6 300 
31 1 160 63 39.5 223 77 34.4 300 
32 1 159 63 39.5 222 78 35.3 300 
Average 175.73 69 39.5 245 60 25.5 300 
Source: The Ministry of Labour 
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TABLE A2.2: Increase in the salary of public organisations due to the salary reformation policy  
Education level October 2011 
(THB) 
January 2012 
(THB) 
Change 
(%) 
January 2013 
(THB) 
Change 
(%) 
Vocational certificate 
 
6,410-6,800 7,620-8,080 18.9 9,000-9,900 20.3 
High vocational 
certificate 
7,670-8,140 9,300-9,860 21.2 10,500-11,550 15.0 
Bachelor’s degree 
 
9,140-9,670 11,680-12,390 28.0 15,000-16,500 30.8 
Master’s degree 
 
12,600-13,360 15,300-16,220 21.4 17,500-19,250 16.5 
Doctoral degree 
 
17,010-18,040 19,000-20,140 11.7 21,000-23,100 12.6 
Source: The Ministry of Finance 
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2.8 Appendix 2.II: Descriptive statistics for provinces and years 
TABLE A2.3: Descriptive statistics of province dummies 
No. Male Female Total Obs. No. Male Female Total Obs. 
10 6,537 8,173 14,710 51 432 679 1,111 
11 1,527 1,800 3,327 52 745 960 1,705 
12 1,528 2,018 3,546 53 581 972 1,553 
13 1,602 2,026 3,628 54 539 811 1,350 
14 984 1,329 2,313 55 384 637 1,021 
15 547 808 1,355 56 289 584 873 
16 792 1,146 1,938 57 398 757 1,155 
17 734 1,048 1,782 58 555 690 1,245 
18 589 890 1,479 60 807 1,161 1,968 
19 1,123 1,197 2,320 61 418 656 1,074 
20 1,449 1,600 3,049 62 580 854 1,434 
21 1,313 1,208 2,521 63 678 949 1,627 
22 631 849 1,480 64 462 696 1,158 
23 741 956 1,697 65 637 1,060 1,697 
24 907 1,117 2,024 66 560 808 1,368 
25 666 889 1,555 67 602 819 1,421 
26 643 890 1,533 70 846 986 1,832 
27 574 687 1,261 71 708 926 1,634 
30 912 1,078 1,298 72 573 813 1,386 
31 574 724 1,298 73 1,149 1,294 2,443 
32 506 662 1,168 74 1,385 1,497 2,882 
33 372 489 861 75 1,023 1,452 2,475 
34 641 813 1,454 76 767 1,042 1,809 
35 428 517 945 77 1,103 1,328 2,431 
36 412 594 1,006 80 607 772 1,379 
37 250 343 593 81 547 771 1,318 
38 151 337 488 82 585 796 1,381 
39 280 386 666 83 811 952 1,763 
40 717 908 1,625 84 834 1,096 1,930 
41 627 767 1,394 85 732 971 1,703 
42 419 561 980 86 655 907 1,562 
43 590 818 1,408 90 882 1,073 1,955 
44 443 564 1,007 91 604 816 1,420 
45 430 528 958 92 642 825 1,467 
46 380 586 966 93 365 518 833 
47 534 694 1,228 94 914 1,203 2,117 
48 495 574 1,069 95 600 823 1,423 
49 466 519 985 96 1,106 1,314 2,420 
50 818 1,041 1,859 total 59,437 77,402 136,839 
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2.9  Appendix 2.III: Heckman selection model outputs 
Table A2.4: Heckman selection model outputs 
 Male Female 
Dependent variable lnrealdailyw lnrealdailyw 
Wage equation   
Age 0.0513*** (0.00297) 0.0590*** (0.00348) 
age2  -0.000521*** (0.0000301) -0.000724*** (0.0000350) 
under primary (base) - - - - 
Primary 0.728*** (0.0848) 0.633*** (0.109) 
Middle 0.772*** (0.0840) 0.692*** (0.104) 
High 0.578*** (0.0912) 1.220*** (0.108) 
post-secondary 0.684*** (0.125) 1.168*** (0.143) 
undergraduate 0.241** (0.106) 0.841*** (0.106) 
postgraduate 0.241 (0.230) 0.698*** (0.229) 
Other 0.537*** (0.115) 0.483*** (0.121) 
under primary * age (base) - - - - 
primary * age -0.0352*** (0.00384) -0.0322*** (0.00499) 
middle * age -0.0386*** (0.00381) -0.0325*** (0.00478) 
high * age -0.0252*** (0.00420) -0.0603*** (0.00508) 
post-secondary * age -0.0268*** (0.00623) -0.0529*** (0.00713) 
undergraduate * age 0.0122** (0.00487) -0.0214*** (0.00470) 
postgraduate * age 0.0357*** (0.0104) 0.0103 (0.0107) 
other * age -0.0259*** (0.00539) -0.0228*** (0.00536) 
under primary * age2 (base) - - - - 
primary * age2 0.000452*** (0.0000445) 0.000420*** (0.0000586) 
middle * age2 0.000609*** (0.0000438) 0.000493*** (0.0000567) 
high * age2 0.000539*** (0.0000487) 0.000977*** (0.0000612) 
post-secondary * age2 0.000660*** (0.0000764) 0.000990*** (0.0000879) 
undergraduate * age2 0.000223*** (0.0000552) 0.000757*** (0.0000523) 
postgraduate * age2 -0.000118 (0.000115) 0.000293** (0.000123) 
other * age2 0.000218*** (0.0000605) 0.000209*** (0.0000576) 
disability=0 (base) - - - - 
disability=1 -0.148*** (0.0207) -0.156*** (0.0243) 
year=2009 (base) - - - - 
year=2011 0.0340*** (0.00568) 0.0316*** (0.00595) 
year=2013 0.183*** (0.00579) 0.208*** (0.00605) 
year=2015 0.206*** (0.00582) 0.240*** (0.00609) 
municipal area=1 (base) - - - - 
rural area=2 -0.0355*** (0.00468) -0.0267*** (0.00496) 
Constant 4.635*** (0.0732) 4.419*** (0.0869) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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Table A2.4: Heckman selection model outputs (continue) 
 Male Female 
Selection equation     
real monthly income of spouse  -0.00512*** (0.00113) -0.00753*** (0.000479) 
log of yearly unearned income -0.0499*** (0.00229) -0.0379*** (0.00135) 
age ≤ 25 (base) - - - - 
age 26-40 0.0942** (0.0426) 0.168*** (0.0299) 
age 41-59 -0.242*** (0.0721) 0.0735* (0.0436) 
age ≥ 60 0.0353 (0.0967) -0.0968* (0.0560) 
Age 0.0611*** (0.0103) -0.00265 (0.00781) 
age2  -0.000855*** (0.000101) -0.000398*** (0.0000761) 
under primary (base) - - - - 
Primary -1.722*** (0.269) -2.703*** (0.223) 
Middle -1.768*** (0.270) -2.534*** (0.218) 
High -2.085*** (0.302) -1.608*** (0.235) 
post-secondary -1.966*** (0.456) -0.977*** (0.324) 
undergraduate -3.407*** (0.361) -3.025*** (0.255) 
postgraduate -2.916*** (1.064) -4.372*** (0.811) 
Other 0.998** (0.420) -0.641** (0.258) 
under primary * age (base) - - - - 
primary * age 0.0892*** (0.0122) 0.123*** (0.00982) 
middle * age 0.0850*** (0.0123) 0.117*** (0.00973) 
high * age 0.106*** (0.0142) 0.0795*** (0.0107) 
post-secondary * age 0.106*** (0.0237) 0.0570*** (0.0158) 
undergraduate * age 0.164*** (0.0171) 0.163*** (0.0115) 
postgraduate * age 0.144*** (0.0502) 0.237*** (0.0387) 
other * age -0.0429** (0.0188) 0.0124 (0.0108) 
under primary * age2 (base) - - - - 
primary * age2 -0.00105*** (0.000141) -0.00134*** (0.000111) 
middle * age2 -0.000953*** (0.000141) -0.00128*** (0.000111) 
high * age2 -0.00122*** (0.000166) -0.000881*** (0.000125) 
post-secondary * age2 -0.00124*** (0.000293) -0.000560*** (0.000188) 
undergraduate * age2 -0.00171*** (0.000196) -0.00150*** (0.000130) 
postgraduate * age2 -0.00124** (0.000559) -0.00217*** (0.000442) 
other * age2 0.000381* (0.000199) 0.0000113 (0.000109) 
never married (base) - - - - 
Married 0.422*** (0.0391) -0.372*** (0.0223) 
Widowed 0.163*** (0.0618) -0.0437 (0.0272) 
Divorced 0.277*** (0.0627) 0.183*** (0.0357) 
Separated 0.251*** (0.0544) 0.166*** (0.0327) 
married (unconfirmed)  -0.381 (0.498) 0.122 (0.493) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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Table A2.4: Heckman selection model outputs (continue) 
 Male Female 
disability=0 (base) - - - - 
disability=1 -0.205** (0.0870) -0.309*** (0.0668) 
year=2009 (base) - - - - 
year=2011 -0.00239 (0.0242) -0.0212 (0.0145) 
year=2013 -0.0155 (0.0248) -0.00588 (0.0149) 
year=2015 -0.0361 (0.0247) -0.0227 (0.0149) 
municipal area=1 (base) - - - - 
rural area=2 0.0685*** (0.0202) 0.0667*** (0.0120) 
no spouse (base) - - - - 
spouse age ≤ 25  0.330*** (0.0612) 0.237*** (0.0352) 
spouse age 26-40 0.357*** (0.0503) 0.222*** (0.0222) 
spouse age 41-59 0.251*** (0.0452) 0.0494** (0.0217) 
spouse age ≥ 60 0.00270 (0.0665) -0.185*** (0.0318) 
spouse_disable=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_disable=1 -0.263** (0.119) 0.213*** (0.0600) 
spouse_selfcare=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_selfcare=1 -0.564*** (0.150) -0.142 (0.0952) 
spouse_notwork=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_notwork=1 0.0602* (0.0338) -0.137*** (0.0272) 
child3 -0.0651 (0.0439) -0.647*** (0.0184) 
child6 0.0715 (0.0459) -0.211*** (0.0185) 
child10 0.0675* (0.0389) -0.0557*** (0.0162) 
child15 0.105*** (0.0319) 0.0319** (0.0140) 
childover15 0.168*** (0.0298) -0.00314 (0.0137) 
a number of members -0.0754*** (0.00561) -0.0640*** (0.00382) 
farm business=0 (base) - - - - 
farm business=1 -0.0268 (0.0299) -0.230*** (0.0176) 
other3 0.392*** (0.106) -0.364*** (0.0785) 
other6 0.340*** (0.100) -0.0684 (0.0774) 
other10 0.417*** (0.0978) 0.0111 (0.0761) 
other15 0.524*** (0.0967) 0.198*** (0.0750) 
other15_60 -0.367*** (0.0847) -0.0981 (0.0695) 
hhover60 0.0392** (0.0163) 0.132*** (0.0111) 
Hhdisable 0.0692** (0.0325) 0.0358* (0.0212) 
household housing debt 0.0162*** (0.00263) 0.00301** (0.00147) 
household education debt 0.00805 (0.00519) 0.0189*** (0.00321) 
household consumption debt 0.0221*** (0.00174) 0.0164*** (0.00104) 
Constant 0.740*** (0.247) 1.693*** (0.192) 
Constant  athrho -0.304*** (0.0236) 0.0419** (0.0180) 
Constant lnsigma -0.738*** (0.00325) -0.757*** (0.00323) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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2.10 Appendix 2.IV: Probit model results 
Table A2.5: Probit model results 
 Male Female 
Dependent variable Employed Employed 
log of daily wage 0.410*** (0.0542) 0.371*** (0.0275) 
log of yearly unearned income -0.0557*** (0.00226) -0.0409*** (0.00134) 
real monthly income of spouse  -0.00814*** (0.00110) -0.00714*** (0.000457) 
age ≤ 25 (base) - - - - 
age 26-40 0.569*** (0.0276) 0.257*** (0.0194) 
age 41-59 0.106** (0.0440) -0.170*** (0.0241) 
age ≥ 60 -0.240*** (0.0597) -0.938*** (0.0318) 
under primary (base) - - - - 
primary -0.00803 (0.0354) 0.0816*** (0.0190) 
middle -0.150*** (0.0399) 0.0170 (0.0229) 
high -0.119** (0.0464) 0.113*** (0.0261) 
post-secondary -0.0752 (0.0621) 0.280*** (0.0361) 
undergraduate -0.238*** (0.0745) 0.576*** (0.0440) 
postgraduate 0.172 (0.123) 1.021*** (0.0712) 
other 0.0880 (0.0564) 0.112*** (0.0255) 
never married (base) - - - - 
married 0.383*** (0.0381) -0.345*** (0.0218) 
widowed 0.0140 (0.0593) -0.151*** (0.0261) 
divorced 0.270*** (0.0611) 0.173*** (0.0350) 
separated 0.278*** (0.0534) 0.164*** (0.0322) 
married (unconfirmed)  -0.354 (0.517) 0.0764 (0.479) 
disability=0 (base) - - - - 
disability=1 -0.139 (0.0858) -0.239*** (0.0663) 
no spouse (base) - - - - 
spouse age ≤ 25  0.512*** (0.0605) 0.243*** (0.0347) 
spouse age 26-40 0.478*** (0.0493) 0.239*** (0.0220) 
spouse age 41-59 0.219*** (0.0444) 0.0483** (0.0214) 
spouse age ≥ 60 -0.138** (0.0645) -0.346*** (0.0310) 
spouse_disable=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_disable=1 -0.253** (0.118) 0.226*** (0.0594) 
spouse_selfcare=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_selfcare=1 -0.583*** (0.150) -0.146 (0.0942) 
spouse_notwork=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_notwork=1 -0.0982*** (0.0325) -0.183*** (0.0269) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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Table A2.5: Probit model results (continue)  
 Male 
 
Female 
child3 -0.0406 (0.0439) -0.619*** (0.0183) 
child6 0.104** (0.0460) -0.171*** (0.0184) 
child10 0.117*** (0.0388) -0.00484 (0.0160) 
child15 0.165*** (0.0317) 0.0982*** (0.0137) 
childover15 0.162*** (0.0296) 0.0352*** (0.0135) 
family size  -0.0758*** (0.00557) -0.0718*** (0.00375) 
farm business=0 (base) - - - - 
farm business=1 -0.0479 (0.0297) -0.233*** (0.0175) 
other3 0.511*** (0.104) -0.312*** (0.0777) 
other6 0.460*** (0.0990) -0.0235 (0.0766) 
other10 0.533*** (0.0964) 0.0387 (0.0752) 
other15 0.633*** (0.0952) 0.228*** (0.0742) 
other15_60 -0.465*** (0.0829) -0.127* (0.0686) 
hhover60 0.0880*** (0.0161) 0.159*** (0.0109) 
hhdisable 0.0621* (0.0322) 0.0306 (0.0211) 
household housing debt 0.00989*** (0.00260) 0.00347** (0.00143) 
household education debt 0.00614 (0.00520) 0.0182*** (0.00319) 
household consumption debt 0.0186*** (0.00173) 0.0170*** (0.00103) 
year=2009 (base) - - - - 
year=2011 -0.0280 (0.0240) -0.0357** (0.0144) 
year=2013 -0.0960*** (0.0265) -0.0837*** (0.0157) 
year=2015 -0.140*** (0.0268) -0.119*** (0.0160) 
municipal area=1 (base) - - - - 
rural area=2 0.0837*** (0.0201) 0.0834*** (0.0120) 
constant -0.992*** (0.289) -1.248*** (0.144) 
observations 59437 77402 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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2.11 Appendix 2.V: Marginal effects 
Table A2.6: Marginal effects  
 Male Female 
Dependent variable Employed Employed 
log of daily wage 0.0485*** (0.00642) 0.106*** (0.00779) 
log of yearly unearned income  -0.00658*** (0.000269) -0.0117*** (0.000375) 
real monthly income of spouse -0.000963*** (0.000130) -0.00203*** (0.000130) 
age ≤ 25 (base) - - - - 
age 26-40 0.0632*** (0.00389) 0.0749*** (0.00582) 
age 41-59 0.0155** (0.00645) -0.0534*** (0.00750) 
age ≥ 60 -0.0420*** (0.0109) -0.301*** (0.00997) 
under primary (base) - - - - 
primary -0.000863 (0.00379) 0.0257*** (0.00608) 
middle -0.0176*** (0.00446) 0.00539 (0.00728) 
high -0.0137*** (0.00520) 0.0356*** (0.00836) 
post-secondary -0.00842 (0.00698) 0.0859*** (0.0113) 
undergraduate -0.0294*** (0.00941) 0.167*** (0.0130) 
postgraduate 0.0165 (0.0110) 0.266*** (0.0161) 
other 0.00890 (0.00551) 0.0352*** (0.00795) 
never married (base) - - - - 
married 0.0475*** (0.00498) -0.0981*** (0.00609) 
widowed 0.00214 (0.00902) -0.0418*** (0.00731) 
divorced 0.0358*** (0.00712) 0.0447*** (0.00880) 
separated 0.0367*** (0.00624) 0.0425*** (0.00813) 
married (unconfirmed)  -0.0657 (0.112) 0.0201 (0.124) 
disability=0 (base) - - - - 
disability=1 -0.0177 (0.0118) -0.0699*** (0.0198) 
no spouse (base) - - - - 
spouse age ≤ 25  0.0536*** (0.00541) 0.0698*** (0.00966) 
spouse age 26-40 0.0511*** (0.00495) 0.0688*** (0.00624) 
spouse age 41-59 0.0275*** (0.00550) 0.0143** (0.00629) 
spouse age ≥ 60 -0.0213** (0.0104) -0.105*** (0.00967) 
spouse_disable=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_disable=1 -0.0345* (0.0184) 0.0622*** (0.0157) 
spouse_selfcare=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_selfcare=1 -0.0948*** (0.0314) -0.0423 (0.0277) 
spouse_notwork=0 (base) - - - - 
spouse_notwork=1 -0.0121*** (0.00417) -0.0535*** (0.00804) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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Table A2.6: Marginal effects (continue)  
 Male 
 
Female 
child3 -0.00480 (0.00519) -0.176*** (0.00512) 
child6 0.0123** (0.00544) -0.0486*** (0.00524) 
child10 0.0139*** (0.00459) -0.00138 (0.00457) 
child15 0.0195*** (0.00375) 0.0280*** (0.00390) 
childover15 0.0192*** (0.00350) 0.0100*** (0.00384) 
family size -0.00896*** (0.000658) -0.0204*** (0.00106) 
farm business=0 (base) - - - - 
farm business=1 -0.00579 (0.00368) -0.0680*** (0.00523) 
other3 0.0604*** (0.0123) -0.0890*** (0.0221) 
other6 0.0544*** (0.0117) -0.00670 (0.0218) 
other10 0.0630*** (0.0114) 0.0110 (0.0214) 
other15 0.0749*** (0.0112) 0.0649*** (0.0211) 
other15_60 -0.0550*** (0.00980) -0.0361* (0.0196) 
hhover60 0.0104*** (0.00191) 0.0453*** (0.00310) 
hhdisable 0.00734* (0.00381) 0.00872 (0.00600) 
household housing debt 0.00117*** (0.000307) 0.000989** (0.000408) 
household education debt 0.000727 (0.000615) 0.00520*** (0.000910) 
household consumption debt 0.00219*** (0.000205) 0.00485*** (0.000291) 
year=2009 (base) - - - - 
year=2011 -0.00312 (0.00267) -0.0101** (0.00405) 
year=2013 -0.0111*** (0.00308) -0.0237*** (0.00445) 
year=2015 -0.0167*** (0.00320) -0.0338*** (0.00456) 
municipal area=1 (base) - - - - 
rural area=2 0.00971*** (0.00229) 0.0236*** (0.00336) 
observations 59437 77402 
Pseudo R2 0.184 0.237 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controlled for provinces: Yes 
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 Individual and family labour supply in 
Thailand: A structural discrete hours 
approach 
3.1 Introduction 
 Background 
As previously mentioned in Section 1.1, Thailand has been facing serious economic difficulties which 
are slow economic growth, the middle-income trap, and economic inequality. Thai governments have 
been attempted to deal with these economic issues with several policies such as increasing minimum 
wages, revising personal income tax brackets, and providing welfare supports. Public policies 
theoretically affect labour supply behaviour and subsequently lead to economic structural changes, 
e.g., boosting economic growth rate and reducing income inequality. Investigation of labour supply 
hence helps an understanding of how people make a decision on working and leisure. This is beneficial 
for policy formation and evaluation.  
Previous studies on labour supply in developing countries usually adopt continuous hours models and 
focuses either individual or household labour supply. Schultz (1990) studies family labour supply in 
Thailand during  the distant past, 1980-1981. Bardhan (1979) studies labour supply of the agricultural 
sector in India using data during October 1972 to September 1973. Sharif (1991) estimates 12 different 
equations to study labour of poor workers in India during 1970-1971. Dessing (2002) investigates 
labour supply of low-income households in the Philippines. Yamada (2008) study labour supply in Peru 
using a cross-sectional dataset in 2002 and a pooled dataset from 1985 to 2000. The model is 
considered an individual labour supply model rather than a family labour supply one although it 
accounts for a marital status factor.  
Due to some advantages over the continuous labour supply models as discussed later in Section 3.2.2, 
the discrete hours labour supply models become widely applied in recent empirical studies. With 
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regard to existing work using discrete choice models to investigate hours labour supply, most of the 
studies focus on labour supply in developed countries. Additionally, they usually investigate either 
individual or family labour supply. There are several examples of studies in developed countries. van 
Soest (1995), which is considered as the seminal paper of structural discrete hours labour supply 
modelling, studies family labour supply in Netherlands. Keane and Moffitt (1998) study individual 
labour supply in the U.S. with the inclusion of welfare program participation. Duncan and Harris (2002) 
study sole parent labour supply in Australia. Kabátek et al. (2014) investigate household labour supply 
behaviour in France. There are a few studies, such as those by Labeaga et al. (2008) and de Boer (2016), 
cover both individual and household labour supply; however, they studied developed countries, 
namely, Spain and Netherland respectively.  
Only one previous paper, Gong and van Soest (2002), investigates a developing country using the 
discrete hours labour supply model, studying the labour supply of married females in Mexico City. This 
chapter contributes to the existing body of literature by adopting the discrete hours labour supply 
model to investigate labour supply in Thailand (as a developing country) at both individual and family 
labour supply levels. It can be expected that people in countries with different degrees of economic 
development possibly have different labour supply behaviours. Studying labour supply 
comprehensively helps gain a better understanding of the labour market in Thailand and other 
developing countries with similar contexts. 
Investigating labour supply in a household (family) context provides a number of important extensions 
since many tax and benefit policies are designed to have impacts on labour supply behaviour; these 
policies can be appropriately understood within a household labour supply framework (Blundell and 
Macurdy, 1999). Studying individual labour supply is also important as the number of households 
consisting a single individual with no children has increased as the demographic structure is transiting 
to an ageing society with a low birth rate. In fact, the percentage of one-person households in Thailand 
by the number of households has doubled during the last three decades (1987-2013); and this type of 
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family and multi-member households behave differently in certain aspects (The United Nations 
Population Fund Thailand and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board., 
2015). 
According to Aaberge and Colombino (2014), there are three main modelling strategies for studying 
labour supply. Firstly, the reduced form approach was widely applied up to the early 1970s. In general, 
this approach has problematic issues when corner solutions and non-linear budget constraints are 
present. Corner solutions, where hours worked is equivalent to zero, are typically ignored or handled 
as interior solutions; non-linearity of the budget constraints due to income taxes and benefits are 
ignored or taken into account by applying the average net wage rate.  
Secondly, the structural approach is developed to account for drawbacks of the reduced form 
approach. This approach also offers a researcher the ability to identify preferences of individuals, to 
deal with unobserved wage rates, and to account for measurement errors, involuntary 
unemployment, and quantity constraints in the choice sets. However, the structural approach with a 
continuous dependent variable has some drawbacks. It is computationally cumbersome when 
individuals face non-convex budget sets or when there are more than two arguments in the utility 
function, e.g., the case of household labour supply; hence, researchers usually select relatively simple 
specifications in empirical work. Researchers applying this approach need to impose a priori the quasi-
concave utility function in order to attain computationally and statistically consistent maximum 
likelihood estimation.  
Lastly, the random utility maximisation approach is applied in response to the aforementioned 
problems. This approach is more convenient than its predecessors; it is affected neither by the 
complex budget set due to complicated tax-benefit rules nor by multiple goods included in the utility 
function. The deterministic part of the utility function is allowed to be very flexible without any 
computational issues. In addition, other dimensions of choices such as fertility, occupational choice, 
and leisure of other members can be implemented into the model.  
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This chapter applies the final approach, in particular, a discrete hours labour supply model, to 
investigate labour supply behaviour in Thailand. This model focuses on the supply side of the market 
only. Several specifications with different degrees of flexibility for individual and household labour 
supply are estimated by the conditional/multinomial logit models and the mixed logit models to 
identify the most appropriate model for individual and household labour supply that fits the Thai 
dataset. Later, additional tests are also performed to check the robustness of the model.   
 Organisation of the chapter 
The next section, 3.2, is theoretical and empirical methodology. It starts with how the simple discrete 
choice model can be estimated in labour supply settings. Second, it discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of the model. Third, empirical techniques for obtaining predicted wages are described. 
The fourth sub-section provides information about utility function specifications for individual and 
household labour supply. The fifth part provides information about the incorporation of observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity into labour supply models. The next sub-section explains how 
incorporation of labour market participation into the model can be done to prevent that some hours 
points are not well-represented by the models. Then, it discusses maximum simulated likelihood 
estimation. Finally, information about empirical estimation models of individual and household labour 
supply is provided. The models are specified based on different degrees of model flexibility.  
Section 3.3 describes the Thai dataset used in this chapter. The first part provides overall descriptive 
statistics of the Thai dataset obtained from the HSES. The next sub-sections describe disposable 
income calculation for each hours point in this empirical essay. The last two sub-sections present 
descriptive statistics for individual and family labour supply, respectively.  
Section 3.4 shows estimation results of individual and family labour supply in Thailand. The first two 
sub-sections provide the results for individual labour supply whilst the next two sub-sections present 
the results for family labour supply. The results at each labour supply level include labour supply 
estimated coefficients as well as calculated marginal utilities and examinations of essential conditions. 
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Then, Section 3.4.5 provides the model selection criteria and shows the preferred labour supply model 
for each sup-group. The last part contains the results of robustness checks for the preferred models. 
The summary of labour supply in Thailand and suggestions for policy microsimulations, which are 
investigated in the last empirical chapter, are provided in the final part of the chapter, Section 3.5.   
3.2 Theoretical and empirical methodology 
 Discrete choice model estimation for labour supply 
The major distinguishing of the discrete hours choice models relative to the continuous hours labour 
supply models, which has continuous hours worked as the independent variable, is that the former 
has a discretised choice set. In other words, each responding decision unit (individual or family) is 
assumed to be able to choose among a list of alternatives, 𝑗 = 1,2, … 𝐽, in the choice set of 
combinations between income and leisure hours (van Soest, 1995). In addition, the discrete hours 
models assume all agents (either individuals or households) have the same available set of hours 
alternatives (Aaberge and Colombino, 2014). 
The basic discrete choice model which is usually applied in labour supply studies is known as the 
conditional/multinomial logit model. Based on a RUM, a unit of analysis (either individual or 
household level) maximises utility with respect to a budget constraint which is a function of leisure 
and income.  
The general form of the utility functions for individual labour supply is as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗(𝑌𝑛𝑗 , 𝐿𝑗;  𝑍𝑛, 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑛𝑗  (3 - 1) 
where 𝑈𝑛𝑗  is the utility of an individual 𝑛 received from an alternative 𝑗; 𝑌𝑛𝑗  represents the net income 
of an individual 𝑛 who selects an alternative 𝑗; 𝐿𝑗  is leisure hours an individual chooses which is 
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assumed to be equivalent to 𝑇𝐸 − 𝐻𝑗  (𝑇𝐸 is the total time endowment
15; and 𝐻𝑗  is hours worked from 
an alternative 𝑗); 𝑍𝑛 is a vector of individual characteristics; 𝛽 is a column vector of coefficients; and 
𝜀𝑛𝑗  is an error term which reflects idiosyncrasies of an individual 𝑛 on alternative 𝑗, this unsystematic 
component is usually assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variable. 
The utility of a household is more complicated than that of an individual since more arguments are 
included in the utility function as shown below.  
 
𝑈𝑔𝑗 = 𝑉𝑔𝑗(𝑌𝑔𝑗 , 𝐿𝑚𝑗 , 𝐿𝑓𝑗;  𝑍𝑔, 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑔𝑗  (3 - 2) 
𝑈𝑔𝑗  indicates the utility of a household 𝑔 which chooses an alternative 𝑗. However, it is clearly seen 
that two leisure arguments appearing in the utility function; they are leisure of males, 𝐿𝑚𝑗, and 
females 𝐿𝑓𝑗. 𝑍𝑔 is designated as a vector of household characteristics whilst 𝛽 is a vector of 
coefficients. 𝜀𝑔𝑗  which captures unobservable preferences of a household 𝑔 which affect the utility 
from 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ choice is an i.i.d. stochastic component. 
On the other hand, the budget constaints of individuals and households are expressed as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑛𝑗 = 𝑤𝑛 ∗ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑛, 𝐻𝑗 , 𝑦𝑛, 𝑍𝑛) (3 - 3) 
 
𝑌𝑔𝑗 = 𝑤𝑚 ∗ 𝐻𝑚 + 𝑤𝑓 ∗ 𝐻𝑓 + 𝑦𝑔 −  𝑇(𝑤𝑚, 𝐻𝑚, 𝑤𝑓 , 𝐻𝑓 , 𝑦𝑔, 𝑍𝑔) (3 - 4) 
where 𝑦 designates unearned income; 𝑇 represents the income tax which depends on arguments in 
parentheses. For an individual, the tax is calculated from individual wage, working hours, other 
unearned income, and individual characteristics. Considering a household agent, computation of the 
                                                            
15 Many empirical studies assumed 𝑇𝐸 to be equal to 80 hours per week. However, this chapter assumes 𝑇𝐸 to 
be 100 hours per week. This is because a fair number of Thai people work longer than 80 hours per week.  
Each week has 168 hours; assuming 𝑇𝐸 = 100 allows 68 hours for necessary activities, e.g., sleeping and eating. 
In addition, this setting, i.e., 100 hours per week, is beneficial if one applies a direct translog utility function. 
Different forms of 𝑇𝐸 do not significantly affect the marginal utilities. Callen et al. (2009) indicate that another 
choice of 𝑇𝐸 would give an identical model.  
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income tax accounts for both partners’ wages (male and female), working hours of both, household 
non-working income, and characteristics of the household.     
 Hence, the agent’s problems for individuals and households take the following form. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑛𝑗  subject to 𝑌𝑛𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑛 ∗ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑛 , 𝐻𝑗 , 𝑦𝑛, 𝑍𝑛) (3 - 5) 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑔𝑗  subject to 𝑌𝑔𝑗 ≤ 𝑤𝑚 ∗ 𝐻𝑚 + 𝑤𝑓 ∗ 𝐻𝑓 + 𝑦𝑔 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑚, 𝐻𝑚, 𝑤𝑓 , 𝐻𝑓 , 𝑦𝑔, 𝑍𝑔) (3 - 6) 
The solution to these equations is complicated as 𝑇(𝑤𝑛, 𝐻𝑗 , 𝑦𝑛, 𝑍𝑛) and 𝑇(𝑤𝑚, 𝐻𝑚 , 𝑤𝑓 , 𝐻𝑓 , 𝑦𝑔, 𝑍𝑔) are 
non-linear. This makes 𝑌𝑛𝑗  and 𝑌𝑔𝑗  non-linear as well. The optimisation for a given marginal tax rate is 
always possible and a parametric Marshallian labour supply function is obtained; the discrete choice 
approach begins by utility specification (see Section 3.2.1 for more details) and coefficient estimation 
instead of estimating the Marshallian labour supply parameter as done in continuous models (Labeaga 
et al., 2008).  
It is worth remarking that, in the household setting which is based on the static unitary household 
labour supply model, only one utility function is maximised by the couple (i.e. the model treats each 
household as one decision unit); this is a sensible assumption for households in which incomes of 
members are entirely pooled (Creedy and Kalb, 2005a). The static collective labour supply model may 
be more suitable if household members do not combine all incomes. This study selects the unitary 
model because the dataset combines all unearned incomes at the household level as well as it is 
simpler than the collective model which requires some extra assumptions or tasks, such as, resources 
allocation in households. Hence, the joint labour supply of both husband and wife is simultaneously 
estimated based on the assumption of one decision unit.  
In practice, the utility of each alternative is unobservable. An analyst observes only the selected 
alternative which is assumed to yield the highest utility among all available alternatives. In other 
words, an agent 𝑎, which represents 𝑛 and 𝑔 for individual and household level respectively, chooses 
a leisure hours option 𝑗 if the level of utility is greater than any other alternative 𝑖. 
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𝑈𝑎𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑎𝑖for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 and all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (3 - 7) 
By substituting for 𝑈𝑎𝑗  using equation (3 - 1) for individual or (3 - 2) household labour labour supply 
to obtain this following equation.  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑖 ≥ 𝜀𝑎𝑖 − 𝜀𝑎𝑗  for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 and all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (3 - 8) 
Then the equation (3 - 8) is rearranged to yield the expression as follows: 
 
𝜀𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝜀𝑎𝑗 + 𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑖 for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 and all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (3 - 9) 
Hence, for any given value of the random component of the alternative 𝑗, the probability that 𝑈𝑎𝑗, 
exceeds all other unsystematic component values of other alternatives 𝑖, is equivalent to the joint 
probability that  𝜀𝑎𝑗 + 𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎1 ≥ 𝜀𝑎1 and 𝜀𝑎𝑗 + 𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎2 ≥ 𝜀𝑎2 and so on for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼. If the 
numerous distributions are independent, the joint probability is basically the product of all separate 
probabilities, 𝑃(𝜀𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝜀𝑎𝑗 + 𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑖). Hence, the probability that hours choice 𝑗 offers maximum 
utility is expressed as follows:  
 ∏ 𝑃(𝜀𝑎𝑖 ≤ 𝜀𝑎𝑗 + 𝑉𝑎𝑗 − 𝑉𝑎𝑖)
𝑖≠𝑗
 (3 -10) 
The equation (3 -10) is the conditional probability, for a given value of 𝜀𝑎𝑗. The total probability is 
easily obtained by aggregating terms as equation (3 -10) over all possible 𝜀𝑎𝑗  values. To simplify the 
analysis, the distribution of 𝜀𝑎𝑗  for each 𝑗  is assumed to have an identical form (Creedy and Kalb, 
2005b). 
Some additional assumptions are made. First, the unsystematic component is a continuous random 
variable. Second, the unsystematic components are assumed to be i.i.d. with the extreme value type 
1 error distribution (extreme value distribution) over all alternatives, the difference between utilities 
from alternatives follows a logistic distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
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In short, based on McFadden (1973) showed, the probability of an alternative 𝑗 being selected by an 
agent 𝑎 is as follows:  
 
𝑝𝑎𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑈𝑎𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑎𝑖) =
exp(𝑉𝑎𝑗)
∑ exp(𝑉𝑎𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1
; 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑀 (3 -11) 
To calculate the probability for the alternatives, the parameters of the direct utility function need to 
be estimated, i.e., the agent’s preferences for income and leisure are determined.  The parameters in 
the utility function can be obtained by a conditional/multinomial logit using maximum likelihood.  
The joint probability that agent 1 chooses 𝑙1𝑗, agent 2 chooses 𝑙2𝑗, agent 3 chooses 𝑙3𝑗, and so on is 
given by the product of each agent’s probability for alternative 𝑗 with an assumption that each decision 
agent (individuals for individual labour supply or households for family labour supply) makes the 
decision on labour supply independently. In other words, its decision is not affected by the alternative 
selected by any other decision unit. The expression is shown as follows: 
 
𝑃(𝑙1𝑗 , … 𝑙𝐴𝑗) = 𝑝1𝑗𝑝2𝑗 … 𝑝𝐴𝑗 = ∏
exp(𝑉𝑎𝑗)
∑ exp𝑀𝑖=1 (𝑉𝑎𝑖)
𝐴
𝑎=1
 (3 -12) 
This joint probability concerns the probability of the set of alternatives, 𝑙𝑎𝑗, (leisure hours levels for 
individuals and combination of leisure hours levels between male and female for households) for 
1, … , 𝐴, being chosen by 𝐴 agents (either 𝑁 individuals or 𝐺 households) given their preferences and 
socio-economic characteristics as well as assuming that all values of 𝜀 follow the extreme value type 
1 distribution. 
The parameters of the assumed form of the preference function are unknown for researchers; 
however, information about the working hours of each individual in a random sample obtained from 
the whole population is available. Regarding the individual level, the hours worked can be applied 
directly whilst, for the household case, both of the partners’ hours worked are taken into 
consideration. Individual and household socio-economic characteristics are observable in practice. 
Disposable income of each agent (individual or household) at each discrete hours point are obtained 
 86 
 
by using predicted wages, hours worked, socio-economic characteristics, and tax rules. The details as 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.  
The probability in the previous equation, (3 -12), can be considered from another perspective. With 
an assumption about the general form of the utility functions and a given set of observed choices, the 
parameter values, which if they are true, they will produce the highest probability observing the actual 
hours, can be obtained. In other words, the equation (3 -12) is reinterpreted as a functional expression 
of unknown parameter values. 
When the utility function of each agent depends upon a vector of parameter 𝛽, with element 𝛽𝑠, for 
𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆. The probability statement based on equation (3 -12) can be specified as 
 
𝐿(𝛽1, … 𝛽𝑆) = ∏
exp(𝑉𝑎𝑗)
∑ exp𝑀𝑖=1 (𝑉𝑎𝑖)
𝐴
𝑎=1
 (3 -13) 
where 𝐿(𝛽1, … 𝛽𝑆) is known as the likelihood function representing an unknown parameters function 
for a given sample in which hours worked are available. The likelihood function needs to be maximised 
over the coefficients 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑆 of the utility function. In fact, the estimated coefficients, ?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑆, are 
yielded by finding values for 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑆 which maximise the value of the function, i.e., the parameters 
with the highest likelihood value given the observed labour supply distribution are estimated. These 
estimated parameters are known as maximum likelihood estimates. 
By taking logarithms, the log-likelihood function for this model is given as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿 = ∑ [𝑈𝑎𝑗 − log (∑ exp
𝑀
𝑖=1
(𝑈𝑎𝑖))]
𝐴
𝑎=1
 (3 -14) 
This monotonic transformation provide less computational burdens in estimation whilst it does not 
affect the maximum likelihood estimates. However, in general, this standard discrete hours labour 
supply model using the conditional/multinomial logit model does not fit data of labour supply so well 
(Aaberge and Colombino, 2014). van Soest (1995) suggests that the model over-predicts the numbers 
 87 
 
of part-time jobs, and it does not allow for random preference heterogeneity. This chapter modifies 
the conditional/multinomial logit model to fit the dataset better; the modifications are presented in 
Section 3.2.5, 3.2.6, and 3.2.7.  
In empirical studies, applying a discrete choice approach of labour supply requires considering a 
number of available alternatives (working hours) for each individual. Under the individual setting, 
numbers of working hours are multiples of a given fixed interval length, 𝐼𝐿, and each hours worked 
alternative, 𝑗; in other words, ℎ𝑗 = 𝑗𝐼𝐿 for some 𝑗 ∈ {0, … . . , 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑 −. Consequently, the choice set for 
individual labour supply is equivalent to 𝑘 = 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑. For the household labour supply, hours worked of 
both partners are taken into consideration. The husband’s alternatives of working hours are  ℎ𝑚𝑗 =
𝑗𝑚𝐼𝐿 for some 𝑗 ∈ {0, … . . , 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑑 − 1} whilst the wife’s alternatives of working hours are ℎ𝑓𝑗 = 𝑗𝑓𝐼𝐿 
for some 𝑗 ∈ {0, … . . , 𝑘𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑 − 1}. The available choice set of each household is hence 𝑘𝑚(𝑘𝑓) or 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑
2  
if both have the exact number of alternatives.  
In survey data, people usually report weekly hours worked as an integer; hence, 𝐼𝐿 = 1 seems to be 
a natural choice. In practice, however, 𝐼𝐿 is expanded so as to limit the computational burden of the 
estimation process. Some studies assume that the choice set comprises only few alternatives, e.g., 
non-participation, part-time, and full-time; the common approach is adopting an equally spaced hours 
points (Aaberge et al., 2009). This chapter selects to apply the common method. Previous empirical 
studies selected different fixed interval length making different numbers of alternatives; few examples 
are provided as follows. van Soest (1995) decides 𝐼𝐿 = 10 or 𝐼𝐿 = 12 to reduce the computation 
burden during the estimation procedure. This allows each family to have 25 or 36 choice possibilities. 
Creedy et al. (2002) and Duncan and Harris (2002) use 𝐼𝐿 = 5 and provide 11 alternatives of hours 
worked on individual labour supply and 121 choice opportunities for household labour supply.  
 
 88 
 
Hence, each individual is assumed to maximise utility function over a set of discrete hours points 𝐿𝑗 ∈
{𝐿1, 𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝐽}. The observability rule for a discrete hours choice labour supply in this chapter is: 
 
𝐿𝑗 = 𝐿
1 if 𝐿 ≤ 𝐿1
𝐵 
 
 
= 𝐿2 if 𝐿1
𝐵 < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐿2
𝐵 
 
 
…………………………… 
 
 
            = 𝐿𝐽−1 if 𝐿𝐽−2
𝐵  < 𝐿 ≤ 𝐿𝐽−1
𝐵  
 
 
                                                         = 𝐿𝐽 if 𝐿 > 𝐿𝐽−1
𝐵  
 
This chapter uses 𝐼𝐿 = 8 for each individual; this is in-line with usual working hours per day in 
Thailand. This chapter also considers the actual hours worked distribution as exhibited in FIGURE A3.1 
in Appendix 3.I. In fact, in all panels the largest proportion of working people spend roughly 48 hours 
per week. The other spike in every panel is about 40, 32, and 56 hours. All these number are related 
to 𝐼𝐿 = 8 since they are divisible by eight. The total number of alternatives available for each 
individual are equivalent to 11 hours points which are identical to what used in Creedy et al. (2002) 
and Duncan and Harris (2002). Thus, in the individual labour supply setting, people are assumed to 
have 11 leisure hours choice opportunities; in the household labour supply, each family is allowed to 
select one out of 121 combinations of husband and wife leisure hours.  
 Advantages and drawbacks of discrete hours labour supply models 
The discrete hours choice labour supply models based on RUM have been a dominating paradigm in 
labour supply studies (Aaberge and Colombino, 2014). There are several advantages why it became 
more popular than the continuous hours models in labour supply literature regarding labour supply 
with policy simulation (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b).  
Firstly, the discrete hours approach can be considered as more realistic, compared with the 
continuous hours counterpart, because, in practice, a limited number of hours worked (part-time and 
full-time jobs) are available. This is supported by the observed peaks in hours distributions in many 
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countries.  This coincides with the assumption of the discrete models in which agents are able to select 
a relatively small number of hours choices rather than being allowed to alter hours work continuously. 
From this perspective, the continuous approach is just an approximation to a discrete optimisation 
problem (Gong and van Soest, 2002). 
Secondly, the discrete hours models require considerably less complex information of the budget set 
faced by each agent. The models simplify the information by estimating utility at a small number of 
hours levels (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b). By using utility maximisation with a discretised budget set, the 
discrete hours approach prevents the complexities arising from a non-linear budget constraint 
characterised by non-linear tax and benefit systems (Creedy and Duncan, 2002). Under a non-linear 
budget constraint, the continuous hours models face some difficulties. For example, with non-
convexity of the budget constraint, theory allows multiple combinations of the arguments 
(consumption and leisure hours) to achieve the same level of utility; this makes identification of 
preference parameters difficult (Myck and Reed, 2006). In practice, it is cumbersome to evaluate the 
complete range of each person’s unique budget set since most tax and transfer structures are 
complex. This issue becomes further complicated when investigating family labour supply with joint 
utility maximisation due to the three-dimensional budget constraint of households. In a nutshell, the 
discrete hours models are less complicated than the continuous hours models in incorporating 
taxation, social security, and social welfare details in estimation as well as simulation.  
Thirdly, the discrete hours approach with a structural modelling technique early developed by van 
Soest (1995) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) allows researchers to incorporate random heterogeneity 
(details in Section 3.2.5) into the models. The discrete hours model can deal with the population 
heterogeneity which is an essential feature of cross-sectional datasets (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b).  
The disadvantages of a limited number of choice opportunities are rounding errors, i.e., the difference 
between numbers results from calculated approximation and exact mathematical computation due 
to rounding, and the incomplete utilisation of available information (van Soest, 1995). For instance, 
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the actual hours worked of an individual is 43 hours per week, the number is reduced to 40 in the 
disposable income calculation process because the closest available hours choice is 40 hours per week. 
This causes some rounding error in the income calculation process.  
 Predicted wages for non-working individuals 
In empirical labour supply studies, it is important to obtain hourly wage information to calculate the 
disposable income at different counterfactual hours worked alternatives for every individual. Whilst 
the wage rates for actual workers can be calculated from information in a survey, e.g., gross earned 
income and hours of works, the wage rates are unobservable for non-workers. Missing wages for these 
individuals has become a common issue as found in research on labour supply; however, this issue 
can lead to the selection bias if observations with unobserved values are dropped or these values are 
defined to be equivalent to zero.  
This chapter follows Sahn and Alderman (1988) and Benczur et al. (2014) by applying the two-stage 
Heckman selection model pioneered by Heckman (1979) to deal with the predicted wage issue (See 
detail in Section 2.2.6). The predicted hourly are estimated by gender as done in Kabátek et al. (2014). 
The empirical strategy for wage prediction in Chapter 2 and 3 are pretty similar; however, this chapter 
applies hourly wages as the dependent variable instead of daily wages as in the previous chapter. This 
chapter selects to impute predicted hourly wages for all individuals in the sample (in which the 
predicted values are provided for those with missing wages and those with reported wages). This make 
the wage imputation consistent with the previous chapter and helps prevent biased estimates caused 
by two distinct wage distributions, namely, the observed one for actual workers and the imputed one 
for non-workers (Löffler et al., 2014a; MaCurdy et al., 1990). The details of the econometric model in 
wage prediction are discussed in Section 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
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 Quadratic direct utility function 
In labour supply estimation using discrete choice models, one of the important aspects is the utility 
functional form. This chapter applies the quadratic direct utility function for investigating individual 
and household labour supply behaviour. 
The quadratic direct utility function has a long history in theoretical and empirical aspects of 
economics. According to Creedy et al. (2002), the quadratic direct utility function was firstly applied 
in Launhardt’s work in 1885 which uses the exchange model of Jevons and Walras to examine supply 
and demand curves for two parties in which the utility increases at diminishing rates. Allen and Bowley 
(1935) is another example of the early application of the quadratic direct utility function. They adopted 
the utility function to present that for any form by which the marginal rate of substitution is a linear 
function of two tradable goods; the expenditure spent on each good is a linear function of total 
expenditure; the coefficients are dependants upon the prices of goods.  
However, later on, the quadratic form of the direct utility function had been generally neglected in 
theoretical or empirical studies, until more recently, it has been widely adopted in empirical research 
on labour supply, e.g., Duncan and Weeks (1997), Keane and Moffitt (1998), Blundell et al. (2000), 
Creedy et al. (2002), Duncan and Harris (2002), Labeaga et al. (2008), Kabátek et al. (2014). 
There are two other utility functions which are applied in previous empirical studies. The first one is 
the translog form of the quadratic direct utility function, the utility function is expressed as a quadratic 
function in the logarithms. The examples of studies using this utility function are van Soest (1995), van 
Soest and Das (2001), Haan (2006), and  (Flood et al., 2007). The other utility function is the Box-Cox 
utility function. This function are used by e.g. Aaberge et al. (1995), Aaberge et al. (1999), Dagsvik and 
StrØm (2006),  Aaberge et al. (2009), Dagsvik et al. (2011) , and Blundell and Shephard (2012).  
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This chapter uses the quadratic utility function because it is more widely used in existing literature as 
well as having advantageous features over other functional forms as discussed later. In this chapter, 
the quadratic direct utility functions for both levels are expressed as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑎𝑗 = 𝑣
′𝐴𝑣 + 𝑏′𝑣 + 𝜀𝑎𝑗  (3 -15) 
where 𝑣 is a matrix containing income and leisure; it will be two arguments (𝑌𝑛𝑗  and , 𝐿𝑗) for the 
individual level and three arguments (𝑌𝑔𝑗, 𝐿𝑚𝑗, and 𝐿𝑓𝑗) for the household level; a symmetric matrix 
𝐴 which is a 2*2 matrix for the individual labour supply and a 3*3 matrix for the household labour 
supply and a column matrix 𝑏′ containing the preference parameters. The unobservable random 
component, 𝜀𝑎𝑗, captures unobservable preferences.  
The simple quadratic form of the direct utility function for the individual labour supply is expressed as 
follows: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑌𝑛𝑗𝐿𝑗 + 𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗  (3 -16) 
As presented, two main arguments in the utility function are 𝑌 for individual net income and 𝐿 for 
leisure hours. While the coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 reflect preferences of individuals in the sample. This 
specification allows non-linear marginal utility through the quadratic terms, namely, 𝛼𝑌𝑌 and 𝛼𝐿𝐿. For 
instance, if 𝛼𝑌𝑌 has a negative value, the marginal utility of income will decline with increasing amount 
of income. The cross-product term between net income and leisure hours, 𝛼𝑌𝐿, allows for investigating 
whether these two arguments are complementary or substitutable. For example, the additional net 
income may be less appreciated if the availability of leisure time decreases, i.e., people do not have 
time to spend money they earned.  
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The quadratic direct utility function is augmented to permit for households comprising of couples. The 
utility function for the household level is more complicated than for an individual as shown below:  
 
              𝑈𝑔𝑗 = 𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑚𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑓𝑗
2 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑚𝑌𝑔𝑗𝐿𝑚𝑗  
                          +𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑓𝑌𝑔𝑗𝐿𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑚𝑗𝐿𝑓𝑗 + 𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑗 + 𝛽𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑚𝑗 + 𝛽𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑓𝑗 + 𝜀𝑔𝑗  
 
(3 -17) 
Regarding household labour supply, three main arguments are included in the utility function. 𝑌𝑔𝑗  
designates each household net income at each alternative whilst, in a given family, 𝐿𝑚𝑗, and 𝐿𝑓𝑗  
indicates leisure hours of a male and leisure time of a female respectively. Similar to the individual 
level, the non-linear marginal utility function is still captured through the quadratic terms; the 
interaction terms between net income and leisure hours for both partners, i.e., 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑚  and 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑓  still 
allow for complementarity or substitutability. The extra cross-product, 𝛼𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓, informs if the male’s 
leisure time complements or substitutes to the female’s leisure time. 
These quadratic direct utility functions are tractable, and also permit an extensive rage of potential 
behaviour response (Creedy et al., 2002). The main reason why this chapter uses a quadratic direct 
utility function instead of a basic linear direct utility function is that the former provides more 
flexibility and allows non-constant marginal utility of income, i.e., usually utility functions allow for 
diminishing marginal utility; furthermore, the cross-product terms in the quadratic direct utility 
function indicate whether the arguments are complements (if the coefficient is positive) or substitute 
(if the coefficient is negative) (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b). This chapter selects to use leisure hours rather 
than working hours as specified in e.g. Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Labeaga et al. (2008) because 
the leisure hours argument reflects the utility of an agent more directly. Creedy and Kalb (2005a) state 
that the argument for hours of work is applied as the complement of leisure hours in the utility 
function.  
The translog utility function has similar advantages as the quadratic utility function (Kalb et al., 2018). 
In fact, it also allows non-linear marginal utility as well as capturing complementarity or substitutability 
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between income and leisure. However, Creedy et al. (2002) indicated that awkwardness from the 
logarithmic transformations can appear where fixed costs of labour market participation are included; 
this is because consumption can be negative (fixed costs exceeds total income). The Box-Cox utility 
function is beneficial when the negative marginal utility is an issue; however, it provides less flexibility 
and yield substantially larger labour supply elasticity than do the quadratic and translog utility 
functions (Mauro et al., 2017) 
The quadratic, as well as the translog utility functions, are not automatically quasi-concave across all 
possible values of estimated coefficients. This is not problematic as long as the utility function based 
on the optimal parameter values is quasi-concave in the observed labour supply points (Creedy and 
Kalb, 2005b). van Soest (1995) showed two necessary conditions to check quasi-concavity after 
obtaining the estimation result. First, marginal utility of income must be positive, so the utility function 
is quasi-concave (at income and leisure for the individual level and at income, male’s leisure, and 
female’s leisure for the household level). Second, the matrix of second order derivatives of income 
with respect to leisure (of a respondent for the individual level and of both partners for the household 
level) along the indifference surface at income and leisure must be a positive definite matrix. The 
matrix for individual and household level can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑛 = −𝑈𝑌𝑛
−1[𝑦𝐿𝑛 1] 𝐻𝑈[𝑦𝐿𝑛 1]
′ (3 -18) 
 
𝐻𝑔 = −𝑈𝑌𝑔
−1 [
𝑦𝐿𝑚 1 0
𝑦𝐿𝑓 0 1
] 𝐻𝑈 [
𝑦𝐿𝑚 1 0
𝑦𝐿𝑓 0 1
]
′
 (3 -19) 
where 𝐻 is the matrix of second order derivatives of income with respect to leisure along the 
indifference surface at income and leisure arguments;  𝑈𝑌 represents the first order derivatives of 
utility, 𝑈, with respect to income, 𝑌, while 𝐻𝑈 is as the Hessian matrix of second order derivatives of 
utility with respect to income; they are a 2*2 and 3*3 matrices for individual and household levels 
respectively; 𝑈𝑌 designates the partial derivatives of utility with respect to leisure hours;  𝑦 is equal to 
−𝑈𝐿/𝑈𝑌, i.e., the marginal rates of substitution of leisure with income; and the subscripts 𝑛, 𝑚, and 𝑙 
indicates individual, male, and female in a given unit of the decision maker.  
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In practice, 𝐻𝑛 is a 1x1 matrix; the condition that 𝐻𝑛 satisfied as a positive definite matrix if and only 
if the element is positive. 𝐻𝑔 is a systematic 2x2 matrix hence determining whether 𝐻𝑔 is positive 
definite is more complicated. In fact, there are a number of tests, e.g. an eigenvalue test and a pivot 
test, to examine whether a symmetric matrix is positive definite. This chapter applies the determinants 
test. Given a systematic 2x2 matrix, [
𝑎 𝑏
𝑏 𝑐
], this matrix is defined to be positive definite if and only if 
𝑎 > 0, and 𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏2 > 0.   
Another important condition to be checked in a discrete hours labour supply is the monotonicity of 
the utility function, because interior points of the budget set of the discrete model are a priori 
excluded since the budget set becomes discrete; the model would lose the economic meaning if the 
monotonicity condition in which the utility increases with income does not hold (van Soest, 1995). The 
utility increase in income at (income and leisure) if and only if this following expression is true. 
 
2(𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝐿) + 𝛽𝑌 > 0 (3 -20) 
 
2 (𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑚𝑌𝐿𝑚 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑓𝑌𝐿𝑓) + 𝛽𝑌 > 0 (3 -21) 
These equations (3 -20) and (3 -21) check whether the estimation results satisfy the monotonicity 
condition for the individual level and the household level, respectively.  
 Observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity 
Incorporating observed and unobserved heterogeneity allows the model to be more flexible, for 
instance, preferences of individuals with a certain characteristic, such as having a university degree, 
may differ from preferences of those without the characteristic. The random heterogeneity captures 
unobservable characteristics that affect the choice preference. This approach is also known as 
parameterisation (Kabátek et al., 2014). 
The observed preference heterogeneity approach can be applied to investigate the impact of socio-
economic characteristics on preferences as well as may help to explain behavioural differences 
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between agents with similar wages but different characteristics (Creedy and Kalb, 2005a). van Soest 
(1995) shows that observed heterogeneity across agents (families specifically) can be linearly 
introduced through any parameter in the direct utility function.  
In practice, different empirical studies incorporate preference variation across agents differently. van 
Soest (1995) introduces observed family heterogeneity through leisure of males and females as well 
as an interaction between both arguments. Keane and Moffitt (1998) apply parameterisation on the 
marginal disutility of work and the marginal disutility (i.e., costs) of welfare program participation. 
Coefficients for the taste of work show a number of children decrease labour supply significantly; 
some certain characteristics including older persons, having university education, having good health, 
and white race, positively impact female labour supply. Labeaga et al. (2008) incorporate observed 
heterogeneity on parameters of household income as well as hours worked of the household’s head 
and the spouse. Regarding individual labour supply, the results show the age factor is the only 
observed characteristic which significantly affects marginal utility of income while none of them 
affects marginal utility of leisure. In terms of family labour supply, many of characteristics influence 
marginal utility of leisure hours for both heads and spouses with statistical significance but one 
characteristic (i.e., age of the spouse) has a significant positive effect on marginal utility of income. 
Callan et al. (2009) allow for observed preference shifters through husband’s leisure and wife’s leisure. 
The results shows age, unhealthiness, and number of children influence marginal utility of leisure for 
both genders whilst presence of a child under 5 years old affect marginal utility of leisure for females 
only. Kabátek et al. (2014) assume parameters of leisure hours and working hours of both partners to 
be functions of a vector of observed household socio-economic characteristics but they do not 
introduce any demographic characteristics into the household income parameter. Some interesting 
results are observed. Age negatively affects marginal utility of leisure and housework of both genders 
with statistical significance. A very young child has significantly negative effect on market work for 
both genders. Duncan and Harris (2002) as well as Creedy et al. (2002) apply similar methodology by 
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allowing observed heterogeneity across agents on linear and squared terms of income and leisure 
parameters as well as on the fixed cost constant; however, the instruments for the linear term, the 
squared term, and the fixed cost constant are different. Duncan and Harris (2002) show that several 
factors influence marginal utility of income and leisure for sole parents. For example, having a very 
young child and a number of children increase marginal disutility of work but reduces marginal utility 
of income for sole parents. Creedy et al. (2002) show that only few characteristics affect the utility for 
sole parents but many observed taste shifters significantly influence the utility at the household level.  
Random heterogeneity can be incorporated into the model by including error terms to the expressions 
of arguments in the utility function. Previous empirical studies do not have any conclusive justification 
how to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity. Regarding studies which accounting for random 
heterogeneity terms, some of them only include a random term to a leisure hours argument such as 
van Soest (1995) and van Soest and Das (2001). Some studies incorporate random heterogeneity to 
only an income argument, e.g., Haan (2006) and Bargain et al. (2014). Some studies allow more than 
one random heterogeneity into their model; for sample, Duncan and Harris (2002) account for random 
heterogeneity at income and leisure hours arguments. Another example is Flood et al. (2007) which 
incorporate unobserved heterogeneity to income, leisure hours, fixed costs, and welfare 
participation16. It is infrequent to incorporate a random term to any squared term; Flood et al. (2004) 
allow for random heterogeneity to squared leisure hours besides leisure hours and welfare 
participation terms. Justifications for these specifications regarding unobserved heterogeneity are 
unclear. However, incorporating unobserved heterogeneity terms allows for larger degrees of 
flexibility with an assumption that decision agents (either individuals or households) have unobserved 
preferences, which are possibly different with statistical significance.  
                                                            
16 Welfare participation is a term accounting for those situations when a decision agent participate a welfare 
program e.g. working support.  
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Typically, the random preference heterogeneity is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean; some additional different assumptions on the correlation with other random heterogeneity 
terms, explanatory variables, and error terms can be found across a number of empirical studies. The 
results in previous works are also varied. 
The first group of studies consists of those which do not incorporate correlation between random 
heterogeneity. van Soest (1995) incorporates random preference heterogeneity through leisure hours 
of males and females; these random error terms are assumed to be mutually independent (no 
correlation with other random terms and covariates), and normally distributed with zero mean. The 
results between models with and without random preference heterogeneity indicate that they are 
not significantly different; this could be because of inaccuracy in estimating standard deviations of the 
random heterogeneity terms and doubtfulness in the importance of including these terms. de Boer 
(2016) allows for random heterogeneity into leisure hours; however, it is assumed independent from 
other random terms and covariates. The results show that the random preference heterogeneity for 
singles is very close to zero without statistical significance. At household level, the random preference 
heterogeneity is statistically different across males but females.  
The second group of studies includes those allowing random preference heterogeneity to be 
correlated. Keane and Moffitt (1998) allow random heterogeneity on both parameters (the marginal 
disutility of work and program participation); all error terms are assumed to follow the multivariate 
normal distribution with an unrestricted covariate matrix. The results suggest that random preference 
heterogeneity is significantly different across individuals. Duncan and Harris (2002) assume the 
stochastic heterogeneity to be jointly normally distributed with constant variances when they 
introduce random heterogeneity into models; they find some improvement in precision of preference 
parameters in the models with random heterogeneity; however, the values of parameters between 
models with and without random heterogeneity are slightly different. Kabátek et al. (2014) introduce 
unobserved heterogeneity terms which are normally distributed with zero mean with an arbitrary 
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covariance matrix. The results suggest that unobservable heterogeneity for leisure hours is greater 
than that for housework hours. In addition, their preferences positive correlated indicating assortative 
mating.  
This chapter modifies Creedy et al. (2002) and Duncan and Harris (2002) strategy for incorporation of 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, observed preference variation across agents is 
introduced into parameters of income and leisure hours at level and squared terms whilst unobserved 
random preference heterogeneity is incorporated at level terms of income and leisure hours. The 
assumption behind incorporation of unobserved heterogeneity is that people in general have their 
personal preferences on choosing the level of income and leisure hours; other terms such as squared 
terms and their observed characteristics aim to allow for larger degrees of model flexibility. However, 
for simplicity in the estimation process, this chapter assumes the random heterogeneity follows the 
normal distribution with zero mean and they are independent from any other terms in the model as 
done in many previous studies such as de Boer (2016).  
Based on the quadratic direct utility function, the linear specifications of parameters for single 
individual labour supply are expressed as follows:  
 
𝛽𝑌 = 𝛽𝑦0 + 𝛽𝑦
′ 𝑍𝑦 + 𝜔𝑦 (3 -22) 
 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑙0 + 𝛽𝑙
′𝑍𝑙 + 𝜔𝑙 (3 -23) 
where parameters with the subscript 0, namely, 𝛽𝑦0 and 𝛽𝑙0, are the constant terms, parameters with 
a transpose sign represent a vector of coefficients, 𝑍 designates a vector of socio-economic 
characteristics, and the subscripts 𝑦 and 𝑙 indicate terms in the utility function including income and 
leisure respectively. The stochastic heterogeneity terms, 𝜔, are as in Callan and van Soest (1996), 
assumed to follow the normal distribution with zero mean with a given standard deviation and they 
are not correlated with any other parameter. The set of socio-characteristics for taste variation for 
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income, 𝑍𝑦, and leisure, 𝑍𝑙, includes two dummy variables indicating if an individual is older than 40 
years old17 and if an individual has any Bachelor’s degree or higher.  
The functions of parameters for household labour supply are shown below:  
 
𝛼𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝑦𝑦0 + 𝛼𝑦𝑦
′ 𝑄𝑦𝑦 (3 -24) 
 
𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑚 = 𝛼𝑙𝑙0𝑚 + 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑚
′ 𝑄𝑙𝑙𝑚  (3 -25) 
 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓 = 𝛼𝑙𝑙0𝑓 + 𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑓
′ 𝑄𝑙𝑙𝑓  (3 -26) 
 
𝛽𝑌 = 𝛽𝑦0 + 𝛽𝑦
′ 𝑄𝑦 + 𝜔𝑦 (3 -27) 
 
𝛽𝐿𝑚 = 𝛽𝑙0𝑚 + 𝛽𝑙𝑚
′ 𝑄𝑙𝑚 + 𝜔𝑙𝑚 (3 -28) 
 𝛽𝐿𝑓 = 𝛽𝑙0𝑓 + 𝛽𝑙𝑓
′ 𝑄𝑙𝑓 + 𝜔𝑙𝑓 (3 -29) 
The notations for household labour supply parameters are very similar to those for individual labour 
supply ones. The parameters with the subscript 0, namely, 𝛼𝑦𝑦0, 𝛼𝑙𝑙0, 𝛽𝑦0, and 𝛽𝑙0, indicate the 
constant terms in the linear expressions of labour supply parameters whilst those with a transpose 
sign and the subscripts 𝑦𝑦, 𝑙𝑙, 𝑦, and 𝑙 are a vector of coefficients of socio-economic characteristics 
incorporated into the main coefficients in the utility function including income squared, leisure 
squared, income, and leisure respectively. The stochastic heterogeneity terms, 𝜔, are identical to 
individual labour supply in which it is normally distributed with zero mean.  
Socio-economic characteristics in observed preference variation across families for income squared, 
𝑄𝑦𝑦, leisure squared for males, 𝑄𝑙𝑙𝑚, and leisure squared for females, 𝑄𝑙𝑙𝑓, are dummy variables for 
youngest child at different age ranges (younger than three years old, between three to six years old, 
                                                            
17 A dummy variable rather than age or age categories is applied to capture an age characteristic for individual 
and household labour supply for two reasons. First, the model specifications follow Creedy et al (2002) and 
Duncan and Harris (2002) in which these papers apply an identical variable to capture an age characteristic for 
observed preference heterogeneity. Specified models are already complicated; applying variables for age 
categories additionally inflicts computational difficulties. Secondly, the results in the previous chapter suggests 
that labour supply behaviour changes drastically after the age of 40. Models incorporating a dummy variable if 
respondents are older than 40 also perform better than those incorporating variables for age categories (the 
results are available upon request).  
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and between six to ten years old). Observed household heterogeneity incorporates the same set of 
socio-economic characteristics for income, 𝑄𝑦, leisure hours for males, 𝑄𝑙𝑚, and leisure hours for 
females, 𝑄𝑦; six variables (five dummies and one variable) are included in the set of characteristics in 
which three of them are identical to those interacting with squared terms, the rest are a number of 
children, a dummy if an individual is older than 40 years old, and a dummy if an individual is holding 
Bachelor’s degree or higher.     
Child-related characteristics are not incorporated into any individual labour supply model because the 
sample used in estimation includes only unmarried lone individuals (without children). Hence, the 
individual labour supply models allow individual characteristics as observed heterogeneity at the level 
terms only (i.e., the models do not include any child-related characteristics at the level terms and 
there is no incorporation of observed heterogeneity at squared terms).  
 Modelling non-participation 
Creedy and Kalb (2005b) state that the basic discrete hours labour supply model (as shown in Section 
3.2.1), which does not allow for demand-sided restrictions, can lead to unrepresentative labour supply 
at some discrete hours points. In fact, labour supply models that do not consider non-participation 
(i.e., characteristics of hours points, hours restrictions, or fixed costs) typically yield under-predicted 
values for the number of non-workers and over-predicted values for the number of part-time jobbers 
which work few hours per week (Gong and van Soest, 2002; van Soest et al., 2002).  
There are some examples of previous studies that apply different approaches to overcome this issue. 
van Soest (1995) introduces an ad hoc alternative specific constant, a penalty parameter which 
reduces utility and probability, on certain hours points (part-time jobs) in the direct utility function. 
The results indicate that this helps reduce hours prediction errors for those hours points. Woittiez 
(1991) applies the hours restrictions in specifying the model by determining a subset of the whole 
hours points to have positive probability; he defines a subset based on actual hours since all other 
possible job offers must yield a lower utility. Gong and van Soest (2002) include a parameter indicating 
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fixed revenues for non-working people in which positive fixed revenues raise the probability of 
choosing an alternative of zero worked hours by increasing the utility of labour market 
nonparticipation; this is beneficial when the translog utility function is applied. The results show that 
fixed revenue term is consistently positive across models. Some characteristics including age and 
presence of other female and young child have negative effects on fixed revenue for non-working, i.e., 
increase the probability of labour force participation. Other characteristics, e.g., the number of 
household’s head children (under 12 years old), the number of elderly or disabled, and the number of 
adults (over 12 years old), positively affect fixed revenues.  
Some recent works generally apply an estimated parameter, reflecting working fixed costs subtracted 
from net income, into the quadratic utility function. Creedy et al. (2002), and Duncan and Harris 
(2002), which estimate different models by degrees of flexibility, indicate that when researchers 
added a dummy for working to capture fixed costs to the model, it seems to absorb the influence of 
significant variables in the previous model. However, the results of fixed costs are inconclusive. 
Duncan and Harris (2002) and Callan et al. (2009) both interpret the fixed costs in financial term; the 
former find a significant result whilst the latter find a constant fixed costs is not statistically significant. 
Kabátek et al. (2014) show that the fixed cost terms of both genders have negative values with 
statistical significance. de Boer (2016) suggests an implication through fixed costs that working is 
disutility for individual and family labour supply. Labeaga et al. (2008) find mixed results; in fact, the 
fixed cost term has a positive significant value at the individual level but it does not have any statistical 
effect at the household level.  
According to Creedy and Kalb (2005b), the ad hoc approach and fixed costs approaches are similar. 
Both parameters (an alternative specific constant and a fixed costs estimate) contain both pecuniary 
(e.g., childcare and traveling costs) and non-pecuniary costs (e.g., working stress) of working (Creedy 
and Kalb, 2005b; van Soest, 1995). It is cognizant of that since a parameter for fixed costs is presented 
in financial terms whilst an alternative specific constant is expressed in a utility unit; a concept of fixed 
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costs is intuitively more appealing than an ad hoc alternative specific constant. Another drawback of 
applying an ad hoc approach is that the parameterisation depends on the selected discretisation of 
the choice set. Models with different values of fixed interval length and numbers of alternatives in the 
choice set have different parameters; hence, results of various models with non-identical fixed interval 
lengths and numbers of alternatives in the choice set can no longer be compared (van Soest, 1995). 
Because of these reasons, most of the recent empirical studies apply a fixed costs method in the 
discrete hours labour supply model which is initially introduced by Callan and van Soest (1996). This 
chapter follows many existing studies by applying the concept of fixed costs in order to enhance 
goodness of fit to the observed labour supply.  
To incorporate the fixed costs into the discrete hours choice labour supply model, this chapter follows 
Bargain et al. (2014) and Mauro et al. (2017), which are similar to previous literature, e.g., Duncan and 
Harris (2002) and Callan et al. (2009), by including a dummy variable representing whether an 
individual is working. In fact, only one dummy variable is added into the individual labour supply. With 
regard to the household labour supply model, three dummies for working males, working females, 
and both married partners working are added into the household direct utility function.  
The fixed cost term when both married partners are workers is a new approach in the labour supply 
literature. Existing empirical studies include only two fixed cost terms for males and females. This 
chapter presumes that the household utility is significantly affected if both partners are working. For 
instance, they could save some travelling costs by going to work together by car; however, they 
possibly need to spend extra childcare costs.  
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Thus, the direct utility functions for individuals and households can be rewritten as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿
2 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑌𝐿 + 𝛽𝑌𝑌 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗  (3 -30) 
 
 
 
 
     𝑈𝑔𝑗 = 𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑚
2 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑓
2 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑚𝑌𝐿𝑚 + 𝛼𝑌𝐿𝑓𝑌𝐿𝑓 + 𝛼𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓 
 +𝛽𝑌𝑌 + 𝛽𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝐿𝑓𝐿𝑓 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑗 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑗 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑗 + 𝜀𝑔𝑗  
(3 -31) 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑟 is designated as fixed costs for alternatives in which an individual decides to participate in 
the labour market; regarding households, the parameter 𝑃𝑎𝑟 with subscripts 𝑚, 𝑓, and 𝑏 indicate 
whether males, females, and both partners are labour market participants.  
Theoretically, these fixed cost terms indicate expenses and disutility. Hence, they are definitely equal 
to zero for non-participants; nevertheless, they cost people differently based on socio-economic 
characteristics, such as the number of children at certain stages and living in the capital city, if people 
participate in the market. Duncan and Harris (2002) show that the incorporation of observed 
preferences variation across individuals for fixed costs is done to make the model more flexible; the 
log-likelihood ratio test suggest the improvement in terms of goodness of fit. Different empirical 
studies show that socio-economic characteristics influence the utility differently. Duncan and Harris 
(2002) indicate that an increase in the number of pre-school and school aged children decreases the 
fixed costs while living in New South Wales increases the fixed costs significantly. Callan et al. (2009) 
show that, for husbands, age reduces the fixed costs whilst unhealthiness increases the fixed costs. 
Regarding wives, age reduces the fixed costs but remaining factors including unhealthiness, the 
number of children with eligibility for child benefit and presence of children under 5 years old 
increases the fixed costs. de Boer (2016) suggests that the fixed costs of singles and single parents 
increase if they have a low educational attainment or a non-Western background. A dummy for the 
Western region (representing relatively high economic activity) has a positive and significant 
coefficient for single parents. The working fixed costs of household labour supply are greater for both 
partners when they have a low educational attainment or non-Western background. The fixed costs 
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of females living in the Western region are lower than those of people living outside. Labeaga et al. 
(2008) indicate that none of socio-economic characteristics statistically influence the fixed costs. 
In this chapter, the fixed cost variables are hence allowed for observed preference variation across 
individuals through socio-economic characteristics. Thus, the fixed costs of labour market 
participation can be expressed as following functions. 
 
                                    𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑗 = 0 
  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑗 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐵𝐾𝐾 + 𝜑2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 + 𝜑3𝐴𝑆 
(3 -32) 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑞𝑗  is designated as the fixed costs (i.e., disutility of working); the subscript 𝑞 can be replaced 
by 𝑛 for individual labour supply and 𝑚, 𝑓, and 𝑏 for family labour supply; BKK is a dummy variable 
representing an agent lives in the capital of Thailand; 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 and 𝐴𝑆 designates the number of pre-
school children (younger than 6 years old) and the number of children older than pre-school age (older 
than 6 years old). 
However, for the individual labour supply setting, this chapter focuses only on single males and 
females without children. In other words, since they do not have any child, some socio-economic 
characteristics, i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 and 𝐴𝑆, are not applicable for the individual labour supply context.  
To reduce the computational burden, this chapter does not allow unobserved heterogeneity through 
fixed cost terms. Most studies do not incorporate any random heterogeneity, through the fixed costs, 
into models (Löffler et al., 2014b). Creedy et al. (2002) is an example allowing random heterogeneity 
into labour supply models. 
 Maximum simulated likelihood 
The estimation procedure described in Section 3.2.1 (i.e., the maximum likelihood estimation for the 
conditional/multinomial logit model) would be straightforward if all actual wages and random taste 
heterogeneity terms were completely observed (Callan et al., 2009). The issue of unobserved wages 
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can be approached by a Heckman selection type of model to predict wages for the whole sample and 
treat them as exogenous (Kabátek et al., 2014). For other error terms that are unobservable, 
introducing random heterogeneity into the model complicates the maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure; the standard maximum likelihood estimation for conditional/multinomial logit can no 
longer be applied (Gong and van Soest, 2002). With these terms in the structural discrete hours choice 
labour supply model, the likelihood contribution is not simply given as the conditional/multinomial 
logit expression, (3 -11). It is instead given by the mean value of the appropriate expression based on 
(3 -11) with the mean which are taken over the unobserved random terms. As the specified models in 
this chapter have up to six unobserved errors, this indicates that up to a six-dimensional integral is 
required. Approximation on such a complex integral by applying conventional numerical (quadrature) 
routines is cumbersome and intractable; hence, a more convenient approach is maximum simulated 
likelihood.   
In this chapter, the estimation procedure applies a mixed logit model which is very flexible model 
providing estimation on any random utility model (McFadden and Train, 2000). As described in Train 
(2009), the probabilities are approximated by simulation for any given value of parameters of the 
distribution, 𝜃, (e.g. the mean and covariance of coefficient). The first stage is to draw a value of each 
unobserved errors from the distribution (such as multivariate normal), and then label it as 𝑟𝑡ℎ draw, 
𝑟 = 1 is the first draw. The next step is the calculation of the conditional/multinomial logit formula 
with the 𝑟𝑡ℎ draw. The last step is to repeat the first and second steps for a number of independent 
times (the total number of draws is defined as 𝑅), and average the results from 𝑅 draws in order to 
obtain ?̌?𝑎𝑗 (known as the simulated probabilities) which is an unbiased estimator of 𝑝𝑎𝑗  by 
construction. According to the law of large numbers, as 𝑅 becomes large, the approximation is 
accurate (the variance of ?̌?𝑎𝑗  decrease). There are three major characteristics of ?̌?𝑎𝑗. First, it is strictly 
positive hence ln (?̌?𝑎𝑗) can be defined; the log transformation is useful for log-likelihood 
approximation. Second, ?̌?𝑎𝑗  is smooth (twice differentiable) in parameters 𝜃 and variables in the utility 
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function; this offers efficiency in the numerical search for the maximum likelihood function as well as 
the calculation of elasticities. Last but not least, the summation of ?̌?𝑎𝑗  over alternatives is equal to 
one; this is beneficial for forecasting.   
After obtaining the simulated probabilities, they are included into the log-likelihood function to yield 
a simulated log-likelihood function expressed as follows: 
 𝑆𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑛𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
𝐴
𝑎=1
ln (?̌?𝑎𝑗) 
 
(3 -33) 
where 𝑑𝑛𝑗  is an indicator variable which gives a value equal to 1 if an agent 𝑎 choose alternative 𝑗 and 
zero otherwise.  
Because the simulated maximum likelihood requires high computational capacity and a long period of 
time, this chapter hence applies 100 draws from Halton sequence in the estimation process as done 
by Kabátek et al. (2014) and Bargain et al. (2014). Five models and seven models are estimated for 
individual and family labour supply respectively. Later on, estimation with 500 Halton draws is 
performed for the preferred model at individual and household level to investigate the sensitivity for 
different numbers of draws.  
 Empirical estimation scenarios 
This section provides a description of the different estimation models for individual and household 
labour supply. Labour supply models are differently specified based on the degree of flexibility in order 
to find the preferred model for the Thai dataset.    
With regard to individual labour supply models, four different models are estimated for each sub 
group (males and females). TABLE 3.1 presents different individual labour models with different 
degrees of complexity. 
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TABLE 3.1: Estimation models for individual labour supply 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 
Income-squared / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics     
Random hetero     
Leisure-squared / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics     
Random hetero     
Income*leisure / / / / 
Income / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics   / / 
Random hetero  / / / 
leisure / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics   / / 
Random hetero  / / / 
Fixed cost each person / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics    / 
The fixed costs term is incorporated into every model since it has been shown that labour supply 
models that do not account for participation do not yield accurate labour supply estimation (Gong and 
van Soest, 2002; van Soest et al., 2002). The first model called I1 is the simplest model among all 
estimation models. It consists of each argument in the utility function, namely, squared income, 
squared leisure, interaction between income and leisure, income, and leisure; it also includes a fixed 
costs term. The second model (Model I2) introduces two additional terms capturing random 
preference heterogeneity for income and leisure into the first model. The next model, which is Model 
I3, incorporates observed preference heterogeneity for income and leisure into Model I2. The last 
model is the most flexible model of individual labour supply in this study. This model extends the 
Model I3 by including observed taste shifters of the fixed costs.  
In terms of household labour supply, six different labour supply models with different degree of 
complexity are estimated. TABLE 3.2 provides the summary of six different models.  
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TABLE 3.2: Estimation models for family labour supply 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
Income-squared / / / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics    / / / 
Random hetero       
Leisure-squared / / / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics    / / / 
Random hetero       
Income*leisure / / / / / / 
Leisure*leisure / / / / / / 
Income / / / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics   / / / / 
Random hetero  / / / / / 
leisure / / / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics   / / / / 
Random hetero  / / / / / 
Fixed cost each person / / / / / / 
*socio-economic characteristics    / / / 
Random hetero     / / 
Interactions between fixed cost     / / 
*socio-economic characteristics      / 
All models are incorporated with the fixed cost terms, similar to individual labour supply. There are 
fixed costs for each partner in all models. This is to prevent over-predicted and under-predicted results 
at some hours points. The first model, Model H1, is the simplest model which includes only a basic 
utility function with fixed costs terms for males and females. The utility function contains 1) squared 
terms of household income, male leisure, and female leisure, 2) interaction between income and 
leisure for males, 3) interaction between household income and leisure for females, 4) interaction 
between leisure of males and females, 5) Household income, 6) male leisure hours, and 7) female 
leisure hours. The second model called Model H2 adds to Model H1 by allowing additional terms which 
capture random heterogeneity on income and leisure hours for both partners. The next model, Model 
H3, includes some additional terms, i.e., observed taste preferences for household income, male 
leisure, and female leisure, into Model H2. The fourth model, Model H4, is more complex than Model 
H3 because the former allows for observed heterogeneity terms for squared-terms as well as fixed 
costs terms. The fifth model, which is named as Model H5, includes one additional term into Model 
H4 to capture the fixed costs if both partners are working on the household utility function.  The last 
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and most complex model, Model H6, extends Model H5 by allowing observed taste shifters into a fixed 
costs term if both partners are workers to capture how socio-economic characteristics influence 
labour force participation. 
3.3 Empirical data and predicted wages 
 Descriptive statistics of Thailand HSES 
This chapter uses the dataset obtained from the HSES covering year 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. This 
is the same dataset used in the previous chapter. However, the research questions and analysis in this 
chapter differ from the previous one. Hence, the sample used in both chapters are different.    
At the outset, this chapter follows the first step of the data-cleaning process in the preceding chapter 
(Section 2.3.1). However, this chapter accounts for people who report unrealistic hours worked (e.g., 
too long hours worked) as well. The remaining number of observations is 405,124 people, i.e., 140,908 
households.  
TABLE 3.3: The total number of observations by gender 
Gender Observations percent 
Male 189,678 46.82 
Female 215,446 53.18 
Total 405,124 100 
 
With respect to genders, TABLE 3.3: The total number of observations by gender shows that 189,678 
males (46.82%) and 215,446 females (53.18%) are included in this dataset.  
TABLE 3.4: The total number of observations by year 
Year Observations percent Households percent 
2009 105,694 26.09 34,806 24.70 
2011 102,766 25.37 35,150 24.95 
2013 99,043 24.45 35,313 25.06 
2015 97,621 24.10 35,639 25.29 
Total 405,124 100 140,908 100 
 
In TABLE 3.4, it is apparent that this dataset has very balanced proportion across years in the studied 
period. The percentage of total observations for year 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 are 26.09, 25.37, 
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24.45, and 24.10 respectively. In terms of the number of households, the percentages are 24.70, 
24.95, 25.06, and 25.29 for the year 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 respectively. The opposite trends 
between the total number of observations (gradually declined) and households (steadily increased) 
imply that the size of Thai family in general shrinks continuously throughout the studied period.  
This chapter focuses on investigating individual and family labour supply behaviours using the discrete 
hours choice model. To prevent complexities on econometric model specification and statistical 
computation, this chapter initially opts to keep households with one adult for the individual labour 
supply and households with a married couple without any other adults for the family labour supply. 
These households may include dependent sons and daughters.  
In turn, those households which consist of more than one adult but they are not a married couple are 
dropped from the analysis. Households with a married couple are categorised as a family labour supply 
sample whilst households with a married couple and any other adults are excluded from the analysis 
as well. The initial number of one-member households is 27,755, and the original number of 
households with one married couple is 104,315. The details of sample construction for individual and 
household labour supply are provided in Section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 respectively.  
Before describing the samples for individual and family labour supply study, brief information on the 
hypothetical net income calculation is provided in the following sub-sections.   
 Calculation of the net income at each discrete point 
Net incomes are not directly observed but are calculated from knowledge of the predicted hourly 
wage of each individual, discrete hours points, and the tax and transfer system. According to the Thai 
revenue code, there are eight main income types called assessable incomes18 in the Thailand personal 
income tax system. However, Thailand HSES covers only four types of income which include 40(1), 
                                                            
18 Eight assessable income types are taken into account for personal tax income tax calculation; there are some 
types of income are tax-exempt.  
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40(3), 40(4), and 40(5) in the revenue code. Details about assessable incomes are in Appendix 3.II. 
Obtaining net income at each discrete point for each decision maker requires five main steps. 
Firstly, after the predicted hourly wages are obtained and applied for all individuals in the sample, 
weekly earned incomes for different discrete hours points for each individual are generated by 
multiplication of the predicted hourly wage by the weekly hours worked at each discrete hours point 
(11 points in total). Since income tax is levied on an annual basis, yearly earned income for different 
hours alternatives are calculated by multiplying weekly earned income with 52.142857 weeks, 365 
days in a year divided by 7 days per week. Information about unearned incomes is available in the 
yearly basis. The summation of earned and unearned income gives the gross income.  
Secondly, incomes after allowable expenses are calculated by subtracting allowable expenses from 
the assessable income. The allowable expense for earned income, 40(1), or income from intellectual 
properties, 40(3), is 40 percent of total earned income but it must not exceed 60,000 baht. Income 
from financial investment, 40(4) does not allow for any tax calculation expense. Income from rent of 
property, 40(5), allows for different rates of expenses depending on property type; this study applies 
the average rate since HESE does not identify property types. This calculation is straightforward at the 
individual level, but it becomes more complicated at the household level due to changed tax rules of 
joint filing. Tax rules on joint tax filing changed in 2012 (details in Appendix 3.II), after which couples 
have options for tax filing (separate, partly-joint, and joint). Couples are assumed to have perfect 
information of these taxation rules; they will select the option that makes them pay the least amount 
of personal income tax.   
Thirdly, summation between yearly earned, 40(1), and unearned, 40(3), 40(4), and 40(5), incomes 
after expenses deduction yields the total assessable incomes after expenses (i.e., taxable income). It 
is apparent that this income amount varies across hypothetical hours choices due to variation in 
yearly-earned income. Unearned incomes, on the other hand, remain unchanged across hours points 
and they enter at the household level.  
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Next, allowances and exemptions are deducted from the total taxable income yielded in the second 
step. Regarding personal allowances, there is only one possibility at the individual level whilst six 
different scenarios of total taxable incomes after expenses and allowances due to different 
approaches at the household level19. In this empirical work, disability allowance and retire-aged 
allowance are not applicable for the calculation as the sample does not include any disabled or 
retirement-aged adult.  For households with children, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct the child 
allowance from the remaining taxable income; when a child is disabled, an extra amount of allowance 
is added. At the end of this step, the net taxable incomes at available hours points are subsequently 
obtained.  
Lastly, tax computation for each hours points is carried out. As shown in FIGURE 3.1, because of tax 
brackets and tax rates amendment in 2012, there are two tax calculation systems (four brackets in 
2009 and 2011, and seven brackets for 2013 and 2015) in this chapter.  
FIGURE 3.1: Marginal tax rates for Thailand from 2009 to 2015 
  
In practice, the tax calculation strictly follows the actual tax brackets. There are four tax brackets 
including 10, 20, 30 and 37 percent for year 2009 and 2011 whilst there are seven tax brackets, namely, 
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 percent for year 2013 and 2015. The detailed information of the tax base 
and tax rate at each tax bracket for two different scenarios are provide in Appendix 3.II, Section 3.7.4.  
                                                            
19 This chapter accounts separate tax filing, partly-joint tax filing, and joint tax filing for husbands and wives.  
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Different levels of net income are reported at different hours points; thus, taxed amounts are usually 
different across hours except when the taxable income after allowances and deductions does not 
exceed the exempted amount. Regarding individual labour supply, the total amount of income tax 
burdens is subtracted from total gross incomes per annum for each hours point to give the disposable 
income. Each individual hence has 11 points of incomes for 11 hours points.  For household labour 
supply, there are net incomes for males and females (each has 11 hours points). The summation of 
these two amounts yields the household disposable income at each combination; there are 121 
possibilities of the household net income in total.  
 Single individual households 
With regard to data cleaning for the analysis, the most straightforward and simplest household type 
is one-member households, in which they are unmarried individuals without children. From total 
27,755 one-member households, 8,950 households are eligible for the estimation process. The details 
of the cleaning process are shown as the following  
TABLE 3.5: The sample construction process for single individuals 
Process Drop Remain 
Initial observations - 27,755 
Non-labour force 15,213 12,542 
Marital status 2,808 9,734 
No predicted wage 205 9,529 
Disabled 129 9,400 
Retire-aged 450 8,950 
From TABLE 3.5, the initial number of one-member households is 27,755. Firstly, those people who 
are not defined as potential labour force due to age (younger than 15 years old) and work status (e.g. 
doing business, having own-account, and studying) are excluded (15,213 individuals) from this 
chapter. Secondly, for all married people living alone, it is assumed that their spouses migrate to work. 
Unfortunately, data on migrating people are not available for the analysis; hence, all such people who 
indicated their status as married are dropped. Next, people without predicted wages are excluded 
from the study; 205 single individuals are deleted at this step. Lastly, disabled people (129 individuals) 
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and people who are older than or equal 65 years old (450 individuals) are excluded. The total number 
of one-member households for analysis is 8,950 which comprise 4,456 males and 4,494 females.  
FIGURE 3.2: Discrete hours worked distributions for unmarried individuals 
 
FIGURE 3.2 shows hours worked of single-individual households by gender; each bar represents an 
hours choice as applied in the analysis as discussed in 3.2.1. The top panel shows the selected hours 
worked of both genders; the mode is 48 hours per week which account for 37.72 percent of the whole 
sample. The second most significant proportion of people, 18.84 percent, worked 40 hours per week. 
The next largest group, 11.58 percent, is people who worked 56 hours per week. 9.26 percent of the 
whole sample selected not to work at all. 
The middle panel presents hours worked of unmarried male individuals; 43.76 percent of males 
selected to work 48 hours per week. The second largest group, 17.95 percent, worked 40 hours 
weekly. The next largest group which shares 12.21 percent selected to work 56 hours per week. Non-
working males share 4.23 percent of the male sample.  
The last panel is the histogram of weekly hours worked for females. Similar to males, the largest 
proportion is 48 hours per week which accounts for 31.73 percent. The second largest group of 
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females, i.e., 19.72 percent, chose an alternative of 40 hours worked. The third largest proportion 
which is 14.20 percent who select to be non-participants in the labour market.  
TABLE 3.6: Descriptive statistics of unmarried individuals by gender 
 Males Females 
Observations 4,456 4,494 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Predicted wageH 63.69 38.31 65.27 50.83 
Earned incomeY 142.03 87.75 131.74 111.32 
Unearned incomeY 1.89 17.84 3.84 28.52 
Total incomeY 143.92 90.60 135.59 115.30 
Disposable incomeY 143.48 87.83 135.43 112.51 
Age  36.88 10.97 41.06 12.51 
Age≥ 40 0.3638 0.4811 0.5151 0.4998 
University degree 0.2078 0.0458 0.3674 0.4821 
Bangkok 0.1075 0.3098 0.0801 0.2715 
H Predicted hourly wage in baht; Y yearly basis income in thousand baht.   
TABLE 3.6 shows the descriptive statistics for key variables. The average predicted hourly wage for 
males and females are 63.69 and 65.27 baht respectively. Even though females have a higher 
predicted wage than males on average, males generally earn more than females; this is due to males 
usually spend longer hours working. The average earned incomes for males and females are 142.03 
and 131.74 thousand baht respectively. The unearned income of female (3.84 thousand baht) is 
greater than it of males (1.89 thousand baht). As the result, unmarried males have a larger amount of 
the total annual income (as well as the yearly disposable income) than unmarried do females overall. 
Another notable point is that the discrepancy between the total income and the disposable income is 
very minute. This indicates that in general unmarried Thai people pay a very small amount of income 
tax. This is not surprising since the total personal tax has been about 2 percent of Thailand GDP since 
2000.  
Regarding important socio-economic characteristics, the first one is an individual’s age; the average 
age of single males is 36.88 years old whilst that of single females is 41.06 years of age. However, an 
age variable is not included in the model; this chapter applies the next characteristics indicating if 
individuals are older than 40 years of age; the numbers show 36.38 percent of single males and 51.51 
percent of single females. In addition, 20.78 and 36.74 percent of males and females hold university 
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degree respectively. These factors (age and education attainment) possibly imply why the average 
hourly wage of females is greater than that of males, because age and education are key factors 
determining wages. In addition, males with higher wages are more likely to get married while single 
females usually must rely economically on themselves. The final row indicates that 10.72 and 7.98 
percent of males and females live in Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand.   
 Married couple households 
This chapter also investigates family labour supply. TABLE 3.7 below presents the sample construction 
process for the analysis at the household level.   
TABLE 3.7: The sample construction process for households 
Process Two-member Three-member Four-member Five-member 
 Drop Remain Drop Remain Drop Remain Drop Remain 
Initial obs. - 39,391 - 30,931 - 22,531 - 11,498 
Couple 14,335 25,056 19,705 11,226 14,787 7,744 9,997 1,501 
Labour force 17,332 7,734 6,558 4,668 4,614 3,130 938 563 
Gender issue 70 7,664 13 4,655 4 3,126 3 560 
Marital status 34 7,630 10 4,645 6 3,120 0 560 
No wage 176 7,454 110 4,535 108 3,012 21 539 
Disabled 75 7,379 33 4,502 27 2,985 3 536 
Retire-aged 185 7,194 28 4,474 4 2,981 0 536 
In TABLE 3.7, 39,391 of households in the HSES consist of two adults. This chapter focuses on the 
25,056 households who are married couples, hence, 14,335 households are dropped because they are 
other types of households e.g. two-individual and sole-parent households. Next, the couples in the 
analysis must be labour supply decision makers. In other words, the family will be excluded from the 
study if any person is not a decision maker in the labour market, for instance, either of them is working 
as a business owner or own-account. This is because the HSES contains hours worked for workers only. 
This step reduces the sample to 7,734 households.  
Same gender marriage has not been legal in Thailand; hence, these people could not claim any tax 
benefit as married couples. In turn, 70 households are dropped. Cohabiting couples (34 households) 
are also dropped because these people are legally the same as two independent individuals. Next, 
people without predicted wages are taken into consideration; 176 households are excluded at this 
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stage. There are 75 and 185 households dropped from the study because either of partners is disabled 
or older than 65 respectively.  The final remaining observations for two-member households with a 
married couple are 7,194.  
For three-member households, this chapter aims to obtain households consisting of a married couple 
with a dependent child. In TABLE 3.7, from 30,931 initial households having three members, 11,226 
of them are those contain a couple and one dependent child. However, some additional issues need 
to be considered. First, both spouses are expected to be labour supply decision makers. Households 
with anyone who is not a decision maker in the labour market are dropped; 4,668 households remain 
at this stage. Second, when both partners have the same gender, the household is excluded from the 
study; there are 13 households dropped due to this cause. The main reason dropping these 
households is that these couples are equivalent to two separate individuals in the income taxation 
regard. Third, since only married couples are eligible to acquire certain tax-benefits, ten cohabiting 
households are excluded. If any of partners does not have a predicted wage, the entire household will 
be dropped from the analysis. Hence, in this step, 110 households are deleted. Next, when any of 
couples is disabled, a household is excluded; hence, 33 households are taken out from the sample. 
The final step is accounting for retired people; both partners are expected to be of the working age, 
leading to 28 households being dropped. This leave 4,474 observations for three-member households. 
There are 22,531 households having four members; nonetheless, 7,744 of them comprises of a couple 
and two dependent children. The same process of the sample construction is still applied to this type 
of households. It starts with the issue of labour market decision makers; 3,130 households meet this 
requirement, both partners are decision makers in the market. The second step is accounting for 
partners of the same gender; four households are dropped because of this issue. Thirdly, six additional 
households are excluded since they are cohabiting households. Next, 108 households are excluded 
since any member of married couples does not have any predicted wage. Fifthly, 27 families are 
dropped due to having any disabled person in the couple; and four additional household are excluded 
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because an adult is older than 65 years of age. The remaining sample of four-member households is 
2,981. 
In TABLE 3.7, the final group is five-member households. From 11,489 five-member households, 1,501 
of them comprise of one couple and three dependent children. Similar to previous sub-samples, there 
are few more steps to get the final observations for estimation. Firstly, when an adult in the household 
is not a labour supply decision maker, that household is not included in the study; 968 households fail 
to fulfil this requirement. Secondly, 3 additional households are cut because the both partners share 
the same gender. Thirdly, issues on cohabiting households are considered; however, zero observation 
are excluded on these aspects. The next step is to deal with people without predicted wages; 21 
households are excluded. Then, three families are dropped because any person of married couples is 
disabled. There are zero household having a retirement-aged issue; the final number of observations 
with five-member households is 536 households.   
In summary, the total number of sample for family labour supply using the discrete hours choice model 
is 15,231 households. There are the two major reasons why this chapter stops acquiring more 
observations when family size gets bigger than five members. First, the number of observations 
acquired from the larger family sizes is small. In fact, only 536 households are obtained from five-
member households. The number of obtained observations becomes smaller for bigger families whilst 
it requires more complicated computer processes to extract legitimate observations from those larger 
families. Secondly, the reason is the Thailand tax rules which allow a certain number of children to be 
eligible for child allowance. When a number exceed three children, the rules become very complex. 
This could cause a lot of time to handle a small number of households. Besides that, this possibly 
causes an error in after-tax income calculation leading an error in the estimated result. For simplicity 
and efficiency, the sample for family labour supply includes households which are not larger than five 
persons. 
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FIGURE 3.3: Discrete hours worked distributions for couples 
  
Panel A Panel B 
  
Panel C Panel D 
FIGURE 3.3 exhibits histograms of selected worked hours of four different household types by size for 
family labour supply analysis. Alphabetically, Panel A, B, C, D present histograms for two-member, 
three-member, four-member, and five-member respectively; the upper graph for each panel is the 
distribution for males whilst the lower one is the distribution for females. Overall, the shapes of 
distributions look similar across different household sizes. The most prominent spike of all males in 
any household type is working for 48 hours weekly.  
In Panel A, 42.26 and 35.81 percent of males and females respectively select to work about 48 hours 
per week. The next two favourite choices for males in two-member households are 40 hours and 56 
hours per week at 17.95 and 16.14 percent respectively. Only 2.21 percent of males choose not to 
participate in the labour market at all. On the other hand, 20.86 percent of females offer zero hours 
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worked; this is the second most significant proportion. Then, 13.25 and 13.21 percent of females 
select to work 56 and 40 hours per week respectively.   
In Panel B, The largest selected alternative for males is to work about 48 hours per week (38.56 
percent) whilst the largest group of females select to be non-working (30.46 percent). With respect to 
males, the distribution is similar to that shown in Panel A, two-member households; the most popular 
choices are 40 hours (22.66 percent) and 56 hours (13.86 percent). Male non-participants are only 
2.08 percent of males decide to be non-participant in the labour market. Considering hours worked of 
married females in three-member households, the 30.46 percent prefer to supply zero hour in the 
labour market; 27.29 percent decide to work 48 hours per week. The next largest proportions are 
those selecting to work 40 hours (16.00 percent) and 56 (8.99 percent).  
Next, Panel C shows the hours distributions for four-member households. Similar to Panel B, while 
most of the males decide to work at 48 hours per week (38.95 percent), most of the females choose 
to provide zero hours labour supply (29.72 percent). Regarding males, the next two popular choices 
for male labour supply decision makers are 40 hours (24.42 percent) and 32 hours (13.72 percent) per 
week respectively. A very small number of males (1.41 percent) are inactive in the labour market. The 
second largest group of females (26.50 percent) decides to work for 48 hours per week. Then, 18.32 
and 10.00 percent of females choose to work for 40 hours and 32 hours per week respectively.  
The last panel, Panel D, shows the distributions for five-member households. As in the previous panels, 
the largest proportion for male observations is to work 48 hours per week (35.26 percent). The biggest 
group of females (47.57 percent) chooses to be inactive in the labour market, i.e., zero hours per week. 
In terms of males, the next two largest groups are similar to what presented in Panel A and B; they 
select to work 40 and 56 hours worked per week at 19.22 and 15.67 percent respectively. Only 1.87 
percent of male observations are labour market non-participants. For females, the second largest 
proportion (17.91 percent) selects to work 48 hours per week; 10.07% and 8.96% decide to provide 
weekly labour supply at 40 and 32 hours respectively.  
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In conclusion, the distributions are similar across different household sizes, especially for male 
observations. Most of the males tend select to work 48 hours per week in all panels. Concerning 
females, when households comprise of a couple only, females tend to work more. However, when 
households have any child, a large proportion of the females decide to work zero hours. Having a child 
or children is presumed to have an impact on the labour supply decision. It is apparent for females 
that they are more likely to opt to be inactive in the labour market when they have a child or children.   
TABLE 3.8: Descriptive statistics of couples by family size 
 Two-member Three-member Four-member Five-member 
Observation 7,230 4,474 2,981 536 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Predicted wageH (M) 72.02 53.07 72.89 50.13 78.01 51.54 69.46 45.70 
Predicted wageH (F) 55.26 44.65 55.35 42.33 58.34 41.03 49.15 35.40 
Earned incomeY (M) 163.20 109.49 162.70 106.43 174.94 115.28 155.92 108.41 
Earned incomeY (F) 105.78 99.91 93.44 101.73 100.12 102.44 64.85 90.49 
Unearned incomeY 4.11 25.82 3.96 31.09 5.84 34.13 3.50 21.10 
Total incomeY 273.10 191.16 260.11 185.84 280.90 197.07 224.27 173.86 
Disposable incomeY 272.31 189.20 258.91 181.13 280.06 193.01 223.95 170.25 
Age (M) 40.69 11.25 40.72 8.98 40.84 7.16 40.67 6.36 
Age (F) 38.52 11.26 37.55 8.92 37.70 6.74 36.96 6.15 
Age≥ 40 (M) 0.5079 0.5000 0.5463 0.4979 0.5713 0.4950 0.5933 0.4917 
Age≥ 40 (F) 0.4479 0.4973 0.4350 04958 0.4029 0.4906 0.3489 0.4771 
University degree (M) 0.1854 0.3887 0.2034 0.4026 0.2529 0.4348 0.1884 0.3914 
University degree (F) 0.2007 0.4006 0.2204 0.4146 0.2627 0.4402 0.1623 0.3691 
Bangkok 0.1186 0.3233 0.0975 0.2966 0.0939 0.2918 0.0877 0.2831 
Youngest child< 3 - - 0.1757 0.3806 0.1989 0.3993 0.3638 0.4815 
Youngest child 3-6 - - 0.1623 0.3687 0.1926 0.3944 0.2164 0.4122 
Youngest child 6-10 - - 0.1806 0.3844 0.2664 0.4421 0.2239 0.4172 
Number of         
- children - - 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 
- pre-school child - - 0.3380 0.4731 0.4626 0.6253 0.7351 0.7109 
- school-aged child - - 0.6620 0.4731 1.2868 0.6434 1.6679 0.7063 
- disabled children - - 0.0110 0.1041 0.0117 0.1167 0.0168 0.1286 
H Predicted hourly wage in baht; Y yearly basis income in thousand baht.   
TABLE 3.8 shows important descriptive statistics, including pecuniary factors such as predicted wages 
and disposable income, personal characteristics of couples, e.g., age and education, and household 
composition characteristics, e.g., the age of the youngest child and number of pre-school children.    
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From TABLE 3.8, the average predicted wage of males is greater than that of females. Five-member 
households have the lowest predicted wages of males at 69.46 baht per hour whilst four-member 
households have the highest predicted wages of males at 78.01 baht per hour. The average predicted 
wage of females from four-member families is also the greatest (58.34 baht per hour) among 
households with different numbers of members. The lowest average predicted wage of females is for 
five-member households at 49.15 baht per hour. Comparison between unmarried and married 
individuals show that wages of unmarried males are less than wages of married males in general; the 
opposite relationship is found in the female case.  
Regarding yearly earned income, it is apparent that males earn more income than females do on 
average because male wages are higher than female wages. Also, hours distributions show that males 
tend to work longer and participate more in the market than females. Female behavioural change in 
labour market participation affect earned income, for example, the mean of female earned income of 
households without children is greater than that of households with one child although the average 
wage rates are very similar. This is mainly because a proportion of non-working females are different 
between these types of households.    
Unearned income, which is presented in a household basis, shares a small percentage of total income 
(i.e., the summation between earned and unearned incomes). The average values of two-member and 
three-member households are very similar (4.11 and 3.96 thousand baht per annum respectively). 
Average unearned income increases to 5.84 thousand baht per annum for four-member households; 
however, that of five-member households is lower than other types of families at 3.50 thousand baht 
per year.  
Total income is the summation of earned and unearned incomes. Disposable income (the total income 
after tax) is the crucial variable in labour supply analysis. Disposable income is consistent with earned 
income since the latter shares a large proportion of after tax income.  
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There are two concluding remarks for financial information. First, the difference between the total 
income and the disposable income for each household type is very small. This depicts the similar 
picture as observed from unmarried individuals that on average Thai married couples pay small 
amounts of tax. In other words, tax rules barely leads to disposable income variations. This is 
consistent with the information that since year 2000 the total amount of personal income tax on GDP 
is approximately 2 percent in Thailand. Second, the information about income by family size implies 
that families with three children are less wealthy than other family types.  
With regard to socio-economic characteristics, there are several important variables relevant to this 
chapter. The average age of males and females are similar across different types of households 
(ranging from 40.67 to 40.84 years old for males and from 36.96 to 38.52 years old for females). 
Married males are usually older than married females; this is opposite to the pattern of unmarried 
individual shown in TABLE 3.6. This make the proportions of individuals who are at least 40 years old 
are different between the samples for individual and household labour supply models.  
In TABLE 3.8, a dummy variable indicating if a person is 40 years old and over across household types 
at the family level suggests an interesting pattern. In fact, percentages of males aged over 40 are 
positively correlated to a number of children whilst the correlation between the percentages of 
females older than 40 years and a number of children is negative. This suggests that age gap between 
both genders may affect the number of children. It also indicates the two mating patterns in Thailand. 
First, couples with a narrow age gap are generally those who have similar mediocre economic statuses. 
They both usually work and focus on economic achievement. This Second, couples with a larger age 
gap are usually those consist of a man with good economic status and a younger woman. In this type 
of couples, a man works for the whole family whilst a woman is usually responsible for domestic duties 
and childcare. This characteristic is different between individual and household levels. Whilst the 
proportion of unmarried males who are older than 40 is smaller than that of females, the opposite 
result is observed for married couples.  
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TABLE 3.8 shows that the percentages of males who are holding any university degree are 18.54, 
20.34, 25.29, and 18.84; on the other hand, the percentages of females graduated from a university 
are 20.07, 22.04, 26.27, and 16.23 for households with two, three, four, and five members, 
respectively. Comparison between TABLE 3.6 and 3.8 reveals the fact that whilst the proportions of 
males with a university degree are similar across all household types, the proportion of unmarried 
females holding a university degree is clearly greater than that of married females.  
It is also noticeable in TABLE 3.8 that four-member households have the largest proportion of couples 
with a university degree; this could help explain why average predicted wages of them for both 
partners are higher than others. Regarding five-member households, the percentage of males holding 
a university is quite low whilst the percentage of females with a higher education is smallest among 
all types of households; this also implies why their average predicted wage rates are the lowest among 
their counterparts. Another point is that the percentage of females holding a university degree is 
usually greater than that of males except for those in five-member households. This reflects the fact 
in Thailand that women with adequate educational opportunities tend to continue study in the 
university. On the other hand, many men decide to enter the labour market or study in vocational 
institutes.  
The percentage of families without children which live in Bangkok is 11.86 percent which is higher 
than other types of families living in Bangkok at 9.75, 9.39, and 8.77 for three-member, four-member, 
and five-member households, respectively. The proportions of households living in Bangkok at 
individual and household level are comparable.  
For characteristics of children, variables are not applicable for two-member households since they 
consist of a couple only. The dummy variables of the youngest child by age ranges (under three, older 
than 3 but younger than 6, and older than 6 but younger than 10) can be interpreted in terms of 
percentage. Households with one child have similar numbers for these variables, namely, 17.57, 16.23, 
and 18.06 percent for the youngest child aged under three, older than 3 but younger than 6, and older 
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than 6 but younger than 10 respectively. The percentage of the youngest child is aged between 6 and 
10 is highest at 26.64 for families with two children; the percentages of the youngest child in remaining 
groups (under three years old and between 3 and 6 years old) are 19.89 and 19.26 respectively. For 
the last type of families (a couple with three children), the highest percentage is the youngest child 
aged under three years old at 36.38; the percentages of remaining groups are 21.64 for age between 
3 and 6 and 22.39 for age from 6 to 10.    
The number of children is straightforward since families are differentiated by numbers of children. For 
three-member households, the proportion of pre-school children (age under six) is 0.380; the number 
of children older than six years old is 0.6620. Regarding households with two children, the numbers 
of pre-school children and non-pre-school children are 0.4626 and 1.27 respectively. On average, five-
member households have 0.7351 pre-school child and 1.67 non-pre-school children. The average 
numbers of disabled children for families with one child, two children, and three children are quite 
small at 0.0110, 0.0117, and 0.0168 respectively. However, having any disabled child affects the 
disposable income through child allowance.  
3.4 Results 
 Estimation results for individual labour supply 
TABLE A3.2 and A3.3 in Appendix 3.II show the estimation results of four models with different degrees 
of flexibility for male and female labour supply, respectively.  Interpretation of labour supply models 
is not straightforward due to parameterisation and random heterogeneity. The exceptions are 
interaction terms between leisure hours and socio-economic characteristics, as these parameters 
indicate how these characteristics affect the marginal utility of leisure (van Soest et al., 2002). In 
practice, interpreting some parameters, e.g., an interaction term between income and leisure, can 
also provide some better understanding of relationship between two arguments.  
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Regarding the parameter of squared income all models for both genders show a negative sign 
suggesting that marginal utility of income increases at a diminishing rate. The negative estimate of 
squared income is consistent with theoretical prediction and findings in previous works, e.g., Labeaga 
et al. (2008) and de Boer (2016). However, the level of statistical significance differs across models 
and genders. In terms of male labour supply, the coefficient does not statistically influence the utility 
in Model I1 and I2 although it is statistically significant at the 10 percent significance level in Model I3 
and I4. In the female models, the coefficient statistically affects the utility in Model I1 and I2 at the 1 
percent significance level. It becomes non-significant in Model I3 and I4 because the effect is possibly 
captured by observed preferences. A negative parameter of squared leisure hours reported for both 
genders indicates a diminishing rate of marginal utility of leisure hours. This parameter is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level in all models. However, previous studies find different values of this 
coefficient; for instance, regarding individual labour supply, Labeaga et al. (2008) find a positive value 
of squared hours of leisure in Spain whilst de Boer (2016) show a negative value of this variable in 
Netherland. This implies a difference in leisure hour preferences across countries.  
For the cross-product term between income and leisure hours, the results across the models for both 
genders suggest that the arguments are complements, i.e., people prefer having more consumption 
and leisure hours. It also shows a strong statistical significance at the 1 percent level in every model. 
This finding is similar to previous studies such as Duncan and Harris (2002) as well as Labeaga et al. 
(2008).  
Socio-economic characteristics are incorporated into income and leisure in Model I3 and I4. The 
effects are consistent across models, although each factor influences marginal utility of income and 
leisure for males and females differently. These coefficients determine how the marginal utility 
changes with these characteristics. For the income variable, the utility of males is not statistically 
affected by the age characteristic (whether they are older than 40 years old). Their marginal utility of 
income increases with the statistical significance level of 10 percent when male individuals have a 
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university degree. On the other hand, females get greater marginal utility when their ages are over 40 
with statistical significance at the 5 percent level whilst having a university degree does not statistically 
influence the marginal utility of income. A possible reason why attaining a higher degree does not 
affect the marginal utility of income for females could be due to gender inequality. In fact, unmarried 
females with a university degree prioritise labour market participation (i.e. having a similar working 
opportunity as males) over the level of income. Similar results are found in Duncan and Harris (2002) 
in which the estimated coefficient for females holding a university degree becomes statistically non-
significant when models additionally include a fixed costs term.  
The results also suggest that, with regard to leisure, males and females gain more utility (with the 
statistical significance level of 1 percent) when they are more than 40 years old. Attaining any 
university degree of education affects the marginal utility of leisure hours differently across genders. 
In fact, whilst it positively influences the marginal utility of males with statistical significance at the 1 
percent level, it does not affect the utility level of females. The results of marginal utility of income for 
males are comparable with Duncan and Harris (2002) whilst that for females are opposite. The 
difference between genders is possibly because of cultural factors; for example, females who are older 
than 40 years old are more prudent about financial security than males with the similar age.  
For unobserved random preferences of income and leisure, the standard deviation of income is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level in male labour supply models and at the 1 percent level 
in female labour supply. This is similar to the finding in Duncan and Harris (2002). The standard 
deviation of leisure is not statistically significant for both genders; the results are similar to findings in 
Duncan and Harris (2002) as well as Labeaga et al. (2008). The results imply the unobserved 
preferences across the sample are statistically different for income but not for leisure 
Labour market participation, represented by the fixed costs terms, affects utility negatively with 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level in all five models of both genders. This implies working is 
a disutility for males and females as expected. Previous empirical studies find both positive fixed costs 
 129 
 
(e.g., Labeaga et al. (2008)) and negative fixed costs (e.g., de Boer (2016)). Living in the capital of 
Thailand does not statistically lead to disutility from working. The results is similar to what reported 
in Duncan and Harris (2002) which also include a dummy indicating if a person lives in the capital of 
Australia.  
 Marginal utilities in individual labour supply 
As mentioned above, most of the coefficients in the utility function cannot be directly interpreted (van 
Soest et al., 2002). The marginal utility of income and leisure hours are calculated using the model 
specifications for ease of economic interpretation. The marginal utility is calculated by following steps. 
First, calculating the utility level using Equation (3 -30) for individual labour supply and (3 -31) for 
household labour supply. Second, taking the first derivative respect to each argument. Individual 
labour supply models have two arguments, namely, income and leisure hours; hence, the marginal 
utility of income and leisure hours are obtained. Household labour supply models have three 
arguments including income, leisure hours for males, and leisure hours for females; thus, three 
marginal utility numbers (the marginal utility of income as well as the marginal utility of leisure hours 
for males and females) are obtained.  
TABLE 3.9 shown below presents the marginal utilities of both arguments as well as the proportion 
that are negative for each of the four models. Overall, all models provide positive computed values of 
the average marginal utility of income and leisure hours for both males and females as expected. The 
negative proportion for the marginal utility of leisure suggests that some would prefer to work without 
returns if fixed costs were zero (Kabátek et al., 2014). This implies these people have a higher 
preference for work than those have positive marginal utility of leisure  (de Boer, 2016).   
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TABLE 3.9: Calculated results for individual labour supply 
Individual 100 draws 
 Male labour supply Female labour supply 
 mean neg. % mean neg. % 
MUyI1 0.0094 4.11 0.0198 1.11 
MUyI2 0.0122 4.82 0.0451 3.05 
MUyI3 0.0169 1.19 0.0320 4.63 
MUyI4 0.0167 1.19 0.0311 4.76 
MUlI1 0.0156 28.95 0.0120 31.00 
MUlI2 0.0251 26.35 0.0906 20.45 
MUlI3 0.0414 20.44 0.0524 26.39 
MUlI4 0.0408 20.53 0.0499 26.72 
 Unsatisfied (%)  Unsatisfied (%)  
Quasi-concave I1 9.58  1.11  
Quasi-concave I2 9.07  7.45  
Quasi-concave I3 1.19  8.61  
Quasi-concave I4 1.19  9.08  
Monotonicity I1 0.00  0.00  
Monotonicity I2 0.00  0.00  
Monotonicity I3 0.00  0.00  
Monotonicity I4 0.00  0.00  
Observations 4,456  4,494  
Notes: MUy and MUl designate the marginal utility of income and marginal utility of leisure, respectively. I1 to 
I4 indicate the estimated models (Model 1, 2, 3, and 4) for individual labour supply. Each MUy and MUl reports 
the mean value and the proportion of the negative values (neg. %). Quasi-concave and monotonicity, followed 
by a model indicator, represent the percentage of unsatisfied conditions for the level of utility.    
With regard to male labour supply, the average marginal utility of income from Model I1 to I4 are 
positive as expected. This suggests that males usually prefer having a larger amount of income. The 
negative proportions of marginal utility of income for Model I1 and I2 are similar at 4.29 and 4.98 
percent. The negative marginal utility of income yielded from Model I3 and I4 are equivalent at 1.19 
percent of the total observations. The mean marginal utility of leisure hours from Model I1 to I4 are 
also positive for all models; this also indicates that males usually prefer having a longer leisure hours. 
The proportions of negative marginal utility of leisure are 28.95, 26.35, 20.44, and 20.53 percent for 
Model I1 to I4 respectively. This implies that a certain group of people have a higher working 
preference than others. It also implies that people with negative marginal utility of leisure possibly 
spend a large proportion of non-working hours to do domestic duties which are not considered as real 
leisure. 9.58 and 9.07 percent of the sample do not satisfy the quasi-concave condition in Model I1 
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and I2 respectively. The proportion drops to 1.19 percent for Model I3 and I4 respectively. 
Nonetheless, all models satisfies the monotonicity condition at the perfect rate.  
Labour supply for unmarried females provides similar results to those of males. As theoretical 
expectation, the average marginal utility of income from Model I1 to I4 yield positive values. The 
proportions of negative marginal utility of income are 1.11, 3.05, 4.63, and 4.76 percent for Model I1 
to I4, respectively. The results of average marginal utility of leisure hours for Model I1 to I4 are also 
positive. The percentages of negative marginal of leisure hours are over 30 for Model 1. The negative 
proportions of the remaining models (I2, I3, and I4) are 20.45, 26.39, and 26.72 percent respectively. 
1.11, 7.45, 8.61, and 9.08 percent of the total observations in Model I1, I2, I3, and I4 fail to satisfy the 
quasi-concave condition respectively. However, all models completely satisfy the monotonicity 
condition.   
By comparing the marginal utility of income between genders for each model, it is observable that the 
number for females is greater than that for males. This implies that labour supply for females is more 
elastic than that for males on average than. The marginal utility of leisure hours for females is generally 
higher than that of males. This suggests that females are more sensitive to leisure hours than do males.  
 Estimation results for household labour supply  
TABLE A3.4 in Appendix 3.III presents the estimation results of household labour supply models by 
different degrees of flexibility. Similar to individual labour supply, six models are estimated from 
simple to complex.  As mentioned previously, most of the parameters cannot be directly interpreted. 
The calculated marginal utilities are discussed in the next section. Regarding squared-terms, the 
squared income parameter in all models is negative with statistical significance as theoretically 
predicted as well as previous research such as van Soest (1995) and Labeaga et al. (2008). An 
interaction between squared income and age of the youngest child (under three years old) is negative 
and statistically significant; this suggests that diminishing rate of marginal utility of income increases 
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significantly when a household has a very young child; the result is consistent with Duncan and Harris 
(2002) and Creedy et al. (2002) 
Results related to squared leisure for both partners suggest that the marginal utility of leisure 
increases with a diminishing rate because the parameter of squared leisure hours for males and 
females in all models is negative with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. The results are 
consistent with Callan and van Soest (1996), Callan et al. (2009), and Kabátek et al. (2014). Some 
studies such as van Soest (1995) find that the squared leisure hours of males is negative whilst the 
opposite result appears for female. Some other works, e.g., de Boer (2016), indicates that the 
coefficients of squared leisure hours for both gender are positive. The difference across studies 
provides an implication that preferences on leisure hours are difference across countries as well as 
periods (van Soest (1995) and de Boer (2016) study labour supply in Netherland at different periods 
of time). The interaction terms reflecting observed heterogeneity in Model H4 to H6 are all positive 
for both partners. This implies that the age of the youngest child reduces the degree of diminishing 
marginal utility of leisure. However, some of the interaction terms are not significant.   
The cross-product terms between income and leisure hours for males and females are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level across models. This indicates that income complements 
leisure hours for both partners. The results are similar to what found in Callan and van Soest (1996), 
Callan et al. (2009), Kabátek et al. (2014), and de Boer (2016). The interaction terms between male 
leisure hours and female leisure hours in all models are also positive with the statistical significance 
level of 1 percent. The results suggest that leisure hours of both partners are complements. The results 
are consistent with previous research such as van Soest (1995), Callan et al. (2009), and de Boer (2016). 
Callan and van Soest (1996) find a negative value for the cross-product term with statistical 
significance. The different results in previous research suggest different preferences across countries.  
Coefficients for socio-economic characteristics incorporated with income and leisure in Model H3 to 
H6 can be interpreted as observed taste shifters. The coefficients of interactions with income are 
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consistent across models; however, those with leisure hours for both partners provide few sign 
differences across models for characteristics of the youngest child at different age ranges. This is 
possibly explained by the inclusion of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in fixed costs for both 
partners in more flexible models (H4 to H6).  
The interaction terms between income and the age of the youngest child implies that if a household 
has younger child, the household utility of income increases. An increase in the number of children 
also influences the utility in the same regard. In other words, holding other factors constant, a 
household with a larger numbers of children has the greater marginal utility of income. However, this 
coefficient is significant at 10 percent level in model H4, H5, and H6. The results for the number of 
children on leisure hours for both partners are similar to the findings in Kabátek et al. (2014). The 
results for the presence of a very young child are similar to what found in Mauro et al. (2017); but 
differ from the results in Kabátek et al. (2014).  
The estimates reveal that age interacted with income have different results across genders. In fact, if 
a male is over 40 years old, the household marginal utility of income will be lower than those who are 
younger than 40. On the other hand, if females are older than 40, the marginal family utility of income 
will be greater than those whose age are less than 40. Creedy et al. (2002) show that age 
characteristics of both gender do not statistically affect the marginal utility of income.  
Regarding educational characteristics, the results suggest positive effects on the utility of income 
when any of partners graduated from a university. The coefficients obtained from all models (H3 to 
H6) are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for male education but not statistically significant 
for female education. Creedy et al. (2002) indicate that the education level of the household’s head 
negatively affects the marginal utility of income but the educational attainment of the female spouse 
has an opposite. The difference results imply different preferences towards income in different 
countries with different degrees of economic development.  
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Positive coefficients on the interactions between leisure hours of both genders and a number of 
children suggest that both males and females value an extra leisure hour more when they have a larger 
number of children. Creedy et al. (2002) show a very similar results for females but they indicate that 
the number of children does not statistically influence marginal utility of leisure for males.  People 
value an additional leisure hour more when they are older than 40 years old with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. The results are consistent with the findings in Creedy et al. (2002). 
The utility of an individual’s leisure also depends upon the age of their spouse, i.e., if the age of the 
spouse is greater than 40, the marginal utility of leisure will increase especially for males. The estimate 
are significant at the 1 percent level in all models while the estimate for females is not significant in 
any model (H3 to H6). The results of these socio-economic characteristics are comparable with those 
obtained in Creedy et al. (2002). If males hold a university degree, the utility of leisure for both 
partners increases. However, the levels of female educational attainment significantly (varied across 
models) increases the utility of leisure for males but does not significantly affects their own utility of 
leisure for females themselves. The findings are opposite to results in Creedy et al. (2002); this is 
possibly due to difference in cultures and preferences across countries.  
Considering unobserved preferences for household income and leisure hours for males and females, 
the standard deviation of random heterogeneity for income is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in Model H2 and 5 percent level for other models (H3 to H6). The standard deviation of random 
heterogeneity for leisure hours of both males and females are significant at the 1 percent level in all 
models. This suggests that the random preferences of income differs significantly across households; 
the random preferences of leisure hours are different across individuals. The results are consistent 
with Kabátek et al. (2014). Callan et al. (2009) and de Boer (2016) find the standard deviation of 
random heterogeneity is significant only for male leisure hours. The results in van Soest (1995) indicate 
that random heterogeneity is not significantly different across males and females.   
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The results of the fixed costs of working suggest that working is a disutility for both males and females 
as expected. These parameters for male working, female working, and both partner working are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results are consistent with Kabátek et al. (2014) and 
de Boer (2016). Some other studies find different results implying different preference in the market 
participation across countries. Socio-economic characteristics incorporated into the fixed costs terms 
provide consistent results in terms of sign but are less consistent in terms of statistical significance 
across models.  
Living in Bangkok increases the costs of working when either of partners are working but reduces some 
fixed costs when both are employed. The transportation costs are possibly the major part of difference 
between living in the capital city and other provinces. The government can reduce the transportation 
cost in the long run by investing on the public transportation.  
The number of pre-school and non-pre-school children negatively affects the fixed costs (increase the 
utility) when either of partners is working. However, children have the opposite effects when both 
partners are working. This is possibly because they bear more childcare costs when both partner are 
working.  
 Marginal utilities in household labour supply 
TABLE 3.10 shown below shows calculated numbers of marginal utilities and other related numbers 
including the negative percentage of each marginal utility, a number of tested conditions (i.e., quasi-
concave and monotonicity).  
The second column of TABLE 3.10 presents calculated marginal utility of household income, male 
leisure hours, and female leisure hours. It also includes their negative proportions obtained from the 
six models for household labour supply.  
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TABLE 3.10: Calculated results for household labour supply 
Household 100 draws 
 Whole sample Couples without child Couples with children 
 mean neg. % mean neg. % mean neg. % 
MUyH1 0.0093 1.90 0.0092 4.99 0.0091 0.84 
MUyH2 0.0124 3.20 - - 0.0101 0.98 
MUyH3 0.0144 2.86 0.0154 1.74 0.0120 2.60 
MUyH4 0.0154 3.56 0.0155 1.70 0.0136 3.84 
MUyH5 0.0161 2.87 0.0159 1.18 0.0143 3.24 
MUyH6 0.0161 2.89 0.0161 1.24 0.0143 3.22 
MUmH1 0.0277 29.75 0.0276 36.73 0.0268 29.65 
MUmH2 0.0399 34.84 - - 0.0306 34.71 
MUmH3 0.0499 34.49 0.0550 32.24 0.0396 34.88 
MUmH4 0.0528 34.37 0.0553 32.30 0.0440 34.61 
MUmH5 0.0548 34.40 0.0558 32.19 0.0463 34.60 
MUmH6 0.0547 34.33 0.0567 32.22 0.0462 34.64 
MUfH1 -0.0720 47.18 -0.0562 39.82 -0.0873 53.61 
MUfH2 -0.0635 45.08 - - -0.0843 51.88 
MUfH3 -0.0568 45.37 -0.0398 41.09 -0.0766 51.27 
MUfH4 -0.0533 45.34 -0.0396 41.03 -0.0706 50.33 
MUfH5 -0.0523 44.98 -0.0394 40.34 -0.0690 50.01 
MUfH6 -0.0524 44.97 -0.0390 40.31 -0.0692 50.03 
Household 100 draws 
Whole sample Couples without child Couples with children 
Conditions Unsatisfied % Unsatisfied % Unsatisfied % 
Quasi-concave H1 32.74  34.32  2.75  
Quasi-concave H2 32.91  -  4.56  
Quasi-concave H3 11.76  13.26  10.96  
Quasi-concave H4 12.19  13.16  15.04  
Quasi-concave H5 10.95  6.94  14.44  
Quasi-concave H6 12.17  7.10  15.94  
Monotonicity H1 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Monotonicity H2 0.06  -  0.00  
Monotonicity H3 0.05  0.03  0.09  
Monotonicity H4 0.06  0.03  0.09  
Monotonicity H5 0.04  0.01  0.09  
Monotonicity H6 0.05  0.01  0.09  
Observations 15,185  7,194  7,991  
Note: MUy designates the marginal utility of income whilst MUm and MUf defines the marginal utility of leisure 
hours for males and females, respectively. H1 to H6 indicate the estimated models (Model 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) for 
household labour supply. Each MUy, Mum and MUf represents the mean value and the proportion of negative 
values (neg. %). Quasi-concave and monotonicity, followed by a model indicator, represent the percentage of 
unsatisfied conditions for the level of utility. 
The marginal utility of income obtained from all models has a positive average value as theory would 
predict. The results from Model H2 and H4 show that 3.20 and 3.56 percent of the sample have 
negative marginal utility, respectively. The other of models yields smaller proportions of observations 
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(less than 3 percent) with a negative marginal utility of income. Model H1 provides the best 
performance in terms of the negative marginal utility of income (1.90 percent of the sample).  
All models yield the positive for the marginal utility of male leisure hours as expected. The proportions 
with negative marginal utility (about 34 percent) are very similar across models except for Model H1 
which yields 29.75 percent of the sample.  
The results for the marginal utility of leisure hours for females are different from the theoretical 
prediction; all models give negative average values. In addition, most of the models yield negative 
marginal utility of leisure hours for females for about 45 percent of the sample. Model H1 gives a 
larger proportion of the negative marginal utility than others at 47.18 percent.  
It is possible that the negative values observed for the average marginal utility of females’ leisure 
hours could result from household work responsibilities especially when couples have a very young 
child. In fact, leisure hours comprises pure leisure hours and domestic duties hours; and these are 
undistinguishable in Thai dataset. The results are hence re-examined by estimating sub-groups, 
namely, couples with children and couples without children. By comparing the results in third and last 
columns in TABLE 3.10, the marginal utility of leisure hours for females in households without a child 
is less negative than that in households with a child. The negative numbers imply that Thai females 
spend a large proportion of non-working hours doing housework and perceive housework hours as 
non-leisure. Females in households without children are expected to have fewer housework 
responsibilities than those in households with children. Labeaga et al. (2008) give two reasons for the 
negative marginal utility of leisure for females. First, due to the increasing labour market participation 
rate in recent years, females need to remain in employment longer to be eligible for retirement 
benefits. Second, women temporarily leave the labour market or work only part-time because of 
childbearing responsibilities; they will return to the market when their children grow up.  
 138 
 
The proportions of families with negative marginal utility of leisure for both partners is larger than in 
Kabátek et al. (2014) who find 26.62 percent of males and 34.89 percent of females have negative 
marginal utility of leisure respectively. However, Kabátek et al. (2014) investigate the household utility 
function with five main arguments, namely, income, male leisure hours, male housework hours, 
female leisure hours, and female housework hours; it is not possible to do this in the Thailand case 
due to the availability of the data. Hence, the results of these two empirical studies cannot be directly 
compared.  
The utility functions produced by six different models are tested for quasi-concavity and monotonicity. 
The results for the quasi-concave condition can be divided into two groups. First, Model H1 and H2 
have non quasi-concave utility for about 33 percent of the total observations. Second, the rest of the 
models yield a similar proportion non quasi-concave utility at about 11 to 12 percent of the whole 
sample. Nonetheless, the results of the monotonicity condition are almost identical; most of the 
models produce the result that more than 99.90 percent of observations have monotonic utility 
functions.   
 Model selection  
This chapter sets five criteria to select the preferred labour supply models for unmarried males, 
unmarried females, and married couples, namely, 1) the negative proportion of marginal utility of 
income, 2) the proportion of observations in which the utility function is not quasi-concave, 3) the 
proportion of observations which has non-monotonic utility function, 4) the log-likelihood ratio test, 
and 5) the consistency between individual and household models.  
Starting with the household labour supply models, the estimated results are very similar for first and 
the third criteria. The second criterion identifies that Model 1 and 2 are not very suitable for the Thai 
data. The log-likelihood ratio test reveals that Model H6 has the best goodness of fit relative to other 
models with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. In conclusion, Model H6 is selected to be the 
preferred model for policy microsimulation.  
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For male labour supply, the first and second criteria suggest Model I3 and I4 are superior since they 
outperform Model I1 and I2 and the numbers of Model I3 and I4 are equivalent for both the proportion 
of the negative marginal utility and the proportion of quasi-concave utility. The third criterion does 
not indicate any difference among models. The final criterion (log-likelihood ratio test) indicates that 
Model I4 is not significantly better than Model I3 in terms of goodness of fit. Female labour supply 
provides a different picture to the male counterpart. The first and second criteria suggest Model I1 as 
the preferred model for unmarried female labour supply whilst the monotonicity condition does not 
provide additional information for the model selection. Additionally, the log-likelihood ratio test 
indicates that Model I4 does not fit the data better than Model I3. In statistical regards, Model I3 
seems preferable than other models for individual labour supply. An additional variable in Model I4 
allowing observed heterogeneity for a fixed costs term is not significant in terms of an individual 
variable as well as model performance; nonetheless, this variable makes the model consistent with 
the preferred household labour supply model (H6) which allows for observed preference 
heterogeneity. 
In conclusion, Model I4 is selected for the individual labour supply whilst Model H6 is the 
representation of family labour supply models for Thailand. Both models are the most flexible among 
all estimated models.  
 Robustness checks 
This section shows the result comparisons for checking robustness of the preferred models. Four 
different robustness checks are performed. The first is the estimation of the preferred models with 
500 Halton draws to see the consistency of the models with different numbers of draws. The second 
check decreases the number of alternatives to seven choices for each individual (7 choices for 
individual labour supply and 49 choices for household labour supply). The third and the last robustness 
checks are done by estimating preferred models with two divided datasets, before and after the 
structural tax change in 2012.  
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Robustness check tables reported in Appendix 3.IV (TABLE A3.5, A3.6, and A3.7 for male, female, and 
household labour supply, respectively) consist of six columns. The first one indicates variables in the 
labour supply models. The second column provides the base estimation results; the third one contains 
the results of the estimation with 500 Halton draws; the fourth column provides the results of 
estimation with seven choices; the fifth and the last columns are the estimated results using the 
samples before and after changes in tax rules in 2012 respectively. 
TABLE A3.5 and A3.6 show robustness checks for males and females labour supply, respectively. By 
comparing the different numbers of Halton draws in maximum simulated likelihood estimation, the 
results are very consistent for both genders. The estimates are almost identical; the statistical 
significance of each variable is unchanged. Changing the number of leisure hours alternatives also 
yields consistent results with the base model. No change of sign is observed and only one estimate 
changes in its level of statistical significance in each gender labour supply. The result is consistent with 
previous works such as those by van Soest (1995) and Gong and van Soest (2002) which suggest that 
changing the number of hours points from 6 to 5 does not significantly affect the estimates.  
By splitting the whole sample into two periods (i.e., 2009-2011 and 2013-2015), the results clearly 
show that the second sub-sample outperforms the whole sample as well as the first sub-sample based 
on the model selection criteria. From TABLE A3.5 and A3.6, the negative proposition of the marginal 
utility of income from the model using the latest dataset (2013-2015) is smaller than that from the 
whole sample and the first sub-sample (2009-2011) for males (0.35 percent) and females (2.41 
percent). The quasi-concave condition also improves for both males and females when the model uses 
the second sab-sample (2013-2015) in relative to the results from other samples (the whole sample 
and the first sub-sample).  
From TABLE A3.5, the numbers for the average marginal utility of income and leisure vary across 
samples which possibly suggests that labour supply behaviour of unmarried males change overtime. 
This help support that the results from latest sub-sample is appropriate for microsimulation since they 
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reflect the latest behaviour. The squared terms (income and leisure hours) as well as the interaction 
term between income and leisure hours provide the similar results across samples. The square terms 
indicate the diminishing marginal utility of income and leisure whilst the interaction term suggests 
that two arguments are complimentary. Socio-economic characteristics suggest how labour supply 
behaviour changes overtime because of changes in sign and magnitude.  
From TABLE A3.6, the results across different sample are quite consistent. The average marginal utility 
of income and leisure hours differ marginally.  The squared terms and the interaction term between 
income and leisure are also consistent across samples. The squared terms indicate the diminishing 
marginal utility of income and leisure; the interaction terms implies complementarity between income 
and leisure for the utility of females. The similar results across samples are observed for socio-
economic characteristics. In fact, there are only changes on magnitude at slight extents.   
By considering the selection criteria as well as behaviour difference overtime, the results from the 
sub-sample (2013-2015) for unmarried males and females are more appropriate to be applied in 
microsimulation than the results from other samples. 
TABLE A3.7 presents robustness checks for family labour supply. A change in the number of Halton 
draws in estimation provides the consistent results with the base model. There are some changes in 
the level of statistical significance and there is only one change of sign. In addition, a decrease in the 
number of hours points obtains results consistent with the base model as well; few changes in the 
level of statistical significance and only one change of sign is observed.  
When the results from different samples by year are compared, the second sub-sample (year 2013-
2015) provides improved results regarding the selection criteria. In fact, the negative proportion of 
the marginal utility of income from the latest sub-sample (0.86 percent) is less than the numbers from 
the whole sample (2.89 percent) and the first sub-sample (16.05 percent). In addition, the quasi-
concave and monotonicity conditions from the second sub-sample are also improved; the percentage 
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of quasi-concave utility increases to 98.82 percent whilst the proportion of non-monotonic utility 
drops to 0.01 percent. 
Regarding the estimation results, the squared terms (household income, male leisure, and female 
leisure) are consistent across samples; they suggest the diminishing rates of marginal utility. The 
interaction terms between arguments are also consistent across samples since they all provide 
positive numbers which imply complementarity between arguments for the utility of households. The 
overall results for socio-economic characteristics are consistent with some differences; there are some 
changes in the magnitude and the statistical significance level as well as few changes in sign observed. 
These differences across samples possibly indicate that labour supply behaviour changes overtime.  
Since the results from the latest sample outperforms those from other samples based on the selection 
criteria and the expectation that labour supply behaviour can change overtime, the results obtained 
from year 2013-2015 are most appropriate to be used in policy microsimulation.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter studies individual and family labour supply behaviour in Thailand using the discrete choice 
approach. Several models with different degrees of flexibility are estimated for individual labour 
supply (four models) and household labour supply (six models). Overall, consistent results are 
obtained across these models; they are in general consistent with economic theory and previous 
empirical studies as well. 
According to results as well as statistical and economic rationales, the preferred model for individual 
labour supply in Thailand is the most flexible model estimated. The result is similar for household 
labour supply, when the most flexible model is selected to be the preferred model for the Thailand 
dataset.  
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The results of family labour supply indicate that the most flexible model outperforms other models. 
The model yields the positive mean of marginal utility of income as well as the small percentage of 
negative marginal utility of income, i.e., it is very consistent with the theory in this regard. It also yields 
the positive mean of marginal utility of male leisure hours as expected. However, a negative mean of 
marginal utility of female leisure is observed. This is possibly because females in a family setting have 
many housework responsibilities and they do not treat these tasks as leisure. The tests for quasi-
concavity and monotonicity indicate that the most flexible model gives the results most consistent 
with the utility function assumptions. The log-likelihood ratio test confirms that the most flexible 
model is the most preferable regarding goodness of fit. 
Regarding the robustness checks, changing the number of draws and with modifying the number of 
hours points yield results consistent with the base model. By dividing the whole sample into two parts, 
the results are still consistent although some differences can be observed. The estimation using the 
sample after the structural tax change provides better results overall. This implies that the preferred 
model fits the sample in year 2013 and 2015 the most.  
One strong advantage of the discrete hours labour supply model is compatibility with factual and 
counterfactual policy simulation. The next chapter applies the microsimulation technique to simulate 
different policies reforms and investigate effects on labour supply response, incomes, and tax 
amounts. These factors are used on further analysis on economic performance and income inequality.  
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3.6 Appendix 3.I: The distributions of hours worked  
FIGURE A3.1: The distributions of hours worked for individuals and couples by gender 
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FIGURE A3.1: The distributions of hours worked for individuals and couples by gender (continue) 
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3.7 Appendix 3.II: Thailand personal income tax 
This section strictly follows the official English version of Thailand revenue code; most information is 
directly adopted from the code.  
 Types of assessable income and their expenses 
The Thailand revenue code categorises personal income into eight different groups of assessable 
income. The term “assessable income” both cash and in kind. Thus, any benefit received from an 
employer or other persons, such as a rent-free house, is included as assessable income.  
The Thailand revenue code also specifies the expenses allowed to be deducted from each type of 
assessable income.  
These categories of assessable income and their expense deductions, which have not changed 
throughout the period covered in this chapter, are clearly described as follows:  
1. Income from personal service rendered to employers, Section 40(1), includes salary, wage, 
per diem, bounty, gratuity, pension, rent allowance, employer-provided rent-free lodging, 
debt liability paid by an employer, and any money, property, or benefit a person received in 
connection to employment.  
2. Income by virtue of jobs, positions, or services rendered, Section 40(2), includes commission, 
meeting allowance, fee, discount, subsidy, gratuity, bonus, rent allowance, employer-
provided rent-free lodging, debt liability paid by an employer, and any money, property or 
benefit your received in connection to your contract.  
Income in Section 40(1) and 40(2) includes an amount of one-time compensation received due to 
termination of an employment contract.  
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When a person earns incomes from Section 40(1) and 40(2), they are combined for the taxable income 
calculation. A person may choose to deduct allowable expenses at 40% of income but not exceeding 
60,000 baht. If a married couple declares income jointly, both of them will apply the same rule, i.e., 
the maximum allowable expense is 120,000 baht (60,000 baht per person). This indicates that the total 
allowable expenses of income in 40(1) and 40(2) for both separate and joint tax filings are identical.  
Additionally, some income is exempted from Section 40(1) and 40(2), namely, the contribution to a 
provident fund (only the part that exceeds 10,000 baht but not over 490,000 baht), the contribution 
to the Government Pension Fund (up to 500,000 baht), the total contribution to a provident fund for 
teachers in private schools (up to 500,000 baht), and severance pay up to 300,000 baht (only if a 
person has included this amount into Section 40(1)).   
3. Income under Section 40(3) includes goodwill, copyright, franchise, other rights, annuity, and 
income in the nature of yearly payments derived from a will, juristic act, or court verdict. The 
deduction of expenses in Section 40(3) equals to 40 percent of the total amount of income 
but not above 60,000 baht. If a married couple declares income jointly, both of them will apply 
the same rule, i.e., the maximum allowable expense is 120,000 baht. 
4. Income from investment, Section 40(4), includes  
a. interest from deposits, loans, bonds, debenture, bills (with or without security), part 
of interest on a loan after withholding taxes prescribed under the law governing 
petroleum income tax, or the discount from a bill or debt instrument issued by a 
company or juristic partnership or by another juristic person and sold for the first time 
at a price below its face value. This type of income includes income in the same kind 
as interest, benefit, or other consideration derived from a loan or from a debt claim 
with or without security as well. A person can select to pay 15 percent tax rate for the 
total income of this type of income. 
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b. Income received as share of profits or other benefits from mutual fund. This type of 
share of profits or other benefits may be paid out by a mutual fund or a financial 
institution that provides loans in support of agricultural, commerce, or specific 
industry. A person can select to pay 10 percent tax rate for the total income of this 
type of income. 
c. Income from dividends or shares of benefits a person received from a company or 
juristic partnership incorporated under foreign law. 
d. Income from dividends or shares of benefits a person received from a company or 
juristic partnership incorporated under Thai law. A person can select to pay 10 percent 
tax rate for the total income of this type of income. 
e. Dividend tax credit included in Section 40(4) when a person received income stated 
as income from dividends or shares of benefits from company or juristic partnership 
incorporated under Thai law.  
f. Other incomes in Section 40(4) including bonus received as a shareholder or partner 
of a company or juristic partnership, a decrease of capital holding in a company or 
juristic partnership for amount not exceeding profits and reserves, an increase of 
capital holdings in a company or juristic partnership for amount determined from 
profits and reserves, a benefits for the amount which exceeds capital receive from 
amalgamation acquisition or dissolution of a company or juristic partnership, gains 
received from transfer of partnership holdings or shares, debentures, bonds, or bills 
or debt instruments issued by a company or juristic partnership or by any other juristic 
person, share of profit or dividends, after withholding tax, paid out under the law 
governing petroleum income tax. 
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5. Income under Section 40(5) is rent of property and benefits received from a breach of hire-
purchase or instalment sale contract. A person can choose to deduct allowance expense from 
rental income either by actual expenses or by percentage depending on types of assets 
(house, building, construction built to land, and floating house: 30 percent, land used for 
agriculture: 20 percent, land used for other purposes besides agriculture: 15 percent, vehicle: 
30 percent, and other property: 30 percent). For benefits received from a breach of hire-
purchase or instalment sale contract, a person can deduct expense allowance by 20 percent.  
6. Income under Section 40(6) is income from liberal professions, i.e., legal services, arts of 
healing, engineering, architecture, accounting services, and fine arts. A person can select to 
deduct expense allowance either by actual expense or by percentage (60 percent for art of 
healing e.g. physicians, or 30 percent for other liberal professions).   
7. Income under Section 40(7) is from independent contracts. A person is considered to receive 
this income when that person supplies own equipment and other materials which are 
essential for the work, a person controls hours of work, or the work can be either temporary 
or permanent. A person can select to deduct expense by a 70 percent fixed-rate expense or 
an actual expense.  
8. Income under Section 40(8) includes as follows: 
a. Income from business, commerce, agriculture, industry, transports, sale(s) of 
immovable property acquired in a commercial or profitable manner. A person may 
either apply a fixed-rate expense or provide an actual expense to deduct the expense. 
In case both of a couple received income in Section 40(8) and fill the income tax form 
jointly. They may specify the proportion of income (the default proportion rate is 50 
percent).  
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b.  Dividends or share of profits from mutual funds setting up under Securities and 
Exchange Act B.E. 2535.  
c. Income from sale(s) of inherited immovable property of sale(s) of immovable property 
acquired not for commercial or profitable manner purposes. A person may choose to 
not include this income with other assessable income in tax calculation. If a person 
received income from sale(s) of inherited property or property gratuitously 
transferred to a person and opted to include such income in the tax calculation for tax 
return, he will apply a deductible fixed-rate expense at 50 percent on this income. If 
a person received income from sales(s) of immovable property not for commercial or 
profits and decided include this in the income tax computation for tax return, he will 
able to deduct expense either at a fixed-rate depending on a number of holding years 
or an actual expense.  
d. Income from sale(s) of units in Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF).  
 Allowances and exemptions for the calculation of personal income tax 
In Thailand, different allowances also called exemptions are allowed in personal income tax 
calculation. This section describes relevant allowances and exemptions applied in this chapter.  
 Personal allowance 
The revenue code allows personal allowance for any taxpayer at 30,000 baht. Another incremental 
30,000 baht may be included as spouse allowance when either the spouse does not earn income or a 
couple decides to jointly declare income tax.  
 Child allowance 
A taxpayer may be able to claim child allowance i.e. child tax credit if these following conditions are 
met. 
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a. A legitimate child of a taxpayer or the spouse is eligible for child allowance. 
b. An adopted child of a taxpayer is allowed for child allowance.  
c. A child in a. and b. has not earned assessable income over 15,000 baht in a given tax year; 
moreover, a child has any of these characteristics including not sui juris (under 20 years old 
and not married), under 25 years old and studying at the university level, adjusted 
incompetent, or quasi-incompetent. Note that the HSES does not have information about 
adjusted incompetent, or quasi-incompetent characteristics for child allowance calculation.  
Child allowance is 15,000 baht for a child who is not studying or studying abroad; additional 2,000 
baht is added up when a child is studying in a domestic educational institution. A taxpayer may include 
any child was born before 1980; regarding children born after 1980, a taxpayer may include up to 
three children including child was born before 1980. 
 Separate filing due to the constitution court 
Thailand had been using joint taxation for married couples earning certain types of incomes. In 
particular, before 2012 tax year, any married female who earned income under Section 40(2), (3), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), and (8) had to include these incomes to the husband income in the tax calculation process.  
In 2012 the constitutional court judge the case that the Section 57 ter and 57 quinque contradicts to 
the constitution of Thailand 2550 B.E. (i.e. 2007). Hence, these sections were terminated; this verdict 
also led to additional personal tax regulations vis-à-vis married couple taxation.  
The 2012 rules allow any married couple to declare personal income tax either separately, jointly, or 
partially jointly. TABLE Appendix A3.1 exhibits all five filing possibilities for a married couple based on 
the 2012 rules. 
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TABLE A3.1: Filing possibilities for married couples 
Taxation Husband Wife 
Separate 
1. Each do filing individually  - Section 40(1) to (8) 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
- Section 40(1) to (8) 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
Completely joint (all types of income) 
2. As husband’s income - Section 40(1) of both 
- Section 40(2) to (8) of both 
- Personal allowance for both 
- 2 times of child allowance 
No filing 
3. As wife’s income No filing - Section 40(1) of both 
- Section 40(2) to (8) of both 
- Personal allowance for both 
- 2 times of child allowance 
Partially joint (only Section 40(2) to (8) 
4. As husband’s income - Section 40(1) 
- Section 40(2) to (8) of both 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
- Section 40(1) 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
5. As wife’s income - Section 40(1) 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
- Section 40(1) 
- Section 40(2) to (8) of both 
- Personal allowance 
- Child allowance 
The first option is married couples declare income tax separately. If they are unable to share 
assessable income in Section 40(2) to (8), they can divide the income into halves. Each individual 
accounts for personal and child allowance.  
If either of spouses does not have income in a tax year, they will apply married filing completely jointly. 
However, a person without income in a tax year is not eligible to claim for child allowance. This 
suggests a reason when both partners with children participate in the labour market or earn any other 
type of income because they have a larger amount of the child tax benefit. 
Completely joint tax declaration is that a couple decides to combine assessable income, allowances, 
and exemptions of both as one person’s income. They may choose to define all income as belonging 
either to husband or wife. The person, who is responsible for declaring all income, accounts for 
personal and child allowances of both spouses.  
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A couple may do partially joint tax declaration, i.e., they decide to combine assessable income in 
Section 40(2) to 40(8) to male’s or female’s income while assessable income in Section 40(1) is 
declared individually. Personal and child allowances are attached to income in Section 40(1); in other 
words, each spouse accounts for personal and child allowance individually.  
 Structural change in Thailand personal income tax in 2013 
Thailand has a progressive income tax structure. During the period in this study, from 2009 to 2015, 
there are two main tax scenarios as shown in FIGURE A3.2. 
FIGURE A3.2: Marginal tax rates for Thailand from 2009 to 2015 
  
Since 1992 Thailand had used a personal income tax structure with four tax brackets including 10, 20, 
30 and 37 percent. Thai government modified the personal income tax structure in 2013 to seven tax 
brackets in total; this structure was continued using in 2015.  
In fact, as shown in the left-hand panel of FIGURE A3.2 (tax brackets for 2009 and 2011), the first 
100,000 baht and next 50,000 baht of taxable income, which they should have been taxed by 5 and 
10 percent respectively, are exempted from being taxed. For the amount of taxable income from 
150,000.01 to 500,000 baht, a person has to pay tax at 10 percent, next 500,000 baht (taxable income 
exceeding 500,000 but less than 1,000,000 baht) is taxed by 20 percent. The amount of taxable income 
over 1,000,000 baht but fewer than 4,000,000 baht is taxed at 30 percent. When a person has taxable 
income over 4 million baht, the government taxes this amount at 37 percent.  
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In regarding the right-hand panel of FIGURE A3.2 (tax brackets for 2013 and 2015), the first 300,000 
baht of taxable income is set to be taxed by 5 percent; however, the half of it (first 150,000 baht) is 
exempted. Taxable income which exceeds 300,000 baht but fewer than 500,000 baht is taxed at 10 
percent. For the next 250,000 baht of taxable income, a person pays tax at 15 percent. When a person 
has taxable income over 750,000 baht but less than 1,000,000 baht, this amount is taxed by 20 
percent. The next 1 million baht of taxable income (1,000,000.01 to 2,000,000 baht) is taxed at 25 
percent and the next 2 million baht (2,000,000.01 to 4,000,000) is taxed at 30 percent. In case, a 
person has taxable income over 4 million baht, this amount is taxed at 35 percent.  
The main reason of adjusting the tax brackets is that the government sought to stimulate economic 
growth via the revised tax brackets; with the modified structure, people will pay a smaller amount of 
tax compared to the previous structure. This implies a higher amount of dispensable income as well 
as a larger amount of consumption in the economy. Nonetheless, an argument about equality is 
raised; cutting the highest income tax rate from 37 to 35 provides benefits for rich people; this could 
expand income gap between poor and wealthy people.  
The other important reason is to compete with other countries in South East Asia countries with the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which started in 2015. This would be a giant improvement in 
ASEAN economic integration. Having a higher personal tax rate than other countries could make 
Thailand less competitive in terms of foreign direct investment. Another potential main effect of AEC 
is increased labour mobility in the forthcoming future. With a higher personal income tax rate, it might 
be more difficult to attract outstanding human resources to work in Thailand.   
As shown in FIGURE A3.3 below, Thailand has a higher maximum tax rate relative to most of the ASEAN 
countries. In fact, only Myanmar has a higher maximum personal income tax rate than Thailand; and 
the maximum personal income tax rate of Thailand is identical to Vietnam. The maximum tax rates of 
other remaining ASEAN countries are lower than Thailand’s.   
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FIGURE A3.3: Maximum personal income tax rate in ASEAN (2013) 
 
 
An argument regarding the income inequality problem was raised. The policy supporters indicated 
that people with lower-middle income could benefit from this structure most. For example, people 
who earned between 150,000 to 300,000 baht would pay 50 percent less tax since the tax rate was 
reduced from 10 to 5 percent. However, the policy opponents criticised that the structure was not 
designed for dealing with the income inequality problem because rich people would benefit from 
reducing the celling of the personal income tax most.   
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3.8 Appendix 3.III: Estimation results  
TABLE A3.2: Estimation results for unmarried male labour supply 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 
𝑌2 -0.00000513 -0.00000621 -0.0000149* -0.0000149* 
 (0.00000301) (0.00000345) (0.00000601) (0.00000599) 
𝐿2 -0.00264*** -0.00255*** -0.00280*** -0.00281*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000162) (0.000184) (0.000181) 
𝑌 ∗ 𝐿 0.000394*** 0.000454*** 0.000360*** 0.000357*** 
 (0.0000423) (0.0000688) (0.0000776) (0.0000777) 
𝑌 -0.0113*** -0.0114*** -0.000141 -0.000218 
 (0.00306) (0.00328) (0.00415) (0.00415) 
𝑌 * age over 40   -0.00109 -0.00106 
   (0.00229) (0.00229) 
𝑌 * Uni. degree   0.00753* 0.00757* 
   (0.00347) (0.00346) 
𝐿 0.255*** 0.247*** 0.285*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0224) 
𝐿 * age over 40   0.0239*** 0.0239*** 
   (0.00659) (0.00655) 
𝐿 * Uni. degree   0.0552*** 0.0551*** 
   (0.0143) (0.0142) 
𝑃 -6.281*** -6.271*** -6.257*** -6.265*** 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198) 
𝑃 *BKK    0.105 
    (0.319) 
SD: 𝑌  -0.00444* -0.00448* -0.00442* 
  (0.00219) (0.00209) (0.00212) 
SD :𝐿  0.00394 0.00476 0.00433 
  (0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Observations 49016 49016 49016 49016 
Log lik. -8251.1 -8250.3 -8184.2 -8184.1 
lrtest_chi2  1.50 132.24 0.11 
lrtest_df  2 4 1 
lrtest_p  0.4727 0.0000 0.7401 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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TABLE A3.3: Estimation results for unmarried female labour supply 
 I1 I2 I3 I4 
𝑌2 -0.0000161*** -0.0000264*** -0.00000640 -0.00000637 
 (0.00000235) (0.00000440) (0.00000545) (0.00000540) 
𝐿2 -0.00245*** -0.00193*** -0.00231*** -0.00233*** 
 (0.000111) (0.000133) (0.000145) (0.000145) 
𝑌 ∗ 𝐿 0.000467*** 0.000952*** 0.000808*** 0.000796*** 
 (0.0000332) (0.0000841) (0.0000831) (0.0000823) 
𝑌 -0.00456 -0.00608 -0.0171*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00361) (0.00413) (0.00411) 
𝑌 * age over 40   0.00703** 0.00707** 
   (0.00239) (0.00237) 
𝑌 * Uni. degree   -0.00641 -0.00604 
   (0.00376) (0.00374) 
𝐿 0.249*** 0.199*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
𝐿 * age over 40   0.0623*** 0.0622*** 
   (0.00590) (0.00584) 
𝐿 * Uni. degree   -0.00330 -0.00304 
   (0.0126) (0.0126) 
𝑃 -7.338*** -7.411*** -7.403*** -7.424*** 
 (0.198) (0.203) (0.200) (0.201) 
𝑃 *BKK    0.315 
    (0.261) 
SD: 𝑌  0.0171*** 0.0120*** 0.0118*** 
  (0.00204) (0.00165) (0.00163) 
SD :𝐿  0.000318 0.00103 0.000980 
  (0.00599) (0.00661) (0.00630) 
Observations 49,434 49,434 49,434 49,434 
Log lik. -8266.5 -8219.2 -8006.7 -8005.9 
lrtest_chi2  94.52 425.08 1.5 
lrtest_df  2 4 1 
lrtest_p  0.0000 0.0000 0.2211 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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TABLE A3.4: Estimation results for household labour supply 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
𝑌2 -0.00000123** -0.00000135* -0.00000304** -0.00000295* -0.00000304** -0.00000287* 
 (0.000000420) (0.000000643) (0.00000112) (0.00000115) (0.00000117) (0.00000116) 
𝑌2*young child 3    -0.0000142*** -0.0000152*** -0.0000146*** 
    (0.00000282) (0.00000286) (0.00000285) 
𝑌2*young child 6    7.64e-08 -0.000000199 0.000000255 
    (0.00000237) (0.00000240) (0.00000239) 
𝑌2*young child 10    -0.00000299 -0.00000329 -0.00000319 
    (0.00000202) (0.00000205) (0.00000205) 
𝐿𝑚
2  -0.00374*** -0.00493*** -0.00589*** -0.00630*** -0.00651*** -0.00646*** 
 (0.0000509) (0.000175) (0.000206) (0.000224) (0.000235) (0.000235) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child < 3    0.00118*** 0.00124*** 0.00125*** 
    (0.000154) (0.000156) (0.000155) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child 3-6    0.000606*** 0.000587*** 0.000549*** 
    (0.000160) (0.000162) (0.000161) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child 6-10    0.000159 0.000187 0.000179 
    (0.000135) (0.000137) (0.000137) 
𝐿𝑓
2  -0.00392*** -0.00432*** -0.00451*** -0.00467*** -0.00469*** -0.00468*** 
 (0.0000568) (0.000103) (0.0000976) (0.000107) (0.000107) (0.000106) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child < 3    0.000777*** 0.000785*** 0.000785*** 
    (0.000133) (0.000133) (0.000133) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child 3-6    0.000164 0.000166 0.000167 
    (0.000119) (0.000119) (0.000118) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child 6-10    0.0000601 0.0000636 0.0000626 
    (0.0000851) (0.0000851) (0.0000850) 
𝑌𝐿𝑚 0.000243
*** 0.000330*** 0.000202*** 0.000198*** 0.000207*** 0.000211*** 
 (0.00000633) (0.0000155) (0.0000168) (0.0000175) (0.0000177) (0.0000177) 
𝑌𝐿𝑓 0.000117
*** 0.000167*** 0.000201*** 0.000198*** 0.000198*** 0.000201*** 
 (0.00000496) (0.0000118) (0.0000133) (0.0000137) (0.0000139) (0.0000139) 
𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓 0.00183
*** 0.00220*** 0.00206*** 0.00209*** 0.00230*** 0.00230*** 
 (0.0000414) (0.0000818) (0.0000755) (0.0000784) (0.0000834) (0.0000834) 
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TABLE A3.4: Estimation results for household labour supply (Continue) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
𝑌 -0.0112*** -0.0161*** -0.0124*** -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0132*** 
 (0.000830) (0.00145) (0.00201) (0.00208) (0.00211) (0.00210) 
𝑌*young child < 3   0.00998*** 0.0262*** 0.0277*** 0.0272*** 
   (0.00156) (0.00353) (0.00359) (0.00358) 
𝑌*young child 3-6   0.00696*** 0.00775* 0.00813* 0.00764* 
   (0.00148) (0.00323) (0.00327) (0.00325) 
𝑌*young child 6-10   0.00312** 0.00727** 0.00771** 0.00755** 
   (0.00112) (0.00280) (0.00285) (0.00284) 
𝑌*number of children   0.000753 0.000892* 0.000857* 0.000866* 
   (0.000394) (0.000409) (0.000409) (0.000409) 
𝑌 * age40(𝑚)   -0.00242* -0.00235 -0.00214 -0.00218 
   (0.00121) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00125) 
𝑌 * University degree(𝑚)   0.00577*** 0.00631*** 0.00656*** 0.00640*** 
   (0.00106) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00110) 
𝑌 * age40(𝑓)   0.00231* 0.00235* 0.00231* 0.00230* 
   (0.00107) (0.00111) (0.00112) (0.00111) 
𝑌 * University degree(𝑓)   0.00211 0.00254 0.00205 0.00186 
   (0.00130) (0.00134) (0.00135) (0.00135) 
𝐿𝑚 0.251
*** 0.344*** 0.446*** 0.484*** 0.492*** 0.486*** 
 (0.00648) (0.0164) (0.0210) (0.0227) (0.0234) (0.0235) 
𝐿𝑚*young child < 3   0.0229
*** -0.0792*** -0.0852*** -0.0871*** 
   (0.00637) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
𝐿𝑚*young child 3-6   0.0309
*** -0.0315 -0.0298 -0.0267 
   (0.00631) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
𝐿𝑚*young child 6-10   0.0219
*** 0.0123 0.0102 0.0106 
   (0.00550) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0164) 
𝐿𝑚*number of children   0.00474
* 0.00729** 0.00716** 0.00712** 
   (0.00213) (0.00227) (0.00231) (0.00230) 
𝐿𝑚 * age40(𝑚)   0.0184
*** 0.0197*** 0.0208*** 0.0204*** 
   (0.00495) (0.00513) (0.00521) (0.00519) 
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TABLE A3.4: Estimation results for household labour supply (Continue) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
𝐿𝑚 * Uni. degree(𝑚)   0.0925
*** 0.0982*** 0.100*** 0.0990*** 
   (0.00779) (0.00810) (0.00822) (0.00820) 
𝐿𝑚 * age40(𝑓)   0.0334
*** 0.0352*** 0.0354*** 0.0350*** 
   (0.00490) (0.00510) (0.00519) (0.00516) 
𝐿𝑚 * Uni. degree(𝑓)   0.0157
* 0.0188** 0.0146* 0.0131 
   (0.00690) (0.00712) (0.00729) (0.00725) 
𝐿𝑓 0.319
*** 0.346*** 0.341*** 0.354*** 0.346*** 0.344*** 
 (0.00702) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
𝐿𝑓*young child < 3   0.0933
*** -0.00216 -0.000752 -0.00164 
   (0.00569) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
𝐿𝑓*young child 3-6   0.0519
*** 0.0282 0.0286 0.0277 
   (0.00478) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0157) 
𝐿𝑓*young child 6-10   0.0215
*** 0.0214 0.0215 0.0214 
   (0.00381) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125) 
𝐿𝑓*number of children   0.00252 0.00960
*** 0.00943*** 0.00941*** 
   (0.00142) (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.00180) 
𝐿𝑓 * age40(𝑓)   0.0257
*** 0.0272*** 0.0272*** 0.0270*** 
   (0.00339) (0.00355) (0.00355) (0.00354) 
𝐿𝑓 * Uni. degree(𝑓)   0.000193 0.00226 0.00204 0.00142 
   (0.00589) (0.00608) (0.00607) (0.00607) 
𝐿𝑓* age40(𝑚)   0.00539 0.00622 0.00643 0.00623 
   (0.00332) (0.00345) (0.00346) (0.00344) 
𝐿𝑓 * Uni. degree (𝑚)   0.0112
* 0.0137** 0.0138** 0.0130** 
   (0.00486) (0.00504) (0.00507) (0.00504) 
𝑃𝑚 -6.385
*** -6.684*** -6.941*** -7.577*** -6.733*** -6.921*** 
 (0.121) (0.139) (0.144) (0.182) (0.207) (0.221) 
𝑃𝑚*𝐵𝐾𝐾    -0.680
* -0.617* -1.628*** 
    (0.307) (0.310) (0.446) 
𝑃𝑚* 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆    1.511
*** 1.208*** 2.308*** 
    (0.286) (0.284) (0.404) 
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TABLE A3.4: Estimation results for household labour supply (Continue) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
𝑃𝑚* 𝐴𝑆    0.506
*** 0.552*** 0.643** 
    (0.142) (0.144) (0.220) 
𝑃𝑓 -8.759
*** -8.840*** -8.955*** -9.262*** -7.776*** -8.057*** 
 (0.117) (0.121) (0.124) (0.142) (0.208) (0.242) 
𝑃𝑓*𝐵𝐾𝐾    -0.164 -0.174 -1.629
** 
    (0.104) (0.103) (0.517) 
𝑃𝑓* 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆    0.167 0.181 1.872
*** 
    (0.176) (0.176) (0.413) 
𝑃𝑓* 𝐴𝑆    0.500
*** 0.506*** 0.657** 
    (0.0717) (0.0717) (0.238) 
𝑃ℎℎ     -1.562
*** -1.272*** 
     (0.162) (0.207) 
𝑃ℎℎ*𝐵𝐾𝐾      1.483
** 
      (0.516) 
𝑃ℎℎ* 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆      -1.715
*** 
      (0.378) 
𝑃ℎℎ* 𝐴𝑆      -0.156 
      (0.231) 
SD:𝑌  0.00320*** 0.00274** 0.00280** 0.00256** 0.00260** 
  (0.000752) (0.000906) (0.000970) (0.000952) (0.000960) 
SD:𝐿𝑚  0.0630
*** 0.0757*** 0.0806*** 0.0856*** 0.0845*** 
  (0.00557) (0.00548) (0.00569) (0.00589) (0.00593) 
SD:𝐿𝑓  0.0369
*** 0.0439*** 0.0468*** 0.0467*** 0.0463*** 
  (0.00482) (0.00364) (0.00377) (0.00373) (0.00374) 
Observations 1,837,385 1,837,385 1,837,385 1,837,385 1,837,385 1,837,385 
Log lik. -53926.3 -53903.4 -52828.4 -52724.4 -52675.6 -52659.5 
lrtest_chi2  45.94 2150.00 207.88 97.62 32.20 
lrtest_df  3 24 15 1 3 
lrtest_p  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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3.9 Appendix 3.IV: Results for robustness checks 
TABLE A3.5: Robustness checks for estimation results for unmarried male labour supply 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
𝑌2 -0.0000149* -0.0000151* -0.0000149* -0.0000199* -0.0000326** 
 (0.00000599) (0.00000609) (0.00000614) (0.00000979) (0.0000107) 
𝐿2 -0.00281*** -0.00277*** -0.00298*** -0.00280*** -0.00301*** 
 (0.000181) (0.000173) (0.000192) (0.000361) (0.000273) 
𝑌 ∗ 𝐿 0.000357*** 0.000374*** 0.000382*** 0.000191* 0.000465*** 
 (0.0000777) (0.0000803) (0.0000786) (0.0000890) (0.000134) 
𝑌 -0.000218 -0.000155 -0.000949 0.000812 0.0136 
 (0.00415) (0.00420) (0.00428) (0.00653) (0.00725) 
𝑌 * age over 40 -0.00106 -0.00113 -0.00168 -0.000452 0.333*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00231) (0.00232) (0.00345) (0.0351) 
𝑌 * Uni. degree 0.00757* 0.00757* 0.00740* 0.00922 0.000937 
 (0.00346) (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00526) (0.00392) 
𝐿 0.285*** 0.282*** 0.305*** 0.282*** 0.0155* 
 (0.0224) (0.0217) (0.0239) (0.0414) (0.00614) 
𝐿 * age over 40 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0236*** 0.0167 0.0421*** 
 (0.00655) (0.00655) (0.00667) (0.00973) (0.0114) 
𝐿 * Uni. degree 0.0551*** 0.0554*** 0.0563*** 0.0459* 0.112*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0202) (0.0269) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟 -6.265*** -6.261*** -6.236*** -5.646*** -6.777*** 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.209) (0.282) (0.280) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟 *BKK 0.105 0.0994 0.112 0.0710 -0.0113 
 (0.319) (0.320) (0.319) (0.431) (0.542) 
SD: 𝑌 -0.00442* -0.00503* -0.00380 -0.000835 -0.00996*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00201) (0.00231) (0.00369) (0.00258) 
SD :𝐿 0.00433 -0.00146 0.00471 0.0132 -0.00148 
 (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0244) (0.0116) 
Observations 49,016 49,016 31,192 20,504 28,512 
Log lik. -8184.1 -8183.8 -6289.2 -3560.1 -4593.8 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
MUyI4 0.0167088 0.0176083 0.0174516 0.0081087 0.0333347 
neg. %  1.19 1.37 0.81 4.94 0.35 
MUlIH4 0.0407644 0.043631 0.0411778 0.0107289 0.1002574 
neg. % 20.53 19.61 23.45 34.71 12.85 
Quasi-concave I4 1.19 1.37 0.81 4.94 0.35 
Monotonicity I4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 4,456 4,456 4,456 1,864 2,592 
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
𝑌 and 𝐿 are designated as income and leisure hours, respectively. 
MUy and MUl represent marginal utility of income and leisure hours, respectively.  
neg.% indicate a proportion of negative values of a variable in an upper row.  
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TABLE A3.6: Robustness checks for estimation results for unmarried female labour supply 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
𝑌2 -0.00000637 -0.00000581 -0.0000113* -0.00000286 -0.0000162* 
 (0.00000540) (0.00000568) (0.00000566) (0.0000107) (0.00000773) 
𝐿2 -0.00233*** -0.00226*** -0.00245*** -0.00184*** -0.00282*** 
 (0.000145) (0.000150) (0.000152) (0.000219) (0.000217) 
𝑌 ∗ 𝐿 0.000796*** 0.000835*** 0.000806*** 0.00101*** 0.000678*** 
 (0.0000823) (0.0000861) (0.0000822) (0.000163) (0.000109) 
𝑌 -0.0174*** -0.0185*** -0.0175*** -0.0195* -0.00951 
 (0.00411) (0.00425) (0.00422) (0.00765) (0.00592) 
𝑌 * age over 40 0.00707** 0.00707** 0.00732** 0.0107* 0.00816* 
 (0.00237) (0.00244) (0.00241) (0.00457) (0.00331) 
𝑌 * Uni. degree -0.00604 -0.00566 -0.00246 -0.0203** 0.000394 
 (0.00374) (0.00386) (0.00379) (0.00724) (0.00525) 
𝐿 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.210*** 0.147*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0285) (0.0282) 
𝐿 * age over 40 0.0622*** 0.0625*** 0.0631*** 0.0631*** 0.0712*** 
 (0.00584) (0.00596) (0.00592) (0.00994) (0.00883) 
𝐿 * Uni. degree -0.00304 -0.00134 0.0112 -0.0441* 0.0255 
 (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0213) (0.0200) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟 -7.424*** -7.406*** -7.226*** -6.745*** -8.127*** 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.210) (0.278) (0.295) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟 *BKK 0.315 0.365 0.296 0.263 0.261 
 (0.261) (0.267) (0.261) (0.406) (0.369) 
SD: 𝑌 0.0118*** 0.0122*** -0.0117*** 0.0163*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00160) (0.00347) (0.00207) 
SD :𝐿 0.000980 -0.000575 0.0000887 0.00456 -0.0000884 
 (0.00630) (0.00644) (0.00652) (0.0102) (0.00699) 
Observations 49,434 49,434 31,458 22,539 26,895 
Log lik. -8005.9 -8002.4 -6310.3 -3754.6 -4224.9 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
MUyI4 0.0310987 0.0326321 0.0320849 0.0388954 0.0318124 
neg. %  4.76 4.49 4.07 7.27 2.41 
MUlIH4 0.0498654 0.055418 0.05217 0.0632855 0.0536646 
neg. % 26.72 25.90 24.72 25.72 26.05 
Quasi-concave I4 9.08 9.28 7.88 8.49 3.44 
Monotonicity I4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 4,494 4,494 4,494 2,049 2,445 
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
𝑌 and 𝐿 are designated as income and leisure hours, respectively. 
MUy and MUl represent marginal utility of income and leisure hours, respectively.  
neg.% indicate a proportion of negative values of a variable in an upper row.  
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TABLE A3.7: Robustness checks for estimation results for family labour supply 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
𝑌2 -0.00000287* -0.00000220 -0.00000267* -0.00000366 -0.00000316* 
 (0.00000116) (0.00000120) (0.00000132) (0.00000226) (0.00000148) 
𝑌2*young child 3 -0.0000146*** -0.0000169*** -0.0000185*** -0.00000884* -0.0000207*** 
 (0.00000285) (0.00000314) (0.00000333) (0.00000417) (0.00000403) 
𝑌2*young child 6 0.000000255 0.000000125 -0.000000784 -0.00000640 0.00000160 
 (0.00000239) (0.00000261) (0.00000283) (0.00000471) (0.00000273) 
𝑌2*young child 10 -0.00000319 -0.00000336 -0.00000325 -0.00000281 -0.00000542* 
 (0.00000205) (0.00000219) (0.00000237) (0.00000337) (0.00000263) 
𝐿𝑚
2  -0.00646*** -0.00740*** -0.00795*** -0.00619*** -0.00642*** 
 (0.000235) (0.000322) (0.000329) (0.000359) (0.000308) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child < 3 0.00125*** 0.00138*** 0.00165*** 0.000920*** 0.00159*** 
 (0.000155) (0.000173) (0.000185) (0.000210) (0.000223) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child 3-6 0.000549*** 0.000568** 0.000828*** 0.000560** 0.000499* 
 (0.000161) (0.000180) (0.000189) (0.000212) (0.000245) 
𝐿𝑚
2 *young child 6-10 0.000179 0.000186 0.000229 0.000132 0.0000879 
 (0.000137) (0.000155) (0.000163) (0.000187) (0.000193) 
𝐿𝑓
2  -0.00468*** -0.00489*** -0.00507*** -0.00447*** -0.00480*** 
 (0.000106) (0.000117) (0.000124) (0.000152) (0.000154) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child < 3 0.000785*** 0.000859*** 0.000865*** 0.000687*** 0.000802*** 
 (0.000133) (0.000139) (0.000149) (0.000176) (0.000197) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child 3-6 0.000167 0.000201 0.000238 0.000297 -0.000103 
 (0.000118) (0.000124) (0.000130) (0.000153) (0.000184) 
𝐿𝑓
2*young child 6-10 0.0000626 0.0000721 0.0000227 0.000134 -0.0000543 
 (0.0000850) (0.0000881) (0.0000931) (0.000113) (0.000127) 
𝑌𝐿𝑚 0.000211
*** 0.000222*** 0.000265*** 0.000214*** 0.000184*** 
 (0.0000177) (0.0000186) (0.0000207) (0.0000290) (0.0000234) 
𝑌𝐿𝑓 0.000201
*** 0.000215*** 0.000253*** 0.000219*** 0.000164*** 
 (0.0000139) (0.0000144) (0.0000160) (0.0000230) (0.0000184) 
𝐿𝑚𝐿𝑓 0.00230
*** 0.00248*** 0.00278*** 0.00218*** 0.00234*** 
 (0.0000834) (0.0000953) (0.000101) (0.000119) (0.000119) 
𝑌 -0.0132*** -0.0152*** -0.0173*** -0.0219*** -0.00730** 
 (0.00210) (0.00232) (0.00253) (0.00358) (0.00281) 
𝑌*young child < 3 0.0272*** 0.0316*** 0.0343*** 0.0213*** 0.0353*** 
 (0.00358) (0.00401) (0.00420) (0.00500) (0.00522) 
𝑌*young child 3-6 0.00764* 0.00894* 0.0105** 0.0140* 0.00748 
 (0.00325) (0.00357) (0.00385) (0.00551) (0.00410) 
𝑌*young child 6-10 0.00755** 0.00836** 0.00898** 0.00460 0.0129** 
 (0.00284) (0.00308) (0.00329) (0.00419) (0.00397) 
𝑌*N of children 0.000866* 0.00102* 0.00115* 0.00150* 0.0000671 
 (0.000409) (0.000442) (0.000484) (0.000612) (0.000511) 
𝑌*age40(𝑚) -0.00218 -0.00210 -0.00307* 0.0000183 -0.00203 
 (0.00125) (0.00136) (0.00149) (0.00192) (0.00161) 
𝑌*Uni. degree(𝑚) 0.00640*** 0.00719*** 0.00781*** 0.00757*** 0.00616*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00119) (0.00129) (0.00178) (0.00140) 
𝑌*age40(𝑓) 0.00230* 0.00250* 0.00325* 0.00547** -0.00000434 
 (0.00111) (0.00122) (0.00133) (0.00171) (0.00143) 
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TABLE A3.7: Robustness checks for estimation results for family labour supply (Continue) 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
𝑌 *Uni. degree(𝑓) 0.00186 0.000861 0.00173 0.00171 0.00256 
 (0.00135) (0.00144) (0.00158) (0.00221) (0.00175) 
𝐿𝑚 0.486
*** 0.566*** 0.605*** 0.451*** 0.489*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0362) (0.0313) 
𝐿𝑚*young child < 3 -0.0871
*** -0.0915*** -0.112*** -0.0645** -0.104*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0193) (0.0210) (0.0238) (0.0249) 
𝐿𝑚*young child 3-6 -0.0267 -0.0233 -0.0475
* -0.0287 -0.00840 
 (0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0219) (0.0241) (0.0284) 
𝐿𝑚*young child 6-10 0.0106 0.0145 0.0148 -0.00134 0.0438 
 (0.0164) (0.0184) (0.0196) (0.0219) (0.0240) 
𝐿𝑚*N of children 0.00712
** 0.00799** 0.00915** 0.0111*** 0.00171 
 (0.00230) (0.00260) (0.00281) (0.00318) (0.00318) 
𝐿𝑚*age40(𝑚) 0.0204
*** 0.0252*** 0.0264*** 0.0196** 0.0248*** 
 (0.00519) (0.00595) (0.00638) (0.00723) (0.00727) 
𝐿𝑚*Uni. degree(𝑚) 0.0990
*** 0.112*** 0.127*** 0.0886*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00820) (0.00937) (0.00996) (0.0118) (0.0116) 
𝐿𝑚*age40(𝑓) 0.0350
*** 0.0404*** 0.0471*** 0.0448*** 0.0228** 
 (0.00516) (0.00593) (0.00635) (0.00740) (0.00701) 
𝐿𝑚*Uni. degree(𝑓) 0.0131 0.0150 0.0159 0.0121 0.0155 
 (0.00725) (0.00826) (0.00881) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
𝐿𝑓 0.344
*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.316*** 0.363*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0166) (0.0172) 
𝐿𝑓*young child < 3 -0.00164 0.00400 0.0160 -0.00528 0.0141 
 (0.0172) (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0228) (0.0257) 
𝐿𝑓*young child 3-6 0.0277 0.0305 0.0320 0.00570 0.0766
** 
 (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0202) (0.0250) 
𝐿𝑓*young child 6-10 0.0214 0.0233 0.0340
* 0.00269 0.0504** 
 (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0165) (0.0189) 
𝐿𝑓*N of children 0.00941
*** 0.0100*** 0.0106*** 0.0123*** 0.00445 
 (0.00180) (0.00196) (0.00209) (0.00244) (0.00258) 
𝐿𝑓*age40(𝑓) 0.0270
*** 0.0297*** 0.0347*** 0.0322*** 0.0201*** 
 (0.00354) (0.00389) (0.00425) (0.00506) (0.00493) 
𝐿𝑓*Uni. degree(𝑓) 0.00142 -0.00416 0.00483 -0.0158 0.0173 
 (0.00607) (0.00638) (0.00704) (0.00876) (0.00893) 
𝐿𝑓*age40(𝑚) 0.00623 0.00802
* 0.00656 0.00719 0.00916 
 (0.00344) (0.00381) (0.00414) (0.00478) (0.00483) 
𝐿𝑓*Uni. degree(𝑚) 0.0130
** 0.0170** 0.0167** 0.0132 0.0138 
 (0.00504) (0.00555) (0.00599) (0.00720) (0.00709) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑚 -6.921
*** -7.180*** -7.016*** -6.241*** -7.535*** 
 (0.221) (0.244) (0.255) (0.319) (0.306) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑚*𝐵𝐾𝐾 -1.628
*** -2.076*** -2.307*** -1.959** -1.105 
 (0.446) (0.493) (0.516) (0.646) (0.612) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑚*𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 2.308
*** 2.397*** 2.791*** 1.946*** 2.524*** 
 (0.404) (0.423) (0.435) (0.564) (0.572) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑚*𝐴𝑆 0.643
** 0.664** 0.707** 0.877* 0.321 
 (0.220) (0.236) (0.239) (0.343) (0.288) 
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TABLE A3.7: Robustness checks for estimation results for family labour supply (Continue) 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑓 -8.057
*** -8.078*** -7.557*** -7.778*** -8.250*** 
 (0.242) (0.253) (0.256) (0.351) (0.334) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑓*𝐵𝐾𝐾 -1.629
** -2.027*** -2.047*** -1.886* -1.325 
 (0.517) (0.555) (0.564) (0.735) (0.727) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑓* 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 1.872
*** 1.869*** 1.969*** 1.895*** 1.509* 
 (0.413) (0.434) (0.444) (0.575) (0.588) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑓* 𝐴𝑆 0.657
** 0.625* 0.665** 1.017** 0.250 
 (0.238) (0.251) (0.252) (0.365) (0.315) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟ℎℎ -1.272
*** -1.367*** -1.555*** -1.154*** -1.480*** 
 (0.207) (0.219) (0.220) (0.306) (0.277) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟ℎℎ*𝐵𝐾𝐾 1.483
** 1.789** 1.771** 1.828* 1.172 
 (0.516) (0.552) (0.561) (0.732) (0.725) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟ℎℎ* 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑆 -1.715
*** -1.668*** -1.734*** -1.866*** -1.309* 
 (0.378) (0.398) (0.405) (0.532) (0.536) 
𝑃𝑎𝑟ℎℎ* 𝐴𝑆 -0.156 -0.109 -0.147 -0.495 0.174 
 (0.231) (0.245) (0.245) (0.358) (0.304) 
SD:𝑌 0.00260** 0.0000582 0.00221* 0.00142 -0.00181 
 (0.000960) (0.00375) (0.000930) (0.00376) (0.00134) 
SD:𝐿𝑚 0.0845
*** 0.108*** 0.120*** 0.0866*** 0.0720*** 
 (0.00593) (0.00785) (0.00782) (0.00918) (0.00786) 
SD:𝐿𝑓 0.0463
*** -0.0555*** 0.0627*** 0.0477*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.00374) (0.00399) (0.00407) (0.00567) (0.00553) 
Observations 1,837,385 1,837,385 744,065 934,967 902,418 
Log lik. -52659.5 -52644.4 -41591.9 -27169.8 -25411.0 
 100 draws 500 draws 7 choices 2009-2011 2013-2015 
MUyH6 0.0160538 0.0167235 0.0201286 0.0119805 0.0167839 
neg. % 2.89 2.60 2.37 16.05 0.86 
MUmH6 0.0547289 0.0573014 0.0697437 0.0388096 0.0592436 
neg. % 34.33 35.97 35.10 38.84 31.68 
MUfH6 -0.0523611 -0.0515169 -0.0444479 -0.0625566 -0.0498856 
neg. % 44.97 45.35 45.16 49.29 42.60 
Quasi-concave H6 12.17 15.52 15.14 30.97 1.18 
Monotonicity H6 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.01 
Observations 15,185 15,185 15,185 7,727 7,458 
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
𝑌 and 𝐿 are designated as income and leisure hours, respectively. 
MUy and MUl represent marginal utility of income and leisure hours, respectively.  
neg.% indicate a proportion of negative values of a variable in an upper row.  
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 Policy microsimulation 
4.1 Introduction 
 Background 
Microsimulation modelling is a simulation-based tool applied on a micro unit of analysis (e.g., cars, 
individuals, families, firms, and farms) from surveys or administrative datasets to evaluate a given 
change20 (O’Donoghue, 2014). A change can be a policy reform or a socio-economic change that 
affects the population of micro units (Mitton et al., 2000).  
Microsimulation modes (MSMs) are widely applied in many branches of sciences, e.g., engineering 
and social sciences. For example, they are applied in transportation studies in simulating traffic control 
systems and pedestrian walkways; urban planning studies apply spatial microsimulation techniques 
to investigate population dynamics and urban expansion. Regarding MSMs in economics, several areas 
of studies (e.g., public finance, agricultural policy, health economic policy, and labour market) use 
microsimulation in policy simulation. For instance, Lux and Marchesi (1998) apply a microsimulation 
of interacting agents to study volatility clustering in financial markets; Spatial MSMs are also applied 
to investigate environment and economic efficiency in farming. Rutter et al. (2011) provide a review 
which covering an overview of dynamic MSMs as well as different studies applying the models to 
answer health policy questions.   
In fact, MSMs have been used in economic studies to simulate the effect of a policy on economic 
agents such as individuals, households, and firms at the micro-level (i.e., the result can be observed 
for each agent); policy evaluation is based on economic contexts of individual agents, their budget 
constraints, and optionally their behavioural reaction to a policy (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). 
MSMs have turned into one of the general analytical approaches in empirical studies for welfare and 
                                                            
20 A given policy change or reform is generally referred to a factual or a counterfactual policy.  
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distributional analysis (Löffler et al., 2014a). MSMs are widely applied to simulate the distributional 
consequences of an issued policy (e.g., a tax or benefit rule) among heterogeneous population groups 
can also be used to evaluate the possible costs and benefits of a policy to the economy (Creedy and 
Duncan, 2002). This aspect of MSMs is closely associated with labour supply studies.  
Many empirical studies in labour supply apply MSMs to investigate the effects of policies through the 
labour supply model; following empirical studies are provided as examples (details are provided in 
Section 4.2). van Soest (1995) studies family labour supply in the Netherlands using a MSM; the paper 
simulates different tax-benefit policies (e.g., separate taxes and benefits) . Duncan and Harris (2002) 
study labour supply responses of sole parents in Australia; they simulate the effects of actual and 
hypothetical welfare policy reforms (e.g., abolishment of single parent rebate and an increase in basic 
income tax rate). Callan et al. (2009) study female labour supply in Ireland and the effects of 
implementing raised independence in tax treatment of both partners. Müller and Steiner (2013) apply 
a German data set to study family labour supply and the effects of increases in the minimum wage. 
Kabátek et al. (2014) investigate household labour supply using a French dataset; they apply a MSM 
to evaluate the effects of separate taxation for married couples and joint taxation for cohabitating 
couples.  
It can be apparently seen that most of the existing literature focuses on developed countries. Gong 
and van Soest (2002) is an example in the literature focusing on a developing country investigating 
married female labour supply in Mexico City. However, the study aims to learn labour supply 
responses of different sub-groups and model specifications in a developing country setting; it applies 
a MSMs for wage elasticity of labour supply only. The literature which applies a MSM model through 
labour supply behaviour to investigate effects of different policies is lacking; this is one of the key 
motivations of this chapter.  
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The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the effects of actual and counterfactual policies on 
labour supply response as well as financial factors, namely, gross income, tax burden, and disposable 
income at individual and household level. On top of that, this chapter aims to explore the effect of 
policies on poverty and income equality. This chapter contributes to the small literature investigating 
such issues in a developing country, which is important as a similar policy can lead to different results 
in developing and developed countries due to different economic contexts.  
This chapter focuses on the MSM based on the static unitary labour supply setting for individual and 
family levels. The model for individual labour supply is more straightforward because only one labour 
supply response is observed under a simulated situation. The model for household labour supply is 
more complicated as behavioural changes of both partners can be observed due to a simulated 
scenario. This chapter is closely linked to the previous chapter; the labor supply behaviour obtained 
from the preferred discrete hours labour supply models in the previous chapter are adopted in MSMs 
in this chapter. The behavioural MSMs based on data in year 2013 and 2015 are applied in the 
simulation for a couple of reasons. First, actual and counterfactual policy reforms simulated in this 
chapter are more relevant to years 2013 and 2015. Second, according to results in the previous 
chapter, the models fit the 2013 and 2015 dataset better than the 2009 and 2011 dataset and than 
the whole sample, four years altogether. 
The next section provides detailed discussion on different policies included in this chapter. The three 
main policy reforms include the national minimum wage, increases in non-transferable allowances, 
and a proposed tax structure reform. 
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 Thailand policy issues 
This section provides a brief explanation about the policy simulations in this chapter. The details of 
the empirical simulation procedure are provided in Section 4.4.4.  
 Minimum wage 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the Thai government changed from provincial minimum wages to a 
national minimum wage in 2012. The minimum wage was set to be 300 baht per day, i.e., it increased 
by about 70 percent on average at the beginning of 2013 (the details of the wage increase are provided 
in TABLE A2.1). The political explanation is that the policy can help increase household income for 
families at the lower end of the income distribution; therefore, it benefits are at least twofold. Firstly, 
it helps raise a living standard of people. The government also claimed that it could promote economic 
growth since people earning the minimum wage spend a larger proportion of income relative to other 
groups. Secondly, increased incomes of people at the lower end of the distribution makes the income 
gap narrower; this ameliorates the income inequality situation in Thailand.  
However, a major concern is a low rate of policy compliance and inefficient law enforcement. 
Leckcivilize (2015) indicates that the minimum wage policy is effective in large businesses but the 
effectiveness drops for small and medium sized businesses in the covered industries; the policy is 
overall ineffective in reducing income wage inequality because of the low compliance rate and 
inefficient law enforcement in Thailand. This is similar to the reason why del Carpio et al. (2014) who 
study  the effects of the minimum wages on welfare in Thailand conclude that the minimum wage 
increased inequality within the lower half of the income distribution since people in very poor 
households tend to work in industries or organisations that are not compliant with the policy. If the 
government increased the rate of policy compliance, the policy will be more effective to achieve its 
key purposes.  
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The minimum wage with perfect compliance is expected to yield different results because the 
different inherent structures of the income distributions between developing and developed 
countries. In fact, developed countries such as Germany in Müller and Steiner (2013) and the UK in 
Atkinson et al. (2017) indicate that people earning the minimum wage in these countries are scattered 
across the income distribution. However, minimum wage workers in Thailand are heavily distributed 
at the bottom half of the income distribution.  
This chapter simulates a perfectly compliant rate of the national minimum wage policy (300 baht per 
day) and investigates the effect on labour supply behaviour, incomes, and personal income tax.  
 Increases in non-transferable allowances 
In the 2017 tax year, the Thai government increased some allowable expenses and allowances. The 
government adjusted these tax benefits to reflect increased costs of living in recent years. Ceteris 
paribus, the reform is expected to help raise disposable income. Among these changes were increases 
in two non-transferable allowances including earned income allowable expenses and child allowance.  
The allowable expense was increased from 40% of income (not over 60,000 baht) to 50% of income 
(not over 100,000 baht); child allowance was also raised from a maximum of 17,000 baht to 30,000 
baht per year. These non-transferable allowances are interesting because they are expected to change 
the labour supply behaviour of people directly, especially those who are not paying personal income 
tax, such as non-workers and part-time workers, encouraging them to participate in the labour market 
and increase hours worked respectively. This is because each person needs to work and earn a certain 
amount of income to utilise these non-transferable allowable tax-benefits efficiently. Although, the 
government also increased other transferable allowances such as personal spouse allowances21, they 
                                                            
21 They were doubled from 30,000 baht per person (60,000 baht in total) to 60,000 baht per person (120,000 
baht in total).  
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are not included in this chapter due to its transferable property, which does not directly affect the 
labour supply response of each individual in specific.  
This chapter simulates an increase on these non-transferable allowances based on the rules in 2017 
to see the effect on labour supply and related pecuniary variables.   
 Recently proposed tax code restructure  
In September 2018, a government committee22 proposed a rudimentary package of tax reforms. 
Personal income tax is a part of the package; other taxes such as corporate tax, VAT, and specific 
business taxes are also included. While most parts of the proposal are still unclear, some interesting 
issues have enough information to be worthwhile investigating. Regarding personal income tax, the 
focus in this chapter, Thai government plans to restructure these following aspects which are related 
to this study23. 
First, based on the current rule, people need to report their incomes if they earn more than a threshold 
amount depending on whether they are single or a married couple. However, the proposal states that 
all people older than 18 years old must declare income for personal income tax; those are who 
younger than 18 years old and earn over the threshold amount as indicated in the current tax code 
also need to declare their incomes to the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance. The objective of 
this amendment is to expand the tax base (i.e., the number of people declaring income for taxation). 
In this chapter, this proposed rule is incorporated into the simulation. However, since a new income 
thresholds is unknown, it is set as the most recent tax rules at the day the simulation is executed (tax 
year 2017). This specific change is expected to affect some individuals who are younger than 18 years 
old but earn less than the income declaration threshold. However, the effects on labour supply 
                                                            
22 This sub-committee is under the Thai law reforming committee appointed by the Prime Minister’s Office.  
23 Some aspects of personal income are not applicable in this study such as incomes earned by groups of persons 
or ordinary partnerships.  
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response and financial variables (income and tax amounts) are likely to be limited because people 
under 18 years old are less likely to have any personal income tax burden. 
Second, the proposed tax codes plan to eliminate joint tax and partially join tax filings to simplify the 
tax calculation as well as to eliminate tax planning for married couples. In recent years, Thai people 
can choose among separate, partially joint, and joint income declarations for personal income tax; 
each option may yield a different tax burden. Allowing options in tax calculation leads to tax planning. 
This study follows the proposed rules by removing all possibilities for married couples to do joint tax 
and partially joint income declarations. This reform possibly has a slight effect on disposable income. 
In the tax calculation process, people are assumed to have perfect information about tax rules and 
therefore they select the best option (separate, joint, or partially joint taxation) to minimise their tax 
burden. Elimination of joint taxation (including partially joint taxation) causes people to pay tax as 
given. This proposed rule is expected to increase tax burden for some households, which do tax 
planning by choosing joint or partially joint tax declaration to minimise the tax amount in the pre-
reform scenario.  
Third, the government committee aims to revise the tax base and tax rates by amending the tax 
threshold, tax brackets, as well as tax rate at each bracket. In fact, the tax threshold, which is currently 
set at first 150,000 baht of taxable income, will be removed. Hence, if a person has net taxable income 
greater than zero, all of the amount will be taxed. Unfortunately, the details about tax brackets and 
tax rates are still unknown. According to available information, the committee plans to expand the 
income range in each bracket and reduce the celling tax rate to be more comparable to the corporate 
income tax rate, which is currently 20 percent. This study is compliant with the proposed reform by 
eliminating the tax thresholds in the tax calculation. In addition, this chapter reduces the number of 
tax brackets and expands the income range at each bracket by applying the rules in 2009 and 2011.  
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FIGURE 4.1: Marginal tax rates and tax brackets for the recently proposed tax restructure 
  
FIGURE 4.1 exhibits marginal tax rates in the pre-reform case (2013-2015) and the proposed personal 
income tax package. This chapter amends the 2013 and 2015 tax rules (shown on the left graph of 
FIGURE 4.1) based on the proposed changes. The right graph of FIGURE 4.1 shows the reformed tax 
brackets and rates. There are some other proposed rules such as reducing income types from eight 
types to three types, revising allowable expenses to suit new income types, and increasing allowances 
for children and the disabled. However, detailed information about these amendments is unavailable. 
On top of that, the HSES does not provide enough information to calculate disposable incomes using 
assumptions based on the proposed rules.  
The effect of this hypothetical reform including removing the tax threshold, reducing a number of tax 
brackets, and revising tax rates is unclear because this change can affect different people differently.  
 Organisation of the chapter 
This chapter applies the microsimulation technique on labour supply models to investigate the impact 
of simulated policy reforms on labour supply responses, gross incomes, tax burdens, and disposable 
incomes. The implications on household income and income equality are also investigated.  
The next section, Section 4.2, reviews the literature, which is sectioned by different simulations. In 
Section 4.3, the data and descriptive statistics are presented. Section 4.4 provides a description of the 
methodology applied in this study, which includes microsimulation in the labour supply setting, an 
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explanation of the microsimulation model taxonomy in labour supply studies, a discussion of the 
labour supply elasticity calculation, and a description of the simulated policies and the policy 
evaluation. Next, Section 4.5 provides simulated results for the labour supply elasticity and each 
separate policy. The final section, Section 4.6, concludes the chapter with a summary of findings and 
economic explanations. 
4.2 Literature reviews 
This section reviews previous empirical work using microsimulation techniques in policy evaluation. 
Different studies simulate different policies depending on their objectives under varied contexts. 
Some studies focus on the impact of actual recent policies; some studies assess the results of 
counterfactual policy reforms; and other studies simulate both types of policies to evaluate their 
effects. The policy measures are also varied across studies. 
 Labour supply elasticities 
Empirical studies which focus on the effects of policy reforms applying microsimulation approaches 
with labour supply settings usually include an analysis of labour supply elasticities. It is to investigate 
the labour supply response when an income factor increases by a given percent. The net wage rates 
or household disposable incomes are endogenously changed through the tax-benefit system. Most of 
the studies focus on labour supply at either the individual level or household level; however, individual 
labour supply research usually studies married individuals. Thus, this section includes empirical work 
that covers labour supply models at the family level so that this allows comparison of own wage and 
cross wage elasticities of labour supply as well as labour supply elasticity between genders and 
marriage status.  
van Soest (1995) is the seminal paper on discrete hours labour supply models and microsimulation; 
the paper uses Dutch household data collected in 1987 to study household labour supply. The author 
increases before tax wage rates of males and females by 10 percent. When wages of males increase 
 176 
 
by 10 percent, both partners increase their hours worked. Increases in male and female labour supply 
are also observed when females’ wages increase by 10 percent. However, the own wage elasticity of 
labour supply is greater than the cross wage elasticity of labour supply for both cases. Overall, the 
results indicate that labour supply is more elastic for females than males.  
van Soest and Das (2001) study family labour supply in Netherlands using Dutch cross-sectional data 
in 1995. The framework is similar to van Soest (1995); they extend some aspects. For instance, they 
incorporate fixed costs into the model rather than apply an ad hoc alternative specific constant on 
certain hours points (part-time jobs) in the direct utility function as in van Soest (1995). They increase 
the before tax wage rates by 1 percent to analyse the own and cross wage elasticities of labour supply. 
The own wage elasticity of labour supply for both genders are positive. The cross wage elasticities of 
labour supply are found to be negative for both genders which is different from the results in van 
Soest (1995). Nevertheless, the relative size of the elasticity in both cases (own wage and cross wage 
elasticities) are consistent with previous work; female elasticities are greater than male elasticities. 
They also provide the overall result when wages of both genders increase by 1 percent. They find a 
very small positive increase on male labour supply but a larger positive increase on female labour 
supply.  
Some studies include standard errors to allow statistical significance testing. Callan and van Soest 
(1996) extend van Soest (1995) by accounting for involuntary unemployment and fixed costs in 
studying the household labour supply in Ireland. They apply a one-percent increase in before tax wage 
rates to investigate both own wage and cross wage elasticities of labour supply for men and women. 
The results indicate that the own wage elasticity of labour supply for males is less elastic than for 
females. The cross wage elasticities of both genders show very small negative numbers; the female 
cross wage elasticity is not statistically significant.  
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Kabátek et al. (2014) study household labour supply in France. They increase net wages by 1 percent 
to investigate elasticities of labour supply for husbands and wives. The results are similar to other 
studies. For both genders, own wage elasticities of labour supply are positive, and cross wage 
elasticities of labour supply are negative. The relative size of (own wage and cross wage) labour supply 
elasticities for females are greater than those for males. The study also investigates the unearned 
income elasticity of labour supply by increasing non-labour income by 1 percent. The simulated results 
indicate that both husbands and wives decrease their hours worked; however, females reduce their 
labour supply more than do males as expected.  
de Boer (2016) studies labour supply in Netherland at individual and household level. The author 
simulates elasticities of labour supply by increasing gross wages by 10 percent. Regarding individual 
labour supply, the elasticity of single parents is larger than that of singles without children. In terms 
of household labour supply, the results are consistent with other studies in that female labour supply 
is more elastic than the male labour supply. The own wage elasticities are positive whilst the cross 
wage elasticities are negative. The study also shows that couples with children have more elastic 
labour supply relative to couples without children.  
Mauro et al. (2017) study not only family labour supply, but also individual labour supply in the 
Netherlands. By applying a large and rich panel data, the microsimulation results suggest that in 
general own wage elasticities of labour supply for both genders are positive; labour supply of females 
is more elastic than that of males. The cross wage elasticities of labour supply, which are only available 
at the family level, are negative for both genders. The cross wage elasticities of labour supply in 
households without children are identical whilst in households with children, the cross wage elasticity 
of labour supply for females is more elastic. The subgroup results indicate that singles without children 
have less elastic labour supply in comparison with singles with children. A similar pattern is observed 
for the household labour supply level as well.  
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It is apparent that most existing studies investigate labour supply in developed countries; hence, there 
is very limited knowledge about labour supply elasticity in developing countries. Gong and van Soest 
(2002) investigate married female labour supply in Mexico City. They simulate a one-percent rise of 
all respondent wage rates; the results suggest that the average hours worked increases. When other 
unearned income (i.e., incomes of husband and unmarried children) increases by 1 percent, married 
females reduce working hours. The findings are similar to previous research in developed countries; 
however, the study does not provide any analysis about male labour supply elasticities and cross wage 
elasticities of both genders. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by simulating labour supply 
elasticities covering own wage and cross wage elasticities of labour supply for both genders in a 
developing country (Thailand).  
 Minimum wage policy 
The extensive literature associated with the effects of minimum wages focuses mainly on employment 
(Brown, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Many studies focus on the effects of an increase in the 
minimum wage on poverty (e.g., Mincy (1990), Addison and Blackburn (1999), and Müller and Steiner 
(2009). However, less research attention has been devoted to the economic question whether and to 
what extent the minimum wages affect household income distribution (Müller and Steiner, 2013).In 
addition, empirical studies investigating the effects of minimum wages on labour supply is limited 
(Rozenbes et al., 2013).  
This section primarily reviews existing empirical research which studies the effect of a minimum wage 
on labour supply, poverty, and income distribution. Although the focus of this chapter is to apply 
microsimulation in the analysis, this section includes a study using other techniques to obtain the 
results as well.  
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Bredemeier and Juessen (2012) study the labour supply response of married and single females in 
Germany. They estimate a structural labour supply model with home production. The results show 
large positive effects of the minimum wage on minimum wage recipients. The results are different 
(positive, neutral, and negative) with smaller effects for non-minimum wage workers. The 
experiments reveal a stronger effect on married women than single ones. However, the effect on the 
total labour supply is relatively small.  
Buddelmeyer and Kalb (2008) investigate the impact of an increase in the minimum wage. Their 
microsimulation uses data from Australia to increase the federal minimum wage from 13.74 to 14.31 
AUDs. The results indicate that all population subgroups (minimum wage workers and all employed 
workers) increase their labour supply after the reform. Regarding minimum wage workers, sole 
parents have the greatest labour supply response followed by partnered women, single women, single 
men, and partnered men respectively.  
Müller and Steiner (2009) apply STSM which is a MSM based on Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to 
investigate the effects of an increase on the minimum wage on poverty in German. In simulation they 
introduce a national minimum wage at 7.50 Euros. This cause overall increases in the minimum wage 
from about 4 percent in West Germany to 15 percent in East Germany. The policy raises the average 
gross hourly wage by 30 percent at the bottom decile of the wage distribution and about 65 percent 
at the first five percentile. However, they find that the minimum wage is not an effective policy for 
poverty remedy because of the means-tested income support. Sabia and Burkhauser (2010) study the 
effects of increases in the minimum wage in the U.S. They estimate a fixed effect model using a dataset 
from March 2004 to March 2008. The simulation results suggest that increasing the minimum wage 
from 7.25 USD to 9.50 USD is ineffective in reducing poverty.  
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However, some empirical studies find increasing the minimum wage is an effective in poverty 
reduction. Mincy (1990) uses the March 1987 Current Population Survey in the U.S. to estimate the 
results and simulate the effects of increases in the minimum wage. The results suggest that the 
minimum wage increases narrow poverty gap, reduce the number of poor households, and increase 
household income. Addison and Blackburn (1999) apply a more flexible reduced form model to 
estimate the U.S. state-level dataset during the year 1983 to 1996. The results suggest that increases 
in the minimum wages benefit poverty reduction for teenagers and older junior high school dropouts.  
Müller and Steiner (2013) develop Müller and Steiner (2009) in studying the effects of an increase of 
the legal minimum wage using the microsimulation technique. The authors use German data to 
investigate distributional effects of a minimum wage through labour supply, employment, and price 
effects models. The study shows that an increase in the minimum wage has a small effect on 
disposable incomes. This is because low-wage earners are distributed across the whole income 
distribution and the effects of the minimum wage increase is cancelled out by reductions in means-
tested welfare transfers and high marginal tax rates. Increases in the minimum wage induce negative 
effects on employment and consumer prices (i.e., inflation); positive direct effects on disposable 
incomes caused by the minimum wage are wiped out.   
Atkinson et al. (2017) apply a MSM which is based on the labour supply based tax-benefit model 
EUROMOD to evaluate the effects of several policies in reducing poverty and inequality in the UK. One 
of the key policies the paper focuses on is increasing the national minimum wage. The microsimulation 
results of a considerable increase in the minimum wage show that the increase affects a large 
proportion of earners, but has a very modest effect in ameliorating inequality or poverty. This is 
because low-wage workers are scattered across the entire distribution rather than concentrated 
towards the lower end. Inclusion of the minimum wage with other tax-benefit policy packages makes 
little difference in terms of incentives to work relative to the effect of those policies without the effect 
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of the minimum wage. Increasing the minimum wage helps to reduce the number of people reliant on 
means-tested support with each policy.  
According to previous work, there is no conclusive result regarding the effect of raising the national 
minimum wage on labour supply, poverty, and income distribution. In addition, previous studies 
simulate the policy in the developed country contexts. There is a gap in the literature for national 
minimum wage policy simulations in developing country settings.  
 Tax and transfer structure simulations 
van Soest (1995) simulates the effects of different tax-transfer scenarios. First, the study assumes 
separate taxation without transfers. This makes one-earner families face an increase in personal 
income tax and a disincentive for female market participation is removed from the tax-benefit system. 
The simulation results reveal that this policy causes an increase in female labour supply; whilst the 
male labour supply changes in the opposite direction. Second, taxes and benefits are completely 
individualised. The simulated results when a government applies a completely separate tax on couples 
suggest that the proportion of lone-working families increases due to benefits received if the partner 
does not work, and both genders reduce their overall hours worked.  
Callan and van Soest (1996) compare simulation results between family-based taxation and two more 
independent taxation systems. First, the simulation applies the quasi-independent taxation whereby 
the transferability of allowances between spouses is limited. The results indicate that the effects on 
male labour supply are small at both intensive and extensive margins. The average hours worked drops 
whilst the participation and employment rates slightly increase. On the other hand, the effects for 
females are larger for worked hours, participation, and involuntary unemployment. The second tax 
system is fully independent individual taxation, which allows married spouses to transfer allowances 
freely. This system reduces effective tax rates by about 10 percent. The effects on males are moderate. 
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Average hours decline slightly; and an increase in nonparticipation leads to a fall in the employment 
rate. The effects on women, on the other hand, are relatively substantial.   
Kabátek et al. (2014) study the effects of changing from joint taxation to separate taxation for married 
couples and vice versa for cohabiting partners in France. Their structural discrete hours labour supply 
model considers market work, domestic duties, and leisure. The simulated effects of income tax 
reforms suggest that replacing joint taxation with separate taxation for married couples increases 
marginally the participation rate and the average market hours for females and reduces the 
participation rate and the hours worked of males slightly. On the other hand, changing the tax system 
from separate taxation to joint taxation for cohabiting couples leads to a slight increase in the 
participation rate and the market labour supply for males and a small negative impact on the 
participation rate and the market hours for women.  
Along with an increase in the minimum wage, Atkinson et al. (2017) simulate a tax system with more 
progressive tax rates (ranging between 25 to 65 percent) using UK labour supply models. Following 
Atkinson (2015) they also investigate the impact of setting the Child Benefit at 18 percent of the 
median equivalised household net income for all children apart from the first child. In fact, the weekly 
payments of Child Benefits for the first child increase from 20.5 to 89.15 pounds per week whilst the 
benefits for any following child rise from 13.55 to 52.50 pounds per week; the baseline system uses 
information from 2014. They also aim to offer two alternative routes to revise social transfers. One 
option is strengthening Social Insurance by raising payment rates, reducing the personal tax 
allowances, and converting child benefits to be taxable. The other option is introducing Participation 
Income24 (75 pounds per week) with some changes including the elimination of the personal income 
tax allowance and age allowance, and interactions between Participation Income and the tax-benefit 
                                                            
24 Participation Income is a partial financial support which is complement existing social transfers. Adults receive 
Participation Income when they meet a condition such as caring for someone (a child or an adult), doing 
volunteer work, doing formal work, seeking for a job training, and etc.  
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system. The simulation results suggest that the each proposed tax-transfer package can help reduce 
income inequality and poverty substantially. 
Creedy and Mok (2017) study labour supply and effects of the New Zealand 2010 tax-transfer change. 
They also provide implications for government revenue and the income distribution. In 2010, the New 
Zealand government introduced a tax package including an increase in the Goods and Services Tax 
rate from 12.5 to 15 percent, decreases in personal income tax rates, and increases in the major 
benefits. Data in year 2009/2010 are used in the estimation and simulation. Reforms in personal 
income tax help increase labour supply at the intensive and extensive margins. Considering separate 
components in the package suggests that the change in tax rates has the largest impact on labour 
supply. This is because it affects a larger percentage of the population relative to other changes. 
Simulations on income taxes and benefits are different across studies because their samples have 
contextual differences (countries and periods). Previous empirical papers usually simulate effects on 
policies in developed countries; this leave some academic opportunities for investigating effects of 
tax-benefit reforms in developing country contexts.  
4.3 Empirical data  
 Descriptive statistics of Thailand HSES 
The data used in the microsimulation is from the HESE in 2013 and 2015. The data is quite recent 
which is an advantage why simulating recent factual policies as well as counterfactual policies. Labour 
supply responses of people in recent years to a simulated policy are likely to differ from their own 
behaviour in the past and hence using older data may give misleading results. 
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The data covers 12,495 households; the number of observations is identical to what is used in the 
estimation in the previous chapter. Households are divided into six different types categorised by the 
type of labour supply (individual or family) and the number of dependent children for married couples. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in TABLE 4.1.  
TABLE 4.1: The number of observations by household type 
Household type Number of observations Percentage 
Unmarried males without children 2,592 20.74 
Unmarried females without children 2,445 19.57 
Married couple without children 3,824 30.60 
Married couple with a child 2,115 16.93 
Married couple with two children 1,292 10.34 
Married couple with three children 227 1.82 
Total 12,495 100.00 
The first household type is unmarried males. These individuals are applied in the estimation to obtain 
coefficients for the policy simulations; the detailed estimation results which are obtained in the 
previous chapter are presented in TABLE A3.5, Appendix 3.IV. Unmarried males account for 20.74 
percent of the total households. The second group of observations is unmarried females. Similar to 
the unmarried male case, a separate model is estimated specifically for these female individuals who 
comprise 19.57 percent of the whole sample; the details of estimation results are shown in TABLE 
A3.6, Appendix 3.IV.  
The parameters of household labour supply are obtained from estimating models for married couples 
(details of the estimates are shown in the previous empirical chapter, TABLE A3.7 in Appendix 3.IV), 
which are divided into three types. Married couples without children, the third household type, consist 
of two adults in each household; they account for 30.60 percent of the whole sample. The next 
household type is married couples with a dependent child; each household includes two married 
adults and their child. This household type covers 16.93 percent of the total observations. This study 
includes households of married couples with two dependent children which share 10.34 percent of 
the whole sample. The last household group is five-member households; each of them consists of a 
married couple and three children. They comprise 1.82 percent of all household types. 
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptive statistics of predicted and calibrated values in the status quo 
Variable  Unmarried individuals Married couples 
Males 
[2,592] 
Females 
[2,445] 
Males 
[7,458] 
Females 
[7,458] 
Predicted hourly gross wage 67.82 70.66 78.57 60.71 
Hours worked 43.30 37.97 45.21 33.81 
Gross income (‘000) 152.44 146.68 292.31 
Tax burden (‘000) 0.837 1.40 2.59 
Disposable income (‘000) 151.60 145.27 289.73 
TABLE 4.2 presents important values under the status quo also known as the pre-reform scenario or 
the base case; besides predicted wages which is obtained from the Heckman selection model25, these 
numbers are obtained from the calibration under status quo (i.e., the microsimulation is performed 
without changing any variable value (details about calibration in Section 4.4.2).  
The predicted wages are applied in calculating incomes and tax burdens. The average predicted wages 
of unmarried males and females are 67.82 and 70.66 baht per hour, respectively. The reason why the 
wage of unmarried females exceeds the wage of male counterparts is that unmarried females are 
more educated and older than unmarried males in general. Among married couples, it can be 
observed that the husband’s hourly wage, 78.75, is greater than wives’ hourly wage, 60.71. A 
comparison between unmarried and married males suggests that males who earn higher wages are 
more likely to be married. The opposite picture is shown for females. Unmarried females who have 
better economic status than married ones are less likely to rely on males (i.e., the former are less likely 
to be married). Predicted wages are also consistent with the fact that in Thai culture husbands take 
the major responsibility in earning income for their families.  
 
 
                                                            
25 The predicted wages are obtained by using a two-stage Heckman model before labour supply estimation (the 
details are in Section 3.2.3). 
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From TABLE 4.2, regardless of marriage status, males usually work longer hours than females do. In 
fact, unmarried and married males work 43.30 and 45.21 hours per week on average, respectively. On 
the other hand, unmarried and married females spend 37.97 and 33.81 hours in the labour market, 
respectively. If people get married, males tend to increase hours worked whilst females are likely to 
decrease hours worked. This is because of an economic factor (i.e., earned wage) and a cultural factor 
(i.e., responsibilities in households).  
Gross income includes earned income, which is a function of wages and hours worked, and unearned 
income, which is assumed to be exogenous. Average gross annual incomes for unmarried males, 
unmarried females, and married couples are 152.44, 146.68, and 292.31 thousand baht respectively. 
Unmarried males usually pay less tax than unmarried females due to the proportions of earned and 
unearned income. In fact, there are eight types of incomes in personal income tax, and different types 
may have different rules about allowable expenses leading to different amounts of net taxable income 
and tax burden. The average tax burden of married couples is 2.59 thousand baht. Although tax 
burden amounts are small, they are consistent with the fact that the percentage of personal income 
tax per GDP in Thailand is just about two percent.  
Disposable income is obtained by subtracting the personal income tax burden from gross income. The 
average disposable incomes of unmarried males, unmarried females, and married couples are 151.60, 
145.27, and 289.73 thousand baht, respectively.  
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 Minimum wage in Thailand 
The national minimum wage during the study period is 300 baht per day (i.e., the minimum daily wage, 
300 baht, divided by 8 working hours per day26 is equivalent to 37.5 baht per hour). Based on predicted 
wages, the numbers of people, by marriage status and gender, who have gross wages below the 
minimum wage are provided in TABLE 4.3. 
TABLE 4.3: Predicted wages for people earn under the minimum wage 
 Frequency Percentage Mean Min. Max. 
Unmarried males 164 6.30 35.14 27.82 37.48 
Unmarried females 807 33.00 31.83 22.67 37.48 
Married males 455 6.10 35.08 27.14 37.49 
Married females 2,830 37.90 33.06 22.90 37.49 
Total 4,256 34.10 33.12 22.67 37.49 
The total number of people earning less than the national minimum wage account for 34.1 percent of 
total individuals. The average wage of these people is about 33.12 baht per day or 88.32 percent of 
the legal minimum wage. The least gross earned wage is 22.67 baht per day or 60.45 percent of the 
minimum wage whilst the highest gross earned wage of these people is just below the minimum wage.  
The number of male and female individuals whose gross wages are below the national minimum wage 
share about 6.3 and 33 percent of total observations in their categories respectively. In addition, the 
number of married males and females who earn less than the minimum comprise approximately 6.1 
and 37.9 percent of married males and females respectively. This identifies a major concern regarding 
the rate of minimum wage policy compliance in Thailand.  
Among people who fail to earn up to the minimum wage, unmarried females have the lowest mean 
wages (31.83); while unmarried males have the highest mean of wages (35.14). The mean predicted 
wages for married males and females earning less than the minimum wage are 35.08 and 33.06, 
respectively.  
                                                            
26 Eight hours are the maximum normal (excluding over-time) working hours per day in Thailand.  
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4.4 Methodology 
 Microsimulation in labour supply 
Microsimulation is a form of partial equilibrium analysis which simulates the effects of a given policy, 
such as tax or benefit reforms, on only one side of the market, i.e., individuals, households, or firms 
(Löffler et al., 2014a). The usefulness of MSMs in the analysis of policy reforms is threefold. Firstly, 
MSMs apply microdata which allow them to account for heterogeneity of individual agents; therefore, 
MSMs offer a precise identification of winners and losers due to a policy change, which also allows a 
researcher to evaluate welfare effects and political economy factors that possibly obstruct the policy 
implementation (Löffler et al., 2014a). Secondly, MSMs provide the possibility of accurately calculating 
the aggregate financial costs or benefits of a policy change (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). In fact, 
the results from MSMs at a micro-unit level can be aggregated for a macro-level analysis, e.g., to find 
the impact on the government budget, household income, and income inequality. Thirdly, previous 
empirical studies as shown in Section 4.2 are good examples for the versatility of the microsimulation 
technique which allows a researcher to simulate any factual and counterfactual policy. The key 
objective of an actual policy simulation is to evaluate whether the policy is effective or not. On the 
other hand, a hypothetical policy simulation aims to find the best solution in a particular context.   
The next section provides information on a general taxonomy of microsimulation models in the labour 
supply context.  
 A taxonomy of labour supply related microsimulation models 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) state that MSMs models consist of three main elements. Firstly, a 
micro-dataset which contains socio-economic information of individuals or households. This 
component of MSMs is straightforward; thus, it is not discussed here. Secondly, an arithmetical model 
is basically the rules of the simulated policies (i.e., the model for the budget constraint faced by each 
agent). An arithmetic MSM (i.e. a non-behavioural MSM) allows a researcher to simulate a policy 
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reform which affects the disposable income and tax burden of decision agents in the micro-level 
dataset while assuming that individual behaviour remains unchanged. Lastly, a behavioural model that 
is built from a theoretical model to incorporate the behavioural responses of micro units. In fact, it 
takes the behavioural response of decision agents due to a change in their budget constraint, i.e., 
disposable income, into account. 
Beginning with arithmetical MSMs, policy simulations possibly affect household gross income or tax 
burden, depending on policies. Consequently, they possibly change household disposable income. The 
theoretical explanation of arithmetical MSMs in labor supply models begins with recalling the utility 
functions and budget constraints as described in the previous chapter. For simplicity, the explanation 
focuses on individual labour supply.  
 
𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗(𝑌𝑛𝑗 , 𝐿𝑗;  𝑍𝑖 , 𝛽) + 𝜀𝑛𝑗  (4 - 1) 
 
𝑌𝑛𝑗 = 𝑤𝑛 ∗ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑛, 𝐻𝑗 , 𝑦𝑛, 𝑍𝑛) (4 - 2) 
Any policy reform, e.g. wage (𝑤𝑛) and tax structure (𝑇), which is a function of earned income (𝑤𝑛 ∗
𝐻𝑗), unearned income (𝑦𝑛), and socio-characteristics (𝑍𝑛) (e.g. the number of children) affects the 
direct utility, 𝑉𝑛𝑗, through a change in the budget constraint, 𝑌𝑛𝑗, i.e., disposable income. The welfare 
effect of a reform affecting individual disposable income marginally at unchanged leisure hours, 𝐿𝑗 , 
i.e., at constant hours worked, 𝐻𝑗, is designated as follows: 
 
𝛥𝑉𝑛𝑗 = 𝑀𝑈𝑦𝛥𝑌𝑛𝑗  (4 - 3) 
where 𝛥 represents the proportional change, and 𝑀𝑈𝑦 is marginal utility of income.  
Arithmetical models have the benefits of indicating how disposable income changes at any hour point 
for each agent due to a given policy reform.  
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As with arithmetical MSMs, behavioural MSMs are based on micro-data (individuals or households), 
but they contain an additional important part to the analysis. Behavioural MSMs extend arithmetical 
MSMs by including a detailed representation of the behavioural response into the MSMs. Since the 
arithmetical part of behavioural MSMs is explained in the previous section, this section focus only 
upon the behavioural part.  
In a labour supply setting, the structural discrete choice models for labour supply do not provide any 
explicit labour supply function, which is directly determined by wage and other socio-economic 
characteristics; however, they obtain estimated parameters of the utility function, which determines 
labour supply (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b). From the results obtained by the structural discrete hours 
choice models in the previous chapter, behavioural MSMs allow simulation of people’s reaction to a 
policy change by comparing the levels of utility across alternatives faced by each decision agent (either 
individual or household). 
The key process of the behavioural MSMs is calibration. In this chapter, the calibration is done through 
the probability prediction process as described in Train (2009). According to equation (4 - 1), utility 
consists of a systematic component, 𝑉𝑛𝑗(𝑌𝑛𝑗 , 𝐿𝑗;  𝑍𝑖 , 𝛽), and a random component, 𝜀𝑛𝑗. The estimation 
of the discrete hours labour supply model obtain the coefficients (𝛽) which are distributed with 
density 𝑓(𝛽|Ɵ), where Ɵ refers to the parameters of the distribution, e.g., mean, variance, and 
covariance of 𝛽.  
The predicted probabilities are obtained through simulation given the density of coefficients, 𝑓(𝛽|Ɵ) 
by the following steps.  The process starts with drawing a value of each coefficient from its distribution 
and label it 𝛽𝑟; with 𝑟 denoting the draw. Secondly, the conditional probability is calculated for each 
draw by the logit formula as follows:  
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𝐿𝑛𝑗(𝛽
𝑟) =
𝑒𝑉𝑛𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑛𝑖𝑀𝑖=1
   (4 - 4) 
where 𝑀 is the total number of alternatives available for each decision agent; the subscript 𝑖 
designates the alternatives and the predicted alternative is identified by the subscript 𝑗. 
Third, the first and second steps are repeated many times. Next, after obtaining the conditional 
probability for many draws, the predicted probability is calculated by averaging the probability over 
the number of draws. The formula is expressed as follows:  
 
𝑝𝑛𝑗
∗ =
1
𝑅
∑ 𝐿𝑛(𝛽
𝑟)
𝑅
𝑟=1
 (4 - 5) 
where 𝑅 is the total number of draws (1,000 in this study). There are some desirable properties of the 
simulated probability in simulation. 𝑝𝑛𝑗
∗  is unbiased estimator of 𝑝𝑛𝑗 = ∫ 𝐿𝑛𝑗( 𝛽)𝑓(𝛽|Ɵ)𝑑𝛽, its 
variance decreases as the total number of draw increases and summation of 𝑝𝑛𝑗
∗  over alternatives is 
equal to 1.  
When 𝑝𝑛𝑗
∗  is obtained, the key outputs of behavioural MSMs which are expected hours worked and 
other pecuniary factors can be calculated by using the following expression:  
 
𝐸(𝐺) = ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑗
∗
𝑀
𝑗=1
𝐺𝑛𝑗  (4 - 6) 
where 𝐺 represents interested factors such as hours worked, gross income, tax burden, and disposable 
income. In practice, this chapter applies calibration on pre-reform (i.e. status quo) and post-reformed 
scenarios (i.e. simulated policies). The calibration on the pre-reform case applies the actual data to 
obtain the predicted probability as well as interested factors including expected hours worked and 
expected financial factors.   
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In this study, the calibration based on the status quo (also called the bese case or the pre-reform case) 
is firstly done. In other words, by using the actual data, the predicted probabilities and expected 
numbers including hours worked, leisure hours, gross incomes, tax burdens, and net incomes are 
obtain through the calibration process as explained from equation (4 - 4) to (4 - 6). The results obtained 
from the calibration based on the status quo are presented in TABLE 4.2 in Section 4.3.1.  
Next, the calibration based on each simulated policy is performed. The calibration on a post-reform 
case applies simulated data calculated through the arithmetical model. A simulated policy could be 
any factor (e.g., wage, tax rule, social benefit, or socio-economic characteristic) which eventually 
changes disposable income at available alternatives whilst estimated parameters remain unchanged. 
Behavioural MSMs calculate the optimal hours worked through the utility maximisation process, i.e., 
they allow decision agents to reconsider the optimal alternative which yields the highest utility under 
a simulated policy scenario. The mathematical expression for utility maximisation after a reform is 
shown as follows:  
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑛𝑗
1  subject to 𝑌𝑛𝑗
1 ≤ 𝑤𝑛
1 ∗ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑇(𝑤𝑛
1, 𝐻𝑗 , 𝑦𝑛, 𝑍𝑛) (4 - 7) 
by assuming that a policy changes the wage to 𝑤𝑛
1. This leads to a change in disposable income to 𝑌𝑛𝑗
1  
and utility to 𝑈𝑛𝑗
1 . With the calibration process as described above in equation (4 - 4) to (4 - 6), the 
interested outputs are computed as done in the pre-reform case.  
The post-reform analysis allows a researcher to examine the impacts of diverse reforms such as the 
minimum wage policy, and income tax reforms. The impacts of a policy is obtained by investigating 
differences between simulated results based on the status quo and the simulated scenario. The details 
of each policy simulation are provided in the following sections. 
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This chapter also applies the parametric bootstrapping technique to obtain standard errors of the 
estimated impacts of the simulated policies27. Behavioural MSMs allow for a more sophisticated 
analysis of policy reforms than arithmetical MSMs because ignoring behavioural response possibly 
leads to misleading results in many situations. Therefore, this chapter applies behavioural MSMs in 
evaluating the effects of several policy changes.  
 Labour supply elasticities 
In this chapter, the (uncompensated) wage elasticity of labour supply is measured by expected hours 
worked. It can be approximated by comparing the expected labour supply for each individual after a 
given percent increase in gross hourly wage with the expected labour supply under the initial case, 
and expressing the wage elasticity of labour supply as the percentage change in labour supply divided 
by the percent increase in wage (Kalb, 2010). Different studies apply different percentage (usually 1 
or 10 percent) changes and different types of income (gross or net wage rates); the details are 
presented in section 4.2.1.  
Three main types of elasticities are evaluated in this chapter. The first type of labour supply elasticity 
is the own wage elasticity of labour supply designated as the change in labour supply behaviour of a 
person, 𝑛, due to a change in that own person’s wage. Secondly, the cross wage elasticity of labour 
supply is defined as the labour supply elasticity of a person, 𝑛, when a wage of the spouse, 𝑚, changes. 
Finally, this chapter evaluates the total labour supply elasticity which is how household labour supply 
changes when gross wages of both partners change. The first type of elasticity is calculated for labour 
supply at individual and household level; the other two types are done for household labour supply 
only. 
                                                            
27 This study performs 1,000 repetitions for each simulation to generate standard errors in statistical significance 
testing. The number of repetitions is larger than that in many of the existing literature such as Kabátek et al. 
(2014) and de Boer (2016) which apply 500 and 200 repetitions in bootstrapping, respectively.  
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The calculation process is carried out in the following order. Firstly, the process starts by increasing 
the gross hourly wage (depending on the type of elasticity) keeping other factor constant. This chapter 
applies 10 percent increase in the gross wage rate to calculate wage elasticity of labour supply as 
found in previous woks such as de Boer (2016). Secondly, the predicted probabilities are obtained by 
the calibration process. Next, the new expected labour supply is computed by applying multiplication 
between a predicted probability and the number of hours worked at that discrete point. Finally, the 
elasticity is the comparison of expected labour supply between the base case and the case with 10 
percent wage increase. The percentage difference in labour supply is interpreted as the wage elasticity 
of labour supply. The mathematic expression for calculating the average wage elasticity on average of 
labour supply is: 
 𝜀𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑
ℎ1𝑛 − ℎ0𝑛
ℎ0𝑛
𝑛
;  ℎ0𝑛 > 0 (4 - 8) 
where 𝜀𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒  designates wage elasticity of labour supply which is the mean percentage change in 
hours worked because of increase in wage; 𝑁 represents the number of observations; ℎ is defined as 
the expected hours worked; the subscripts 0 and 1 indicate the base case and the reformed case, 
respectively, while the subscript 𝑛 identifies the decision agent.   
The elasticity described above is designated as an unconditional wage elasticity since the calculation 
takes into consideration labour supply reactions at both the intensive and extensive margins28 (Löffler 
et al., 2014a). In other words, it allows individuals to change hours worked as well as labour market 
participation.  
 Simulated policies 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the simulated policies including the perfect rate of the 
national minimum wage compliance, changes in non-transferable allowances in the personal income 
                                                            
28 Conditional elasticities assess labour supply reactions conditional on being participants in the labour market 
prior to the change in gross hourly wage.  
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tax, and the recent proposed tax rules (removing the taxable person threshold, eliminating joint 
taxation, as well as revising the tax brackets and tax rates).  
For simplicity, this chapter adopts the case of one-member households (single people without 
children) to explain the arithmetical model in obtaining gross income, tax burden, and disposable 
income for each policy.  
 Minimum wages 
This policy simulation in this study assumes that the minimum wage at 2015 is perfectly complied 
with. In other words, the hourly wage is nationally designated to be 37.5 baht per hours (i.e., it is equal 
to the daily minimum wage at 300 baht divided by 8 hours worked) for anyone who earned less than 
the minimum wage prior to implementation.  
The arithmetical calculation starts with the earned income. The earned income at each hours 
alternative is the product of the wage rate and hours worked. The policy simulation affects wage rates 
of people who earn less than 37.5 baht per hours. The earned income varies across hours choices 
whilst the unearned income remains unchanged. The summation of earned and unearned incomes 
yields the gross income which is different across alternatives due to earned income. The tax amount 
paid and the disposable income at each hours point are calculated through the tax-benefit system 
based on tax rules in 2013 and 2015. Then, calculated disposable income due to the change in the rate 
of policy compliance at each hours point replaces actual disposable income. Finally, the behavioural 
MSM is executed to investigate labour supply response and changes in financial parameters.  
 Change in non-transferable allowances  
This policy simulation adopts an adjustment in personal income tax rules (i.e., two non-transferable 
allowances). Firstly, the government increases allowable expenses of earned income from 40% of 
income (not over 60,000 baht) to 50% of income (not over 100,000 baht). Secondly, the government 
also increments the child allowance from from maximum 17,000 baht to 30,000 baht yearly.  
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For this policy, the gross income remains unchanged because there is nothing modified at the stage 
of gross income calculation. Whilst other personal income tax rules for 2013 and 2015 remain 
unchanged, changes in these non-transferable allowances in the tax rules affect tax burden as well as 
disposable income at each hours point. In fact, increases in these non-transferable allowances cause 
a decrease in taxable income at each hours alternative for tax payers; this leads to less tax burden as 
well as increased disposable income if an individual retains hours worked. Then, the calculated 
disposable income variable replaces the pre-reform disposable income variable in the behavioural 
MSM to simulate the predicted probability and parameters of interest.  
 Income tax restructure 
According to the proposed tax package as described in 4.1.2.3, this policy simulation starts with 
calculating earned income at each hours point. Similar to the previous simulation gross income at each 
hours alternative faced by a decision agent does not alter. The policy reform affects directly to 
personal income tax rules.  
In the arithmetical model, the first change is that the taxable person threshold is amended t. All people 
older than 18 years of age are included in the tax calculation. Other people younger than 18 years old 
are included in the tax calculation if and only if their income exceeds the income threshold depending 
on household type (60,000 baht for single individuals and 120,000 for married couples). The second 
adjustment is the elimination of joint taxation and partially joint taxation. The pre-reform scenario 
allows all married couples to choose among separate, joint, and partially joint taxation based on 
disposable income maximisation. In the proposed tax package setting, this rule is completely removed. 
The last amendment in this simulation is discontinuing the tax threshold, decreasing the number of 
tax brackets, and revising the tax rate at each tax bracket. The summary of the adjustment is as shown 
in FIGURE 4.1.  
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The remaining tax rules in this simulation follows the rules in 2013 and 2015. The proposed tax 
package in the simulation affects the tax burden and disposable income of each decision agent; 
however, the result depends on many factors, e.g., household types and the level of income. The 
disposable income at each hours point calculated under this setting replaces the disposable income in 
the status quo case. Finally, the behavioural MSM can be processed to obtain predicted probability, 
expected hours worked, and expected pecuniary variables.   
 Policy evaluation 
In comparison between status quo and post-reform cases, this study compares changes in labour 
supply responses, household incomes, and amounts of tax paid. The statistical significances of changes 
are tested by a standard errors obtained as mentioned in Section 4.4.2.2. 
 Labour supply responses 
The effects of a policy reform on labour supply is also known as efficiency effects, i.e., the efficiency 
costs, measured in terms of hours worked, of the reforms (Labeaga et al., 2008). Evaluating the effects 
on labour supply is similar to the calculation process for the wage elasticity of labour supply; the only 
difference is that a policy reform can take several forms rather than a given percent change in wage.  
In particular, the simulated labour supply based on a policy reform (i.e., the conditional post-reform 
hours distribution) is computed and then compared with labour supply under the pre-reform 
situation. 
For any given policy change, this chapter shows the average labour supply response. This provides the 
overall picture of the labour market under a policy reform, which also indicates the dominance of 
either the income effect or the substitution effect on labour supply.  
 Winner-loser analysis and aggregate national income per capita 
Winner-loser evaluation of policy consequences is to compare disposable income between status quo 
and post-reform cases for each agent. By following Labeaga et al. (2008) the number of winners, 
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unaffected individuals, and losers in terms of disposable income are provided. In addition, those 
agents for whom the disposable income changes by at least 5 percent are also reported as done in 
Atkinson et al. (2017).  
The key purpose of winner-loser analysis is to see how changes vary across different household types 
and certain characteristics e.g. the income distribution. This is beneficial in teasing out overall impact 
of a reform policy, as well as in detecting any inadvertent consequences. On top of that, the 
aggregation of disposable income changes can be interpreted as an impact on national income per 
capita due to a policy reform.  
 Effects on poverty  
Regarding measures of a policy reform on poverty, two indicators are adopted in this chapter. Firstly, 
the primary indicator for poverty is the percentage of the population falling below a national poverty 
line. According to the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand, the 
Thailand national poverty line in 2016 is equal to 88.90 Thai baht per capita per day (approximately 
2.72 USD) which is greater than the global poverty set by the World Bank at 1.90 USD per day (PPP 
using 2011 prices) in 201529. This chapter applies HDIPAC30 in comparison with the national poverty 
threshold. If HDIPAC of a household is lower than the poverty line, members in this household are 
considered to be poor people. A number of poor households are compared between pre-reform and 
post-reform cases.  
Secondly, this chapter applies the poverty gap measure to reflect the distance between HDIPAC and 
the threshold under each policy scenario. This captures the impact of a reform on those people living 
                                                            
29 Data from http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq  
30 HDIPAC is equivalent to household disposable income divided by a number of adults (anyone who are older 
than 15 years old) in a household.  
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under the poverty line by showing changes in the gap between HDIPAC and the threshold for pre-
reform and post reform situations.  
 Effects on income redistribution 
This study also investigates effects of simulated policies on income redistribution. In fact, HDIPACs in 
both status quo and post-reform cases are compared along the distribution of HDIPAC to observe if a 
given policy affects HDIPAC at any part of the distribution and to what extent.  
This study applies the quantile-quantile plot to compare income distributions before and after the 
policy simulation in order to evaluate the effect of a policy simulation on income redistribution. The 
result can be also implied for the income equality analysis. 
4.5 Results 
 Wage elasticities 
Wage elasticities are computed based on a 10 percent change in gross wages of people depending on 
different scenarios including own-wage, cross-wage, and both-wage elasticities.  
 Labour supply responses 
The following table shows the overall labour supply elasticities when wages are raised by 10 percent. 
Regarding individual labour supply, only one simulation is performed for single individuals whilst three 
scenarios, namely, increases in wages of males, females, and both genders, are simulated for the 
household labour supply setting. In TABLE 4.4, the first number reported in each block is the change 
in hours worked; it can be converted to minutes by multiplying the result by 60. The second number 
is the standard error, which is shown in parentheses. The next number is the elasticity of labour supply, 
i.e., the percentage change in hours worked if the wage increases by 1 percent. The last number in 
the square brackets is the number of observations in each type of households.  
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From TABLE 4.4, Panel (1) shows the unconditional wage elasticities when males’ wages are raised by 
10 percent. This change does not influence single females without children (reported as N.A.) because 
this type of household does not comprise any male. This change positively affects hours worked of 
unmarried males by 0.33 hour or about 20 minutes per week, with statistical significance at the 1 
percent level. The own wage elasticity of labour supply is 0.076 percent. In terms of married couples, 
a 10 percent increase in male wages statistically influences labour supply behaviour change for males 
by about 0.25 hour or 15 minutes per week, whilst it reduces hours worked of females by 0.89 hour 
or 53 minutes per week with statistical significance at the 5 percent level. Thus, the own-wage and 
cross-wage elasticities of labour supply for married males and females are 0.056 and -0.263 percent 
respectively.  
TABLE 4.4: Overall labour supply response when increase in wages by 10 percent  
Policy changes  Unmarried individuals Married couples 
males females males females 
(1) 10% change in male wage 0.3307225*** 
(0.1068394) 
0.076% 
[2592] 
N.A. 0.2527185*** 
(0.039318) 
0.056% 
[7458] 
-.8894429*** 
(.0564362) 
-0.263% 
 [7458] 
(2) 10% change in female wage N.A. 0.4947338*** 
(0.1183232) 
1.224% 
[2445] 
-.2052379*** 
(.0242569)  
-0.045% 
[7458] 
.8758556*** 
(.08362) 
0.259% 
 [7458] 
(3) 10% change in wages of males and 
females 
N.A. N.A. .0570549 
(.0443109) 
0.013% 
 [7458] 
.0077422 
(.087828) 
0.002% 
 [7458] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
Panel (2) indicates labour supply responses in the case that there is a 10 percent increase in females’ 
wages. Hence, there is no result for single males without children (reported as N.A.) since the 
households do not have any female. Individual females increase hours worked by 0.49 hours or about 
half an hour with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. In other words, the elasticity of labour 
supply for single females without children is 1.224 percent. At the household level, an increase in 
females’ wage negatively affects male hours worked by about 0.20 hour or 12 minutes and positively 
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influences female hours worked by 0.88 hours or 53 minutes per week. The labour supply responses 
of both genders due to an increase in females’ wages are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The own-wage and cross-wage elasticities of labour supply for females and males are 0.259 and -0.045 
percent, respectively.  
Panel (3) presents to what extent married couples react to a 10 percent increase in both partners’ 
wages. This simulation is applicable for household labour supply only because it is not possible to 
increase both partner wages in one-member households. The small increases without statistical 
significance that are observed for the overall labour supply responses of both partners indicates that 
their labour supply are statistically unchanged when their wages are increased by the same 
proportion. The wage elasticities of labour supply for married males and females are very small at 
0.013 and 0.002 percent, respectively. This is possibly because the effects of own-wage elasticity and 
cross-wage elasticity cancel each other out for both partners. According to labour supply responses in 
Panel (1) and (2), these two cases yields opposite effects but similar magnitudes for both genders.  
Overall, the simulated results are consistent with most of the previous studies. The own wage 
elasticities of labour supply are positive whilst the cross wage elasticities of labour supply are negative. 
Similar results are found in previous studies such as Callan and van Soest (1996), van Soest and Das 
(2001), Kabátek et al. (2014), de Boer (2016), and Mauro et al. (2017). In addition, female labour supply 
is more elastic than for males at both individual and household levels; these findings are similar to 
what are found in many previous studies, e.g., van Soest (1995), Callan and van Soest (1996), van Soest 
and Das (2001), Kabátek et al. (2014), de Boer (2016), and Mauro et al. (2017). The results when wages 
of both partners increase are also similar to van Soest and Das (2001)31, in that the labour supply 
responses of both genders are positive and very small.  
                                                            
31 Other previous studies rarely discuss on the labour supply elasticity when wages of both partners are raised.  
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Next, the labour supply elasticities are reported by decile of disposable income per adult capita32 to 
investigate labour supply responses across the income distribution. FIGURE 4.2 shows the labour 
supply response by income decile; Panel (A) and (B) present the results of unmarried males and 
females, respectively. 
FIGURE 4.2: Labour supply responses by income decile of unmarried individuals 
  
Males Females 
FIGURE 4.2 exhibits the overall pattern of labour supply response with 95 percent confidence intervals 
of single males (the left panel) and females (the right panel) by income decile when the gross wage 
rates increased by 10 percent. The details of the results are provided in TABLE A4.1, Appendix 4.I. The 
behavioural patterns between two genders are generally similar. However, the female labour supply 
response is overall more elastic and changes more abruptly than the male labour supply response. 
The results indicate that when wages are increased by 10 percent, the substitution effect prevails at 
the lower end of the income distribution (i.e., both genders increase hours work with statistical 
significance). However, the increases in hours worked are declining due to the increasing income 
effect as disposable incomes move towards the upper end of the income distribution. Males start 
reducing labour supply at the 9th decile while females start doing so at the 6th decile. The results show 
                                                            
32 Disposable income per adult capita is calculated by household disposable income divided by the number of 
adults (age over 15) in a household.  
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decreases in labour supply with statistical significance at 5 percent level for the last decile of male 
labour supply and at last two deciles for females.  
FIGURE 4.3: Labour supply responses by income decile of married couples (husbands’ wages) 
  
Overall males Overall females 
  
Males without children  Females without children 
  
Male with children  Female with children 
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FIGURE 4.3 presents labour supply response with 95 percent confidence interval for married males on 
the left-hand-side panels and married females on the right-hand-side panels when the male wage 
rates increase by 10 percent. The top panels show the results of all household types. The middle panels 
exhibit the labour supply response of males and females in two-member households (i.e., married 
couples without children). The bottom panels present the results of four-member households (i.e. 
married couples with two children) as representatives of households with children. The detailed 
results by HDIPAC decile and household type (the number of the household members) are provided 
in TABLE A4.2 for married males and TABLE A4.3 for married females.  
In comparison between genders, it is apparent that the labour supply responses of males and females 
are generally opposite. Regarding married males, the overall pattern in the top-left panel shows that 
they tend to work more if their HDIPACs are either at the bottom or at the top end of the income 
distribution. This is because married males at the bottom end of the HDIPAC distribution want to raise 
their living standard; the males at the other end of the distribution usually work fewer hours than 
other males categorised in lower deciles and therefore they are able to increase hours worked33. Those 
in households without children shown in the middle-left panel barely change their works hours until 
the HDIPACs reach the 8th decile. On the other hand, in the bottom-left panel, married males are found 
to increase their hours worked if they have children. This implies that the household size affects the 
married male labour supply response as well. In general, males with the larger number of dependent 
children supply are more responsive to changes in their wages.   
 
 
                                                            
33 In deciles where males tend to increase hours work, the proportions of males working about 48 hours are 
lower than 76 percent while these proportions are greater than 85 percent in other deciles.  
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With regards to married females, they reduce hours worked when the wages of their husbands 
increase by 10 percent. The overall results from all three panels on the right-hand-side of FIGURE 4.3 
show that the reduced hours worked are positively related to household disposable income (HDIPAC). 
Overall female hours worked decreases by approximately a half-hour at the first decile of the HDIPAC 
distribution and the magnitude of the reduction in hours worked becomes almost 2 hours at the 
highest income decile. The middle-right and bottom right panels also suggest that the degrees of 
reduced labour supply increases in the number of children. This is possibly due to domestic duties and 
childcare responsibilities. 
FIGURE 4.4 shown below presents the labour supply response with 95 percent confidence interval for 
married males on the left-hand-side panels and married females on the right-hand-side panels when 
the female wage rates increase by 10 percent. Similar to FIGURE 4.3, the top, middle, and the bottom 
panels present different household types, namely, all households, household without children, 
household with two children. All results are provided in TABLE A4.4 for males and TABLE A4.5 for 
females.  
The labour supply responses of both genders generally have the opposite sign. The overall results for 
males in the top-left panel show that only those living in households in the 1st decile of the HDIPAC 
distribution increase their hours worked. This is mainly due to households with children as shown in 
the bottom-left panel.  When the females’ wages are increased in percentage, married males in higher 
HDIPAC households are more likely to reduce their hours worked. This is because females in the high 
HDIPAC households usually make earned income more than females in the low HDIPAC households. 
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FIGURE 4.4: Labour supply responses by income decile of married couples (wives’ wages) 
  
Overall males Overall females 
  
Males without children Females without children 
  
Males with children Females with children 
 
On the other hand, married females increase their hours worked regardless HDIPAC and household 
type. However, the patterns in the right-hand-side panels suggest that the degrees of increases in 
females’ labour supply are depending on HDIPAC and household type which is similar to the results 
for married males. In fact, the females in the upper end of the HDIPAC distributions (from the 8th 
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decile) are more responsive to an increase in their wage than females in the remaining households. 
On top of that, the number of dependent children is positively related to the degree of increase in 
labour supply.   
FIGURE 4.5: Labour supply response by income decile of married couples (both partners’ wage) 
  
Overall males Overall females 
  
Males without children Females without children 
  
Males with children Females with children 
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FIGURE 4.5 presents the labour supply response with 95 percent confidence interval for married males 
on the left-hand-side panels and married females on the right-hand-side panels when the wage rates 
of both partners increase by 10 percent. Similar to FIGURE 4.3 and 4.4, the upper, middle, and lower 
panels exhibit different household types, namely, all households, households without children, and 
households with two children. Details of the simulated results for males and females are shown in 
Appendix 4.I, TABLE A4.6 and A4.7, respectively.  The statistical significance of the results is not as 
apparent as in previous cases (FIGURE 4.3 and 4.4).  The explanation is similar to the overall results; 
for both genders, the effects of an increase in husbands’ wages are cancelled out by the effects of an 
increase in wives’ wages.  
Comparing males and females by household type finds similar patterns for the top and middle panels. 
The pattern is less similar for households with children, probably because husbands and wives are 
responsible for different tasks in the household. In addition, the number of children positively affects 
the labour supply response. Both males and females usually increase their hours worked when they 
have children, i.e., the substitution effect exceeds the income effect. The opposite result is observed 
for households without children, where the labour supply response by HDIPAC decile of both partners 
is usually negative. 
 Transition matrices for wage elasticities 
This section presents labour supply transition matrices for males and females at individual and 
household levels for different cases of gross wage increases by 10 percent (one scenario for individual 
labour supply and three scenarios for household labour supply). In fact, tables 4.5 to 4.8 present hours 
worked that people select in the status quo and the simulation (i.e. a 10 percent increase in wages) 
by sub-sample.  
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In each table, hours worked resulting from calibrations based on the status quo are reported in rows 
whilst hours worked resulting from simulations based on a 10 percent increase in wages depending 
on each scenario are reported in columns. The elements along the diagonal line present the number 
of people consistently selecting the same number of hours across the pre-reform and post-reform 
cases. For example, when a person selects 40 hours worked under the status quo and the reform case 
(10 percent increase in his wage), this observation is presented on the diagonal panels (40 hours 
worked for both cases).  
A person's observation will move to the right of the diagonal line if that person increases their hours 
worked, and vice versa (i.e., an observation will move to the left of the diagonal line if that person 
reduces hours worked). Changes in hours worked depend on the magnitude of the income effect and 
the substitution effect. In other words, people can either increase, decrease, or keep constant the 
number of hours they work. In theory, assuming leisure hours and consumption goods to be normal 
goods, the income effect makes people reduce the number of hours they work (i.e., increase leisure 
hours) whilst the substitution effect makes people increase the number of hours they work (i.e., 
decrease leisure hours). If the income effect exceeds the substitution effect, people will offer less 
labour supply, and vice versa. If both effects cancel each other, people’s labour supply will remain 
unchanged. 
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TABLE 4.5: Transition matrices of single individuals in the case of 10% own wage increase 
Unmarried males 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
16 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3 
24 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 
32 0 0 0 0 21 17 0 38 
40 0 0 0 0 6 1,262 0 1,268 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,277 1,277 
Total  1 0 2 6 27 1,279 1,277 2,592 
Unmarried females 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
8 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 
16 0 0 11 8 0 0 0 19 
24 0 0 0 234 186 0 0 420 
32 0 0 0 0 303 56 0 359 
40 0 0 0 0 17 956 0 973 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 658 658 
Total  5 11 11 242 506 1,012 658 2,445 
TABLE 4.5 shown below presents transition matrices of married individuals by gender. Whilst the 
transition matrix for males is shown at the top part of TABLE 4.5, the matrix for females is located at 
the bottom part.  
Comparing between two genders, a larger proportion of females switch hours choices, reflecting a 
greater wage elasticity of labour supply in relative to males. However, most of the unmarried 
individuals (both males and females) do not change their hours worked after a 10 percent increase in 
gross wage. Similar to males, some females have a tendency to increase hours worked if they work 
less than 40 hours per week in the base case. On the other hand, some of them (both genders) 
decrease hours worked if they work about 40 hours per week.  
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TABLE 4.6: Transition matrices of married couples in the case of 10% increase in males’ wage 
Married males 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
24 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 
32 0 0 0 0 72 61 0 133 
40 0 0 0 0 0 1,913 159 2,072 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,248 5,248 
Total  0 1 1 1 74 1,974 5,407 7,458 
Married females 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
8 10 115 0 0 0 0 0 125 
16 0 48 525 0 0 0 0 573 
24 0 0 121 702 0 0 0 823 
32 0 0 0 195 2,362 0 0 2,557 
40 0 0 0 0 303 2,361 0 2,664 
48 0 0 0 0 0 398 304 702 
Total  24 163 646 897 2,665 2,759 304 7,458 
TABLE 4.6 presents the transition matrices of married couples when husbands’ wages increase by 10 
percent. With regards to husbands, the base case results reveal that most married men work full time 
(32 hours per week and more). The simulated results suggest that when males’ wages increase by 10 
percent, they either decide to increase or remain their hours worked.  
In terms of married females, the hours distribution of the status quo is relatively more balanced for 
females than males. The simulated results are consistent with the theoretical expectation. In fact, 
none of the married females increase hours worked under the case when their husbands’ wages 
increase by 10 percent; they choose to either reduce or remain their hours worked.  
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TABLE 4.7: Transition matrices of married couples in the case of 10% increase in females’ wage 
Married males 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
24 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
32 0 0 0 2 131 0 0 133 
40 0 0 0 0 140 1,929 3 2,072 
48 0 0 0 0 0 114 5,134 5,248 
Total  1 0 1 5 271 2,043 5,137 7,458 
Married females 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 14 
8 0 84 41 0 0 0 0 125 
16 0 0 409 164 0 0 0 573 
24 0 0 0 652 171 0 0 823 
32 0 0 0 0 2,305 252 0 2,557 
40 0 0 0 0 0 2,409 255 2,664 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 702 702 
Total  10 88 450 816 2,476 2,661 957 7,458 
TABLE 4.7 exhibits the transition matrices of married couples when wages of wives are incremented 
by 10 percent. Whilst the largest group is those whose labour supply remain unchanged, among 
husbands who change hours worked, they mostly decide to reduce their labour supply in the market. 
The results are consistent with the theoretical prediction stating that labour supply response of cross-
wage is overall negative.  
Most married females make the same choices between the status quo and the reform case. For those 
who switch labour supply choices, 100 percent of them choose to increase labour supply. This is 
consistent with theoretical prediction in which the own-wage elasticity is generally positive.  
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TABLE 4.8: Transition matrices of couples in the case of 10% increase in both partners’ wages 
Married males 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
24 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
32 0 0 0 0 129 4 0 133 
40 0 0 0 0 18 1,943 101 2,072 
48 0 0 0 0 0 44 5,204 5,248 
Total  0 1 1 3 147 2,001 5,305 7,458 
Married females 
 elasticity 
 
base case 
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 Total 
0 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 14 
8 3 109 13 0 0 0 0 125 
16 0 13 492 68 0 0 0 573 
24 0 0 22 758 43 0 0 823 
32 0 0 0 57 2,458 42 0 2,557 
40 0 0 0 0 34 2,621 9 2,664 
48 0 0 0 0 0 180 522 702 
Total  15 124 527 883 2,535 2,843 531 7,458 
TABLE 4.8 presents transition matrices of married couples if their (both husbands and wives) gross 
wages increase by 10 percent. Both partners mostly keep their hours worked unchanged between the 
base case and the simulated case. Regarding those who change hours points, the transition patterns 
of both genders do not provide a clear picture. However, married males are likely to increase hours 
worked when they work full-time (from 32 hours per week) in the base case. On the other hand, 
married females tend to reduce rather than increase their hours worked under the reformed scenario 
if they work 32 hours or over per week in the status quo.   
 Perfect compliance of the national minimum wage policy 
This section provides simulated results of behavioural changes when the government is able to 
implement the national minimum wage policy at the perfect rate (i.e., everyone working in the labour 
market is paid at least 37.5 baht per hour).  
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 Labour supply responses: perfect compliance of the national minimum wage policy  
In TABLE 4.9, there are four groups of people categorised by four different panels, i.e., row (1) to (4). 
The first group is those unaffected by the policy, i.e., they earn an hourly wage at least 37.5 baht in 
the pre-reform case.  
TABLE 4.9: Labour supply responses for affected people from the minimum wage policy reform 
Policy changes  Unmarried individuals Married couples 
males females males females 
(1) households in which the policy 
does not affect anyone 
- 
- 
[2428|93.67] 
- 
- 
[1638|66.99] 
- 
- 
[4621|61.96] 
- 
- 
[4621|61.96] 
(2) households in which only males 
earn less than the minimum wage 
.3238665*** 
(.121502) 
[164|6.33] 
N.A. .0778215*** 
(.0171269) 
[16|0.21] 
-.1185123*** 
(.010054) 
[16|0.21] 
(3) households in which only 
females earn less than the minimum 
wage 
N.A. 2.753187*** 
(.3947254) 
[807|33.01] 
-.030791* 
(.0163325) 
[2391|32.06] 
.6954015*** 
(.0921687) 
[2391|32.06] 
(4) households in which both males 
and females earn less than the 
minimum wage 
N.A. N.A. .1418486** 
(.0639513) 
 [439|5.87] 
1.514349*** 
 (.2242492) 
  [439|5.87] 
Total observations [2592|100] [2445|100] [7458|100] [7458|100] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observations and percentages in square brackets, respectively; 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
The second group as reported in Panel (2) is households in which only males are affected by the perfect 
compliance of the minimum wage policy. It is noticeable that the result for single females without 
children is not applicable.  About 6.33 percent of unmarried males earn wages lower than the national 
minimum wage at 300 baht per day in the pre-reform case. The simulated results suggest that if the 
policy is perfectly compliant, these males increase their labour supply by about 0.32 hour or 19.2 
minutes per week with statistical significance at 1 the percent level. Regarding family labour supply, 
0.21 percent of married couples for which the reform affects only husbands since their hourly wages 
are below 37.5 baht. In this case, the labour supply responses of both partners are similar to the case 
when males’ wages increase. Males in these households extend weekly hours worked by about 0.08 
hours or just below 5 minutes with statistical significance at the 1 percent level; females in these 
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households reduce their weekly hours worked by about 0.12 hour or 7 minutes with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
The next group, which is shown in the row (3), covers households in which the simulated policy on the 
minimum wage affects only females. Hence, single males without children are not applicable (N.A.) 
for this case. Inefficient enforcement of the national minimum wage policy causes approximately 33 
percent unmarried females without children earn less than 37.5 baht per hour under the pre-reform 
case. These females increase hours worked by about 2.75 hours, or 2 hours and 45 minutes, per week 
with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. With regards to married couples, about 32 percent 
of them are households that the policy affects only females because they receive daily wages under 
300 baht. In this scenario, the behavioural responses of couples are similar to the case when females’ 
wages increase. In fact, husbands decrease weekly hours worked by only 0.03 hour with statistical 
significance at 10 percent, whilst wives increase weekly hours worked by 0.70 hour with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level.  
Last but not least, the group of households in which both partners are affected by the simulated policy 
are considered; they are presented in Panel (4). Both single males and females without children are 
not applicable for this case because they are one-member households. 5.87 percent of households 
with married couples for which wages of both partners fall below the national minimum wage. This 
case is comparable to the scenario when wages of both husbands and wives increase. As expected 
both partners provide more labour supply; weekly hours worked of males increase by 0.14 hour or 8 
minutes and 24 seconds with statistical significance at the 5 percent level, whilst females extend 
weekly hours worked by 1.51 hours, or 1 hours 30 minutes, with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level. Since the female labour supply at the lower end of the income distribution is more elastic than 
the male labour supply (as discussed in Section 4.5.1), it is expected that the magnitude of change in 
female labour supply is larger. 
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 Winners-losers analysis: perfect compliance of the national minimum wage policy 
This section describes changes in gross income, tax paid, and disposable income between pre-reform 
and post-reform cases. Positive changes in incomes suggest that those observations are winners whilst 
negative changes in incomes indicate those observations as losers. In addition, positive or negative 
changes in tax paid can be interpreted as a gain or a loss in government income, respectively. This 
section also provides the number of households for which their disposable income increases or 
decreases by at least 5 percent to identify winners or losers. 
Regarding labour supply, it is apparent that there are no losers due to the government perfectly 
enforcing the national minimum wage. In others words, some households have more incomes 
(positive effect) whilst the incomes of the remaining households does not change at all (neutral effect).  
According to TABLE 4.10, the proportion of winner is about 30.5 percent of the total observations in 
this study (12,495 households). About 17.81 percent of the whole sample are able to increase their 
disposable income by at least 5 percent under the post-reform setting compared to the pre-reform 
one. 
These households (one-member households and married couples) can be categorised into four groups 
based on the members affected by the policy. Both gross and disposable incomes of these groups 
increase significantly whilst the amounts of taxes paid for these groups are either equal to zero or very 
close to zero as their taxable incomes are usually below the tax threshold. It follows that changes in 
gross income and disposable income are almost identical. This section describes only disposable 
income; however, other numbers including gross income and tax paid are provided in TABLE 4.10.  
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TABLE 4.10: Change in incomes and taxes due to the minimum wage policy compliance 
Policy changes (a) Unmarried  
males 
(b) Unmarried 
Females 
(c) Households 
(1) does not affect anyone - 
- 
[2428|93.67] 
- 
- 
[1638|66.99] 
- 
- 
[4621|61.96] 
(2) affects only males    
Gross income 6.200545*** 
(.1679739) 
[164|6.33] 
N.A. 2.323938*** 
(.035511) 
[16|0.21] 
Tax paid - 
- 
[164|6.33] 
N.A. -6.15e-06*** 
(1.33e-06) 
[16|0.21] 
Disposable income 6.200545*** 
(.1679739) 
[164|6.33] 
N.A. 2.323944*** 
(.0355105) 
[16|0.21] 
(3) affect only females    
Gross income N.A. 13.9786*** 
(.6586006) 
[807|33.01] 
7.718541*** 
(.1813544) 
[2391|32.06] 
Tax paid N.A. 0.00000127 
(0.000000912) 
[807|33.01] 
.0004161*** 
(.000123) 
[2391|32.06] 
Disposable income N.A. 13.9786*** 
(.6586007) 
[807|33.01] 
7.718125*** 
(.1812783) 
[2391|32.06] 
(4) affects both males and females    
Gross income N.A. N.A. 22.83342*** 
(.4402173) 
  [439|5.87] 
Tax paid N.A. N.A. - 
- 
   [439|5.87] 
Disposable income N.A. N.A. 22.83342*** 
(.4402173) 
[439|5.87] 
Total observations [2592|100] [2445|100] [7458|100] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation and percentage in square brackets, respectively; 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
6.33 percent of all unmarried male households increase their disposable income by about 6.20 
thousand baht with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Among unmarried males, about 3.82 
percent of them are able to increase their disposable income by at least 5 percent because of this 
reform. With regard to unmarried females, 33.01 percent earn higher disposable incomes by 
approximately 13.98 thousand baht with the statistical significance level of 1 percent. 28.96 percent 
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of the total unmarried females can earn disposable incomes more than 5 percent higher after the 
national minimum wage policy is perfectly implemented.  
This policy affects 38.16 percent of all married couples. Only 0.21 percent are considered as winners 
due to only husbands earning below 37.5 baht per hours in the status quo situation. These households 
increase their disposable income by about 2.32 thousand baht with statistical significance at the 1 
percent level. However, none of them is able to increase their disposable income by at least 5 percent.  
32.06 percent of all married couples for which the wages of married females are less than the 
minimum wage indicate a positive effect on their income because of the reform. Their disposable 
incomes rise significantly at the 1 percent level by about 7.72 thousand baht due to the policy reform. 
About 13.21 percent of total married couples gain their disposable income by at least 5 percent if the 
national minimum wage is perfectly complied with.  
The remaining households (5.89 percent of the married couples) are those households for which 
wages of both partners are lower than the minimum wage; their disposable incomes increase due to 
the reform by about 22.83 thousand baht with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. About 
5.81 percent of all married couples are affected by the policy and their disposable incomes rise by at 
least 5 percent.  
 Effects on poverty: perfect compliance of the national minimum wage policy 
Among all 12,495 households34, regardless of household types (individuals or couples), the simulated 
results show that only 0.088 percent of the whole sample in the pre-reform case have HDIPAC below 
the national poverty line, which is equivalent to 88.90 Thai baht per capita per day.  
Under the perfect rate of the minimum wage policy compliance, none of households has HDIPAC 
below the national poverty line. This implies that if the government is able to execute the national 
                                                            
34 They comprise 2,592 of single males, 2,445 of single females, and 7,458 of married couples. 
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minimum wage policy perfectly, the number of poor people in the labour market will be likely to 
decline to zero.  
The discrepancies between HDIPAC and the poverty line are ranging from 311 baht to 3,630 baht per 
year. As the reform eliminates all households in poverty in the sample, households with HDIPAC falling 
below the national poverty line manage to rise their HDIPAC over the poverty line by 378 baht to 30.36 
thousand baht per year. Married couples are the household type that has the least change between 
the pre-reform and the post-reform cases; this is foreseeable because domestic duties make the 
labour supply less elastic. They are less likely to increase hours worked to raise HDIPAC than others.  
 Effects on income distribution: perfect compliance of the national minimum wage policy 
FIGURE 4.6: Comparison of HDIPAC distributions due to the minimum wage reform 
 
Quantile-quantile plots presented as FIGURE 4.6 provides a comparison the income distributions 
between pre-reform and post-reform. The vertical axis of the figure presents HDIPAC of the pre-
reform case; the horizontal axis in each provides HDIPAC after policy simulation. The diagonal line 
indicates one-to-one relationship between pre-reform and post-reform scenarios, i.e., the blue dots 
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lie on the diagonal line (or 45-degree line) if incomes in both cases are identical. When the blue dots 
locate on the right-hand-side of the diagonal line, HDIPACs in the post-reform scenario exceed 
HDIPACs in the pre-reform cases. This can be observed at the beginning of the diagonal line. On the 
other hand, if the blue dots appear on the left-hand-side of the 45-degree line, HDIPACs after the 
policy launch decline below HDIPACs in the base case. 
FIGURE 4.6 contains two quantile-quantile plots; the upper and lower panels present the lower half 
and the upper half of the HDIPAC distribution, respectively.  The upper panel shows that the minimum 
wage policy with complete compliance affects mainly the lower half of the HDIPAC distribution. To be 
specific, perfect compliance of the minimum wage policy improves HDIPAC at the lower half of the 
distribution; and the group at the bottom end gains from the policy reform more than other groups. 
The lower panel indicates the policy reform does not affect HDIPAC at the upper half of the distribution 
significantly. The result presented in FIGURE 4.6 implies that the reform helps to reduce income 
inequality since the HDIPAC gap between the upper and the bottom ends become narrower. The result 
is different from the previous work, i.e., Müller and Steiner (2013) and Atkinson et al. (2017), which 
indicated that the minimum wage policy is not effective because minimum wage workers are 
distribute across the whole income distribution. This implies that the distribution of income may differ 
across countries, especially between developed and developing countries.  
 Reforms on non-transferable allowances 
This section presents the effects of reforms in important non-transferable allowances in personal 
income tax rules. They include earned income allowable expenses and the child allowance; whilst the 
former is related to the whole labour force, the latter is associated with only those household with 
children.  
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 Labour supply responses: changes in non-transferable allowances  
TABLE 4.11: Labour supply responses due to changes in non-transferable allowances 
Policy changes  Males Females 
(1) Singles without children .0337255*** 
(.0066294) 
[2592] 
.018909 
(.4800627) 
 [2445] 
(2) Households without children .0145103 
(.2524606) 
[3824] 
-.0313676 
(.4250545) 
[3824] 
(3) Households with one child .0450247 
(.2411392) 
[2115] 
-.0021952 
(.3893336) 
[2115] 
(4) Households with two children .0760588 
(.3577033) 
[1292] 
.0278461 
(.5851339) 
[1292] 
(5) Households with three children .0713438 
(.6132488) 
[227] 
.0524638 
(1.011806) 
[227] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
From TABLE 4.11, besides single male individuals, changes in non-transferable allowances do not 
statistically influence labour supply behaviour at both individual and family levels. The non-significant 
results are observed because changes in non-transferable allowances are marginal in general aspects.  
First, the allowable expenses affected only people earning a certain range of earned income. In fact, 
some people who do not pay personal income tax in the pre-reform case are highly probable to be 
unaffected by the policy. People who pay tax and deduct allowable expenses in the base case gain 
some benefits from the reform. The degree of benefits depends on the amount of earned income (i.e., 
the ceiling earned income, which has the maximum allowable amount, increased from 150,000 baht 
per year in the pre-reform case to 200,000 baht per year in the reformed case).  Thus, people who 
earn over 200,000 baht per year do not receive any benefit from the reform.  
Second, households gaining benefits from the child allowance are those with children. As expected, 
the simulated results suggest that couples with children increase their hours worked more than people 
without children do. However, the benefit from the child allowance is quite limited (13,000 baht per 
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child each year); the maximum amount of the benefit is 39,000 baht per year for households with 
three dependent children.  
While the impact of the policy is limited in general, the results imply some behavioural patterns. 
Unmarried individuals generally increase their hours worked. It is noticeable that unmarried males 
extend hours worked more than unmarried females. The reason for this may be that changes in tax 
rules influence those working in the base case more than those who are inactive. The pre-reform 
simulation shows that the proportion of working males is greater than that of working females.  
Although the results for married couples are not significant, some behavioural response can be 
observed. The number of dependent children seems to positively affect hours worked of married 
couples. Regarding couples without children, husbands increase a small amount of hours worked 
whilst wives decrease their hours worked by a fraction of an hour. For households with children, 
married males gradually increase their labour supply except those in the households with three 
children. Married females in households with children also provides longer hours worked gradually as 
the number of children increases.  
 Winners-losers analysis: increases in non-transferable allowances  
TABLE 4.12 shows the results of changes in gross income, personal income tax paid, and disposable 
income by household type. These numbers can be also applied for winners and losers analysis.  
From TABLE 4.12, the results in the gross income column indicates that only unmarried males provide 
statistically significant change in gross income at about two hundred baht with statistical significance 
at the 1 percent level. Under the post-reform scenario, single males, single females, households 
without children, households with one child, households with two children and households with three 
children pay a smaller amount of income tax by about 423, 660, 1,260, 1,265, 1,522, and 915 baht, 
respectively. All of these numbers are statistical significance at the 1 percent level. The last column, 
disposable income, shows that all household types obtain some positive changes due to the 
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summation between increased gross income and decreased tax burden, but only single males without 
shows the statistically significant improvement.  
TABLE 4.12: Change in incomes and taxes due to changes in non-transferable allowances 
Household types Gross income Tax paid Disposable income 
(1) Male Individuals .2036261*** 
(.0461572) 
[2592] 
-.4229567*** 
(.0111966) 
[2592] 
.6265828*** 
(.0478823) 
[2592] 
(2) Female Individuals .1769653 
(1.591782) 
[2445] 
-.6603493*** 
(.0654067) 
[2445] 
.8373145 
(1.553636) 
[2445] 
(3) Households without children .0363679 
(1.934578) 
[3824] 
-1.260623*** 
(.0719747) 
[3824] 
1.296991 
(1.886033) 
[3824] 
(4) Households with one child .3746666 
(1.65278) 
[2115] 
-1.265503*** 
(.0452142) 
[2115] 
1.64017 
(1.627184) 
[2115] 
(5) Households with two children .8255346 
(2.936973) 
[1292] 
-1.522117*** 
(.0707662) 
[1292] 
2.347652 
(2.886963) 
[1292] 
(6) Households with three children .838324 
(3.888576) 
[227] 
-.9151959*** 
(.0595006) 
[227] 
1.75352 
(3.854179) 
[227] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 
The overall results of individual labour supply suggest that increases in gross income (shown in TABLE 
4.12) are clearly related to changes in hours worked (shown in TABLE 4.11). Whilst unmarried males 
increase labour supply and earn gross income more than do unmarried females, the changed amounts 
of personal income tax and disposable income for males are smaller than those for females. With 
regards to unmarried males, the simulated results indicate that 41.71 percent of unmarried males are 
considered as winners since their disposable incomes are positively affected by the policy reform; the 
remaining observations are unaffected. However, the difference in disposable income between pre-
reform and post-reform cases for any unmarried male does not exceed 5 percent. In terms of 
unmarried females, the results show that 51.45 percent of total unmarried females are winners (i.e., 
they earn more disposable income in the post-reform case relative to the pre-reform case). The 
remaining 48.55 percent of total unmarried females are losers as their disposable incomes decline in 
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the post-reform scenario compare to the pre-reform case. It is possible that some people reduce their 
hours worked due to the income effect exceeding the substitution effect. Nevertheless, none of the 
changes in disposable income for unmarried females exceeds a 5 percent threshold.  
Regarding household labour supply, the first type of households is married couples without children. 
50.10 percent of this household type are considered as winners since they gain more disposable 
income in the post-reform situation compared to the pre-reform one. The remaining households are 
identified as losers because their disposable incomes decline after the policy is executed. Those 
reducing hours worked because the income effect is greater than the substitution effect. Only one 
household without children obtain the exact same amount of disable income between pre-reform and 
post-reform scenarios. When a five-percent income change threshold is taken into account, none of 
these households is reported as either winners or losers.  
Considering married couples with dependent children, 74.24 percent of them are indicated as winners 
since their disposable incomes in the post-reform situation are greater than those in the pre-reform 
case. 25.76 percent of them are considered as losers due to negative changes in disposable income. 
The winner-loser ratio for households with children is greater than other household types because of 
the benefits from child allowance. However, the results concerning a five-percent threshold of income 
changes show zero observations. This means that changes in disposable income of these households 
do not reach 5 percent.  
 Effects on poverty: increases in non-transferable allowances 
The simulated results regarding effects on poverty can be concluded that increasing non-transferable 
allowances does not significantly affect the poverty situation because the policy reforms do not 
influence working behaviour and disposable income of poor households with statistical significance; 
HDIPAC almost remains the same between pre-reform and post-reform scenarios. The result is not 
surprising since poor people do not pay tax; hence, reforming tax rules does not affect them.  
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Regarding the discrepancy between HDIPAC and the national poverty line, because the policy does 
not statistically change HDIPAC, the difference between pre-reform and post-reform cases are not 
significantly different.  
 Effects on the income distribution: increases in non-transferable allowances 
FIGURE 4.7: Comparison of HDIPAC distributions due to rises in non-transferable allowances 
 
 
The plot in FIGURE 4.7 shows that the policy reform, i.e., increasing non-transferable allowances, does 
not provide any distinct change throughout the HDIPAC distribution. However, whilst the policy seems 
unsuccessful in increasing disposable income at the lower end of the distribution, there are slight 
improvements of HDIPAC for households at the middle and the upper end of the distribution. This 
reform is hence ineffective in income inequality amelioration. This is not beyond expectations since 
increases in these allowances aim to have influences merely on tax payers, and the effects are not 
statistically significant. This implies that this type of policies affects only people who have incomes 
over a certain threshold (i.e., those who pay tax). 
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 Proposed tax restructure 
This section provides explanations on the effects of the recently proposed set of policy reforms in 
which the government committee recommend that the proposed tax package reforms many aspects 
including an increase in the amount of taxable persons, elimination of the tax threshold, reduction of 
the number of tax brackets, expansion of income ranges in the tax brackets, and revision of personal 
income tax rates.  
 Labour supply responses: a proposed tax restructure 
From TABLE A4.8 in Appendix 4.II, the proposed package of tax rule reforms negatively influences 
labour supply behaviour of people with statistical significance in general.  
Regarding unmarried males without children, their hours worked decline by about 2.66 hours or 2 
hours and 40 minutes on average. Investigating labour supply responses throughout the HDIPAC 
distribution shows that apart from the 10th decile of the distribution, unmarried males generally 
decrease hours worked after the tax rules restructure, with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level. The pattern of labour supply responses in the bottom half of the distribution is unclear, whilst 
single males tend to decrease their hours worked more across the upper half of the distribution. 
However, the labour supply response turns positive (but without statistical significance) at the 10th 
decile of the disposable income distribution. These males usually offer shorter hours worked than 
others in the same income decile due to a larger amount of unearned income.  
In terms of unmarried females, the overall labour supply response is about -1.29 hours or they 
decrease hours worked by about 1 hour and 17 minutes. The magnitude of the change in the female 
case is smaller than in the male case; the reason is possibly that the proposed rules affect the latter 
to a larger extent since, in the status quo scenario, males usually have more taxable income than do 
females. Exploring labour supply responses by disposable income decile reveals that the pattern of 
labour supply response of females is very similar to that of males. From the first decile to ninth decile 
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of the income distribution, females usually decrease their hours worked with statistical significance at 
least at the 5 percent level after the introduction of the policy. At the tenth income decile, female 
labour supply response is dramatically different from other deciles; unmarried females increase hours 
worked by about 3.81 or 3 hours and 48 minutes with statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
The reason for this behavioural difference is identical to the case of unmarried males. 43.44 percent 
of unmarried females in the tenth decile increase their hours worked if the proposed tax rules are 
effective.  
In the household labour supply setting, overall, both married males and females decrease hours 
worked by 0.64 hour (i.e., 38.4 minutes) and 1.72 hour (i.e., 1 hour and 43 minutes) with statistical 
significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Besides the tenth income decile, the 
labour supply response patterns of both husbands and wives are similar; the negative response due 
to tax rule reforms is higher at the both ends of the disposable income distribution relative to other 
deciles in the middle. Married males and females behave differently at the upper end of the 
distribution. In fact, husbands decide to increase their hours worked by 1.64 hour or 1 hour and 34 
minutes with statistical significance at the 1 percent level; however, wives decrease their hours 
worked by 3.16 hours or about 3 hours and 10 minutes with statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level. Observing the data reveals that the reason for why couples react oppositely in the tenth decile 
of the income distribution is possibly because of unearned income and the gender wage gap. 
Unearned income differentiates households in the upper end of the distribution from others; ranking 
households by unearned income identifies that husbands increase their hours worked if their wages 
are much higher than the spouses’ wages. On the other hand, wives living in households with high 
disposable income (tenth decile) decrease their hours worked because the gender wage gap is large.  
Changes in the tax brackets and tax rate are expected to have the biggest effect than other changes 
in the proposed tax package on the labour supply. The results in the arithmetical model indicate that 
the combination of eliminating the tax threshold, reducing a number of tax brackets, and revising tax 
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rates affect disposable income the most. A change in tax declaration threshold from the income basis 
to the age basis does not affect disposable income of people in the arithmetical model. This is because 
this change affect people who are older than 18 years old but earn less than the income thresholds 
(60,000 baht for single people and 120,000 baht for married couples); these people are very less likely 
to pay tax. The other change in the proposed tax package is eliminating joint taxation (i.e., all married 
couples need to declare income separately). This affects disposable income only slightly because the 
difference between separate and joint taxation is some parts of allowances which are small in relative 
to household income.   
 Winners-losers analysis: a proposed tax restructure 
TABLE A4.9 in Appendix 4.II presents labour supply responses when the government applies the 
proposed personal income tax package by decile. Overall, the proposed reform affects households (all 
gross income, tax burden, and disposable income) negatively.   
In terms of unmarried males, in general, gross income decreases by about 7.59 thousand baht; the 
income tax burden increases by approximately 29.52 thousand baht and these factors together cause 
decrease in disposable incomes by about 37.10 thousand baht. These changes are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Investigating results by decile indicates that changes in gross incomes 
are in-line with labour supply responses although the increase in the personal income tax burden is 
quite consistent with incomes by decile. As a result, the magnitude of a decreased in disposable 
income for the first decile is greater than the second decile due to the elimination of the tax threshold. 
The decreased amount of disposable income for males in the tenth decile is smaller than that for the 
ninth decile because people at the top end of the distribution increase their hours worked and earn 
more gross income.  
The results also suggest that 97.84 percent of the total unmarried males are negatively affected by 
the reform; 2.12 percent is consider as the winner as their disposable incomes increase due to the 
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proposed tax rules; only one male is found that his disposable income remain unchanged. By using 5 
percent change in disposable income as thresholds, 97.45 percent of the male individuals are 
considered as losers. 2.08 percent of the observations gain disposable income by at least 5 percent 
under the revised tax setting; and all of these persons are categorised in the upper end of the 
distribution. 12 households or 0.46 percent are identified as neutral since their income changes do 
not reach 5 percent thresholds; these persons are scattered at the lower part and the upper end of 
the disposable income distribution.  
Regarding the labour supply of unmarried females, as they generally decrease their hours worked, 
their gross incomes decline by about 570 baht without statistical significance. Overall, the personal 
tax income burden increases by about 30.31 thousand baht with statistical significance at the 1 
percent level. These factors reduce disposable income by about 30.88 thousand baht with statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level. Effects on disposable income due to the tax reform change 
negatively along the disposable income distribution except the last decile at the upper end.  
The winners-losers analysis indicates that most unmarried females (95.99 percent) are negatively 
affected by the policy reform. 3.8 percent are considered as winners whilst only 0.2 percent is 
unaffected by the reform at all. By adopting 5 percent change thresholds, 94.81 percent is classified 
as losers. 1.84 percent of single females manage to increase their incomes by at least 5 percent in the 
proposed tax rules. All of these individuals are those at the upper end of the income distribution.  3.35 
percent of unmarried females are considered as unaffected because their disposable income changes 
lie within the 5 percent range. They are mostly living in the households at the tenth decile of the 
distribution whilst the remaining observations are distributed along the middle of the distribution.  
The results of household labour supply indicate that in general the policy reform affect household 
income in negative ways. In fact, overall, household gross income declines by about 7.45 thousand 
baht, their tax burden rises by about 53.33 thousand baht, and their disposable income reduces by 
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about 60.78 thousand baht. All estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The pattern 
of changes in these monetary factors is similar to what is observed at the individual level.  
Investigating the proportions of winners and losers indicates that 98.22 percent of married couples 
earn smaller disposable incomes in the post-reform setting whilst 1.78 percent gain some extra 
disposable income from the reform. Using 5 percent disposable income change threshold reveals 
similar results. 96.90 percent of couples are considered as losers whilst 0.79 and 2.31 percent are 
suggested as winners and unaffected households respectively. Winners are distributed at the upper 
part (decile 8 to 10) of the disposable income distribution; unaffected couples are found across the 
distribution. 
In short, people in the ninth decile of their own groups are most affected by the proposed reform. 
People in the last decile manage to ameliorate negative effects of the reform on their disposable 
income because of unearned income in which they usually do not have the ceiling amount of allowable 
expenses. Hence, the taxable incomes of people with a high unearned income percentage are usually 
lower than those of people relying heavily on earned income. This allows people at the upper end of 
the distribution to earn more gross income from earned income whilst their tax burdens are not as 
large as those of people in the ninth decile. The winners-losers analysis suggest that the proposed tax 
restructure makes most people worse off, while some of them at the upper end of the distribution are 
better off.  
 Effects on poverty: a proposed tax restructure 
Since the reform affect most of the households negatively, it is not surprising HDIPACs of some 
households fall below the national poverty line. In fact, 0.64 percent of the whole sample become 
poor households in the post-reform scenario (i.e., 0.72 percent of all households are poor under a 
proposed tax restructure). 
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With regards to the gap between HDIPAC and the national poverty line, the results indicate that the 
discrepancy is expanding in the post-reform situation. In fact, the average income of poor households 
under the pre-reform case is lower than the poverty line by 1.99 thousand baht whilst the average 
income of poor households under the post-reform setting falls behind the poverty line by about 2.08 
thousand baht.  
 Effects on the income distribution: a proposed tax restructure 
FIGURE 4.8: Comparison of HDIPAC distributions due to proposed tax rules 
 
FIGURE 4.8 is quantile-quantile plot comparing HDIPAC distributions between pre-reform and post-
reform situations for the whole HDIPAC distribution.  
The plot presents some serious negative effects on HDIPAC at the bottom half of the distribution. The 
negative effects carry over to the middle part of the distribution as well. At some proportion in the 
upper half of the distribution, the negative effects become less critical. However, at the upper end to 
the distribution, households manage to gain HDIPAC after the government makes the tax reform 
effective. The plot clearly indicates that the revised tax package aggravates income inequality in 
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Thailand. This is because it decreases HDIPAC across the almost entire distribution, and most seriously 
at the lower half of the distribution, while it generally increases HDIPAC at the top of the distribution.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to study the effects of different policies on the economy using the microsimulation 
technique. Firstly, this chapter investigates the labour supply response due to a gross wage increase. 
Three different situations, namely, a 10 percent increase in male wages, a 10 percent increase in 
female wages, and a 10 percent increase in both genders wages, are simulated. The results suggest 
that in general female labour supply is more elastic than male labour supply as found in previous 
studies. Additionally, people tend to increase hours worked when their own wages increase whilst 
they response oppositely when their partners’ wages rise. The findings are consistent with many 
existing studies.  
This chapter also simulates different factual and counterfactual policies to investigate several 
economic aspects of each policy including the labour supply response, effects on pecuniary factors, 
winners-losers analysis, effects on poverty, and effects on the income distribution. The summary of 
the results and some conclusions for policy implications are as follows:   
The perfect compliant rate of the minimum wage is the first policy considered in this study, as previous 
empirical work on the minimum wage in Thailand finds a low rate of policy compliance as well as 
ineffective law enforcement. In general, the simulated results show that the policy increases hours 
worked, gross incomes, tax burdens, and disposable incomes. The policy is targeted since only a 
proportion of people gain benefits from it. However, if the minimum wage is fully complied with, it 
can help to ameliorate economic problems including poverty and income inequality in Thailand 
because it increases disposable income of people at the bottom end of the HDIPAC distribution. 
Besides the amount of the minimum wages, the government is encouraged focusing on policy 
implementation and law enforcement to increase the rate of policy compliance. The results also 
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indicate that the minimum wage may have different effects across countries. This is because different 
countries have different income distribution regarding minimum wage workers (Atkinson et al., 2017; 
Müller and Steiner, 2013). In addition, the minimum wage has a smaller effect if a country has a larger 
amounts of mean-tested benefits, and vice versa (Müller and Steiner, 2013).   
The effects of increases in non-transferable allowances is also simulated using the labour supply 
model. The results reveal that the policy scarcely influences people’s labour supply behaviour. 
Although the policy aims to reduce income tax burden directly, it barely affect disposable income as 
well as economic situations including poverty and income inequality. In fact, HDIPAC of people at the 
middle and the upper parts of the distribution increase very slightly; however, the policy does not 
affect income of people at the lower end much at all. The government needs to sacrifice some revenue 
as a cost of the policy. The results suggest that policy makers need to consider whether the reform 
affects economic factors or not. An increase in tax allowances can be effective if it is large enough to 
affect labour supply behaviour as well as disposable income. Small changes in allowances might not 
help change labour supply behaviour or disposable incomes, but they possibly compensate some 
increased living costs. Policy makers also need to bear in mind that changing tax allowances affect only 
people who are eligible to pay tax (i.e., they have income greater than a certain amount depending 
on tax rules).  
The Thai government committee, which is appointed by the Prime Minister’s Office, proposed a 
package of tax restructure. This chapter selects some issues including a change in the income 
declaration threshold, elimination of joint taxation, and revision of tax brackets and rates to simulate 
the effects of these hypothetical changes. The results suggest that the policy generally has a negative 
impact on labour supply and gross incomes. In addition, the policy reform increases the overall tax 
burden of households which helps a government earn more revenue from personal income tax. 
Combining effects on gross income and tax burden yields a decrease on disposable income 
significantly. Therefore, a government may adopt this policy in slowing down an economy if needed. 
 234 
 
In addition, the policy exacerbates the poverty concern and possibly expands the income gap between 
the lower and upper ends of the income distribution. The results also suggest that restructuring tax 
brackets and rates affects the labour supply response and other pecuniary factors more than other 
changes in the proposed tax package. This implies that since a tax-benefit restructure policy affects 
labour supply and financial factors of people across the HDIPAC distribution, the government has to 
consider this policy type very carefully.  
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4.7 Appendix 4.I:  The results of labour supply elasticity 
TABLE A4.1: Labour supply response for 10% wage increase at the individual level 
 Single males Single females 
Total .3307225*** 
(.1068394) 
[2592] 
.4947338*** 
(.1183232) 
[2445] 
Decile 1 .8299069*** 
(.1992616) 
[260] 
1.933583*** 
(.266451) 
[245] 
Decile 2 .803247*** 
(.1872882) 
[259] 
1.956291*** 
(.2587732) 
[244] 
Decile 3 .5383815*** 
(.1435548) 
[259] 
1.449049*** 
(.1976877) 
[245] 
Decile 4 .4548381*** 
(.1296121) 
[259] 
.384094** 
(.1568854) 
[244] 
Decile 5 .3167821*** 
(.1209508) 
[259] 
.0627625 
(.1462492) 
[245] 
Decile 6 .3099452*** 
(.1160585) 
[260] 
-.01797 
(.1372864) 
[244] 
Decile 7 .222396** 
(.1064204) 
[259] 
.0307303 
(.1824577) 
[245] 
Decile 8 .2407749** 
(.1043397) 
[259] 
-.1715009 
(.150812) 
[244] 
Decile 9 -.0056878 
(.1103389) 
[259] 
-.2779661** 
(.1226026) 
[245] 
Decile 10 -.4052058** 
(.1845691) 
[259] 
-.4047035** 
(.1766275) 
[244] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.2: Married male labour supply response due to a 10% increase in males’ wages 
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total .2527185*** 
(.039318) 
[7458] 
.1292634*** 
(.0375335) 
[3824] 
.3524721*** 
(.0452251) 
[2115] 
.4157407*** 
(.0512254) 
[1292] 
.4751357*** 
(.0618692) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
.3318857*** 
(.0531182) 
[746] 
.0390961 
(.0354956) 
[25] 
.3424424*** 
(.0567142) 
[403] 
.3273004*** 
(.052592) 
[240] 
.3852938*** 
(.0646373) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
.183847*** 
(.0369745) 
[746] 
.0313398 
(.0348939) 
[329] 
.2937841*** 
(.047725) 
[225] 
.3055948*** 
(.0493952) 
[156] 
.3629133*** 
(.0595471) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
.0956972*** 
 (.0326908) 
[746] 
.0184654 
(.0333703) 
 [468] 
.2076866*** 
(.0387587) 
[161] 
.2325826*** 
(.0441366) 
[102] 
.372487*** 
(.060018) 
[15] 
Decile 4 
 
.1014293*** 
(.0332636) 
[746] 
.0029206 
(.0331319) 
[441] 
.2216282*** 
(.0395111) 
[185] 
.264179*** 
(.0461708) 
[103] 
.3627439*** 
(.0628881) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
.0923902*** 
(.0342041) 
[745] 
-.0007556 
(.0348343) 
[448] 
.2208466*** 
(.0396058) 
[201] 
.2512917*** 
 (.0458927) 
[84] 
.3058825*** 
(.0576275) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
.0712921** 
(.0352166) 
[746] 
-.014547 
(.0365502) 
[484] 
.1901115*** 
(.0383531) 
[160] 
.2849486*** 
(.0455118) 
[88] 
.3379541*** 
(.0552996) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
.0633754* 
(.0370164) 
[746] 
-.0119608 
(.0385787) 
[501] 
.1640116*** 
(.0380482) 
[149] 
.2769617*** 
(.045352) 
[89] 
.5975784*** 
(.0786137) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
.2263884*** 
(.0448391) 
[745] 
.0757638* 
(.0429462) 
[401] 
.3361893*** 
(.0500188) 
[199] 
.4819937*** 
(.0601172) 
[128] 
.5694832*** 
(.0708825) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
.5292318*** 
(.069504) 
[747] 
.3365888*** 
(.0633779) 
[297] 
.6175975*** 
(.0747739) 
[259] 
.6843155*** 
(.0832907) 
[171] 
.9196789*** 
(.1095398) 
[20] 
Decile 10 
 
.8318033*** 
(.087837) 
[745] 
.82816*** 
(.0951865) 
[430] 
.8140393*** 
(.0862588) 
[173] 
.842989*** 
(.0942127) 
[131] 
1.120389*** 
(.1262805) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.3: Married female labour supply response due to a 10% increase in males’ wages 
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total -.8894429*** 
(.0564362) 
[7458] 
-.8067587*** 
(.0538398) 
[3824] 
-.9352216 
(.0604468) 
[2115] 
-1.040113*** 
(.0674587) 
[1292] 
-.9982406*** 
(.0704568) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
-.5013794*** 
(.0474108) 
[746] 
-.419893*** 
(.0396848) 
[25] 
-.4900876*** 
(.047208) 
[403] 
-.5199245*** 
(.0489927) 
[240] 
-.528776*** 
(.0524293) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
-.5339734*** 
(.0466497) 
[746] 
-.4669435*** 
(.042187) 
[329] 
-.5544315*** 
(.050271) 
[225] 
-.6153405*** 
 (.0545433) 
[157] 
-.6660982*** 
(.0600618) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
-.540306*** 
(.0451873) 
[746] 
-.4821042*** 
(.0418614) 
[468] 
-.6154063*** 
(.0520496) 
[161] 
-.6523101*** 
(.0546451) 
[102] 
-.7884979*** 
(.0673705) 
[15] 
Decile 4 
 
-.5715812*** 
(.0463298) 
[746] 
-.494897*** 
(.0418953) 
[439] 
-.6920356*** 
(.0559441) 
[185] 
-.6516047*** 
(.0547634) 
[103] 
-.7651856*** 
(.0677699) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
-.6214043*** 
(.0485431) 
[745] 
-.5317239*** 
(.0439065) 
[448] 
-.7494807*** 
(.0586447) 
[201] 
-.7495844*** 
(.0609794) 
[84] 
-.9269361*** 
(.0633309) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
-.6909984*** 
(.0526125) 
[746] 
-.5781327*** 
(.0470924) 
[484] 
-.8340992*** 
 (.0630832) 
[161] 
-.994801*** 
(.0725952) 
[88] 
-1.047871*** 
(.0799402) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
-.7835453*** 
(.0591443) 
[746] 
-.6927542*** 
(.0555256) 
[501] 
-.9072241*** 
(.0681974) 
[149] 
-1.040405*** 
(.0729804) 
[89] 
-1.383217*** 
(.1100175) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
-1.13098*** 
(.0757554) 
[746] 
-.9541976*** 
(.0727225) 
[401] 
-1.228027*** 
 (.0806817) 
 [199] 
-1.440803*** 
(.0907447) 
[128] 
-1.832175*** 
(.1137805) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
-1.555124*** 
(.0896647) 
[746] 
-1.332526*** 
(.0884531) 
[297] 
-1.616752*** 
(.0935768) 
[259] 
-1.770753*** 
(.1045916) 
[171] 
-2.21901*** 
(.162659) 
[20] 
Decile 10 
 
-1.965651*** 
(.1240337) 
[745] 
-1.938505*** 
(.1289799) 
[430] 
-2.00139 
(.1319186) 
[173] 
-1.977669 
(.1481933) 
[131] 
-2.321619 
(.1825604) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.4: Married male labour supply response due to a 10% increase in females’ wages  
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total -.2052379*** 
(.0242569) 
[7458] 
-.2128115*** 
(.0241872) 
[3824] 
-.187963*** 
(.0254948) 
[2115] 
-.2193654 
(.0301855) 
[1292] 
-.1582007 
(.0297949) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
.0317322* 
(.0171856) 
[746] 
-.0415146*** 
(.0149679) 
[25] 
.0370639** 
(.017638) 
[403] 
.0272242 
(.017915) 
[240] 
.0415323** 
(.0204368) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
-.0124245 
(.0149801) 
[746] 
-.0534963*** 
(.0148368) 
[329] 
.020992 
(.017416) 
[225] 
.0167186 
(.0181768) 
[156] 
.0277866 
(.0202782) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
-.0496916*** 
(.014747) 
[746] 
-.0680266*** 
 (.0150769) 
[468] 
-.0195329 
(.0155901) 
[161] 
-.0250508 
(.0178119) 
[102] 
.0310975 
(.0216673) 
[15] 
Decile 4 
 
-.0584592*** 
(.0154839) 
[746] 
-.0808231*** 
(.0153538) 
[441] 
-.0331853* 
(.0169869) 
[185] 
-.0148413 
 (.0190667) 
[103] 
-.0176272 
(.0234728) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
-.0748224*** 
(.0158525) 
[745] 
-.0916754*** 
(.0159184) 
[448] 
-.0463004*** 
(.0171154) 
[201] 
-.0447323** 
(.0181899) 
[84] 
-.1340158*** 
(.0268614) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
-.096552*** 
(.0164065) 
[746] 
-.1079087*** 
(.0165664) 
[484] 
-.0788011*** 
(.0176849) 
[160] 
-.0681065*** 
(.0186729) 
[88] 
-.0856036*** 
(.0221456) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
-.1215151*** 
(.0175214) 
[746] 
-.123733*** 
(.0173929) 
[501] 
-.1111477*** 
(.0183511) 
[149] 
-.1268511*** 
(.0222131) 
[89] 
-.1156055*** 
(.0244761) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
-.2242968*** 
(.0264099) 
[745] 
-.1608891*** 
(.0209177) 
[401] 
-.2562353*** 
(.0334597) 
[199] 
-.3497177 
(.043092) 
[128] 
-.401755*** 
(.0446361) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
-.5045646*** 
(.0511279) 
[747] 
-.3088601*** 
(.0362542) 
[297] 
-.5989001*** 
(.0615247) 
[259] 
-.6608329*** 
(.0697075) 
[171] 
-.8530393*** 
(.1108001) 
[20] 
Decile 10 
 
-.9422225*** 
(.0928584) 
[745] 
-.9677599*** 
(.1038315) 
[430] 
-.9441395*** 
(.0923307) 
[173] 
-.8371846*** 
(.0924463) 
[131] 
-1.164701*** 
(.145553) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.5: Married female labour supply response due to a 10% increase in females’ wages 
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total .8758556*** 
(.08362) 
[7458] 
.5384286*** 
(.0791009) 
[3824] 
1.142079*** 
(.0942264) 
[2115] 
1.335972 
(.1044362) 
[1292] 
1.460828 
(.1242152) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
1.003104*** 
(.1046116) 
[746] 
.2870621*** 
(.0747444) 
[25] 
1.001368*** 
(.1064598) 
[403] 
1.026179*** 
(.1069457) 
[240] 
1.170575*** 
(.1248696) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
.7412298*** 
(.0881253) 
[746] 
.2983871*** 
(.0757547) 
[329] 
1.045395*** 
(.1137204) 
[225] 
1.114881*** 
(.1189015) 
[156] 
1.268131*** 
(.1378897) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
.533805*** 
(.0789578) 
[746] 
.2966112*** 
(.0758311) 
[468] 
.8428915*** 
(.0968332) 
[161] 
.990808*** 
(.11265) 
[102] 
1.509105*** 
(.1621596) 
[14] 
Decile 4 
 
.5931565*** 
(.082806) 
[746] 
.2860335*** 
(.0762467) 
[441] 
.9398495*** 
(.1024449) 
[185] 
1.153968*** 
(.1240571) 
[103] 
1.38959*** 
(.1604321) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
.5739492*** 
(.0841351) 
[745] 
.2920035 
(.0799386) *** 
[448] 
.9725869*** 
(.106099) 
[201] 
1.05324*** 
(.1197909) 
[84] 
1.067705*** 
(.1214598) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
.5477434*** 
(.0859773) 
[746] 
.2964688*** 
(.0842671) 
[484] 
.9117489*** 
(.1024594) 
[160] 
1.160877*** 
(.1194566) 
[88] 
1.220617*** 
(.1289702) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
.5488769*** 
(.0887453) 
[746] 
.3454707*** 
.0903282 
[501] 
.8277656*** 
(.0932171) 
[150] 
1.150235*** 
 (.1141969) 
[88] 
1.524768 
(.1366372) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
.953878*** 
(.0993636) 
[745] 
.55584*** 
(.1001421) 
[401] 
1.2285*** 
(.1011826) 
[199] 
1.651918*** 
(.123733) 
[128] 
1.872366*** 
(.1399187) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
1.508648*** 
(.12198) 
[747] 
1.016349*** 
(.1173476) 
[297] 
1.727562*** 
(.1287279) 
[259] 
1.911409*** 
(.1341022) 
[171] 
2.540756*** 
(.164252) 
[20] 
Decile 10 
 
1.754194*** 
(.1176101) 
[745] 
1.66631*** 
(.1216335) 
[430] 
1.795008*** 
(.1178943) 
[173] 
1.943921*** 
(.1290866) 
[131] 
2.288265*** 
(.150038) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.6: Married male labour supply response when (partners’ wages increase by 10 %) 
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total .0570549 
(.0443109) 
[7458] 
-.0734417 
(.0450079) 
[3824] 
.1732841*** 
(.0474653) 
[2115] 
.2061097*** 
(.0516831) 
[1292] 
.3240825*** 
(.0618643) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
.3585682*** 
(.061986) 
[746] 
-.0023585 
(.0476036) 
[25] 
.3745705*** 
(.0659302) 
[403] 
.3492735*** 
(.0617347) 
[240] 
.4201697*** 
(.074783) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
.1687515*** 
(.046204) 
[746] 
-.0218423 
(.0464085) 
[329] 
.3101872*** 
(.0571677) 
[225] 
.3170558*** 
(.0586619) 
[156] 
.3839433*** 
(.0696759) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
.0451891 
(.0426026) 
[746] 
-.0489315 
(.0447151) 
[468] 
.1853543*** 
(.0472486) 
[161] 
.2043719*** 
(.0528213) 
[102] 
.3948686*** 
(.0699163) 
[15] 
Decile 4 
 
.0420918 
(.0431327) 
[746] 
-.076939* 
(.0445299) 
[441] 
.18554*** 
(.0472911) 
[185] 
.2451989*** 
(.054836) 
[103] 
.3382469*** 
(.0718344) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
.0170707 
(.0440702) 
[745] 
-.0914026** 
(.0462873) 
[448] 
.1713381*** 
(.0471434) 
[201] 
.2041237*** 
(.0535998) 
[84] 
.1733918*** 
(.0627741) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
-.0247548 
(.0450684) 
[746] 
-.1208635** 
(.0480131) 
[484] 
.1106291** 
(.0457371) 
[160] 
.2141262*** 
(.0514571) 
[88] 
.2490801*** 
(.0607064) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
-.056251 
(.0465701) 
[746] 
-.1333749*** 
(.0494752) 
[501] 
.0542675 
(.0451975) 
[149] 
.1504768*** 
(.0505778) 
[89] 
.4827569*** 
(.0815884) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
.0109483 
(.0504313) 
[745] 
-.0805584 
(.0508565) 
[401] 
.0912243* 
(.0528757) 
[199] 
.147822** 
(.0602982) 
[128] 
.1991486*** 
(.0706821) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
.054353 
(.0685565) 
[747] 
.0432446 
(.0650306) 
[297] 
.0552304 
(.0732049) 
[259] 
.0639971 
(.0782192) 
[171] 
.1254927 
(.0913375) 
[20]  
Decile 10 
 
-.0456676 
(.0962166) 
[745] 
-.0721829 
(.1028978) 
[430] 
-.0641551 
(.0940527) 
[173] 
.0584679 
(.1028003) 
[131] 
.0414365 
(.1250568) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.7: Married female labour supply response (both partners’ wages increase by 10 %) 
 Total 2-member 3-member 4-member 5-member 
Total .0077422 
(.087828) 
[7458] 
-.2420762*** 
(.0856644) 
[3824] 
.2229786** 
(.0948037) 
[2115] 
.3165756*** 
(.1057865) 
[1292] 
.4529749*** 
(.1239313) 
[227] 
Decile 1 
 
.4834599*** 
(.1095542) 
[746] 
-.130593 
(.0901468) 
[25] 
.4928415*** 
(.1113073) 
[403] 
.4880857*** 
(.1124906) 
[240] 
.6175671*** 
(.1299406) 
[78] 
Decile 2 
 
.1992472** 
(.0968712) 
[746] 
-.1654239* 
(.0899242) 
[329] 
.4765123*** 
(.1184907) 
[225] 
.4811898*** 
(.1224959) 
[156] 
.5772776*** 
(.1420243) 
[36] 
Decile 3 
 
-.0077819 
(.0894631) 
[746] 
-.1812188** 
(.0883231) 
[468] 
.2171174** 
(.102816) 
[164] 
.3302947*** 
(.1175748) 
[102] 
.6906079*** 
 (.1577546) 
[15] 
Decile 4 
 
.0199489 
(.091956) 
[746] 
-.2031653** 
(.0879386) 
[441] 
.2356879** 
(.105772) 
[185] 
.4926482*** 
(.1266107) 
[103] 
.5960435*** 
(.1561595) 
[17] 
Decile 5 
 
-.0478508 
(.0931989) 
[745] 
-.2326375** 
(.0913056) 
[448] 
.2087625* 
(.1075863) 
[201] 
.298623** 
(.1219285) 
[84] 
.127265 
(.1277503) 
[12] 
Decile 6 
 
-.1416511 
(.095896) 
[746] 
-.2722611*** 
(.0962724) 
[484] 
.0695287 
(.1056333) 
[160] 
.1469619 
(.1207291) 
[88] 
.1460996 
(.1348405) 
[14] 
Decile 7 
 
-.2269801** 
(.0993611) 
[746] 
-.3350586*** 
.1024912 
[501] 
-.075426 
(.1007275) 
[149] 
.1006582 
(.1145985) 
[89] 
.116728 
(.1527232) 
[7] 
Decile 8 
 
-.1641539 
(.1048111) 
[745] 
-.3808707*** 
(.1084367) 
[401] 
.010286 
(.1075583) 
[199] 
.2210939* 
(.1252705) 
[128] 
.0051494 
(.1489254) 
[17] 
Decile 9 
 
.015609 
(.1237949) 
[747] 
-.2859212 
(.117916) 
[297] 
.1922456 
(.1330573) 
[259] 
.2302849 
(.1480672) 
[171] 
.3704108* 
(.1958125) 
[20] 
Decile 10 
 
-.0528218 
(.1699245) 
[745] 
-.1211526 
(.1798545) 
[430] 
-.0374264 
(.1739259) 
[173] 
.1352853 
(.1847298) 
[131] 
.1359807 
(.2328642) 
[11] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 242 
 
4.8 Appendix 4.II: The results of the recently proposed tax reform 
TABLE A4.8: Labour supply response due to proposed tax restructure 
 Single males Single females Married males Married females 
Total -2.658091*** 
(.4868457) 
 [2592] 
-1.287904*** 
(.3906604) 
[2445] 
-.6404871** 
(.2544013) 
[7458] 
-1.721599*** 
(.457833) 
[7458] 
Decile 1 -2.448605*** 
(.4942047) 
[260] 
-1.893211*** 
(.2547314) 
[245] 
-.9878512** 
(.4592703) 
[746] 
-2.283126*** 
(.7650591) 
[746] 
Decile 2 -2.73148*** 
(.5427526) 
[259] 
-2.672868*** 
(.3579042) 
[244] 
-.8292736** 
(.3380049) 
[746] 
-1.730463*** 
(.6323459) 
[746] 
Decile 3 -2.383433*** 
(.4932505) 
[259] 
-2.841122*** 
(.3903083) 
[245] 
-.5952269* 
(.3084115) 
[746] 
-1.211843** 
(.562655) 
[746] 
Decile 4 -2.431952*** 
(.4965116) 
[259] 
-1.559479*** 
(.3866234) 
[244] 
-.6952668** 
(.275249) 
[746] 
-1.432424*** 
(.5076879) 
[746] 
Decile 5 -2.324229*** 
(.5095503) 
[259] 
-1.055266** 
(.4157841) 
[245] 
-.7411013*** 
(.272291) 
[745] 
-1.239659** 
(.4856405) 
[745] 
Decile 6 -2.662971*** 
(.5442864) 
[260] 
-1.048962** 
(.4614599) 
[244] 
-.7340012*** 
 (.2689066) 
[746] 
-.9763982** 
(.4777079) 
[746] 
Decile 7 -2.996503*** 
(.5845841) 
[259] 
-1.749782** 
(.8411063) 
[245] 
-.7256874*** 
(.2739366) 
[746] 
-.7070424 
(.4855742) 
[746] 
Decile 8 -3.979061*** 
(.6754987) 
[259] 
-1.815664* 
(1.021545) 
[244] 
-1.269216*** 
(.3498672) 
[745] 
-1.428085** 
(.6177953) 
[745] 
Decile 9 -4.86549*** 
(.8173969) 
[259] 
-2.039714** 
(.8335744) 
[245] 
-1.467699*** 
(.5462961) 
[747] 
-3.049491*** 
(.9255456) 
[747] 
Decile 10 .2420192 
(.4926035) 
[259] 
3.8099*** 
(.6833909) 
[244] 
1.643645*** 
(.6068345) 
[745] 
-3.156565*** 
(.8448503) 
[745] 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.9: Changes on financial factors due to proposed tax restructure  
Policy changes Unmarried males Unmarried females Married couples 
Overall [2592] [2445] [7458] 
Gross income -7.586629*** 
(1.497408) 
-.5708419 
(1.497334) 
-7.451187*** 
(2.16393) 
Tax burden 29.51763*** 
(1.042136) 
30.3135*** 
(1.192371) 
53.32573*** 
(1.245192) 
Disposable income -37.10426*** 
(.9256018) 
-30.88434*** 
(1.302215) 
-60.77691*** 
(1.688174) 
Decile 1 [260] [245] [746] 
Gross income -5.002087*** 
(1.002585) 
-2.841729*** 
(.3826625) 
-6.202023*** 
(2.014154) 
Tax burden 9.61147*** 
(.4329957) 
2.468067*** 
(.1924675) 
16.3241*** 
(.3903711) 
Disposable income -14.61356*** 
(.6577612) 
-5.309796*** 
(.3075256) 
-22.52612*** 
(1.740957) 
Decile 2 [259] [244] [746] 
Gross income -6.157664*** 
(1.221059) 
-4.530743*** 
(.6070386) 
-5.275757*** 
(1.657701) 
Tax burden 12.24104*** 
(.475441) 
4.105987*** 
(.2376773) 
19.60927*** 
(.3456515) 
Disposable income -18.39871*** 
(.8434899) 
-8.636729*** 
(.5063488) 
-24.88503*** 
(1.394608) 
Decile 3 [259] [245] [746] 
Gross income -5.549052*** 
(1.134124) 
-5.589382*** 
(.7571729) 
-3.961726** 
(1.543808) 
Tax burden 14.3232*** 
(.4180738) 
6.84019*** 
(.2377899) 
23.64601*** 
(.338195) 
Disposable income -19.87225*** 
(.7999746) 
-12.42957*** 
(.6560842) 
-27.60774*** 
(1.283137) 
Decile 4 [259] [245] [746] 
Gross income -6.171804*** 
(1.228854) 
-3.481945*** 
(.772768) 
-5.030162*** 
(1.454226) 
Tax burden 16.93439*** 
(.4306568) 
11.45527*** 
(.3073577) 
26.79033*** 
(.3407698) 
Disposable income -23.10619*** 
(.8810894) 
-14.93722*** 
(.6018953) 
-31.8205*** 
(1.185274) 
Decile 5 [259] [245] [745] 
Gross income -6.287498*** 
(1.343396) 
-2.577047*** 
(.8993604) 
-5.278727*** 
(1.528905) 
Tax burden 20.01675*** 
(.4593588) 
15.40176*** 
(.3464203) 
33.45857*** 
(.3725019) 
Disposable income -26.30424*** 
(.9756863) 
-17.97881*** 
(.7207292) 
-38.7373*** 
(1.240564) 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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TABLE A4.9: Changes on financial factors due to proposed tax restructure (Continue) 
Policy changes Unmarried males Unmarried females Married couples 
Decile 6 [260] [244] [746] 
Gross income -7.980928*** 
(1.58801) 
-2.94684** 
(1.169963) 
-5.142924*** 
(1.619578) 
Tax burden 23.48966*** 
(.52876) 
20.35074*** 
 (.4015203) 
42.09331*** 
(.4209367) 
Disposable income -31.47059*** 
(1.158872) 
-23.29758*** 
(.957897) 
-47.23623*** 
(1.309206) 
Decile 7 [259] [245] [746] 
Gross income -10.12159*** 
(1.915012) 
-6.253403** 
(2.926235) 
-5.345339*** 
(1.919946) 
Tax burden 28.77919*** 
(.6445346) 
32.12983*** 
(1.422761) 
53.73038*** 
(.550015) 
Disposable income -38.90078*** 
(1.400571) 
-38.38323*** 
(1.70022) 
-59.07571*** 
(1.520893) 
Decile 8 [259] [244] [745] 
Gross income -15.81004*** 
(2.626812) 
-8.103316* 
(4.583921) 
-13.35446*** 
(3.549396) 
Tax burden 36.49714*** 
(1.024362) 
49.24546*** 
(1.993634) 
80.4912*** 
(1.354077) 
Disposable income -52.30717*** 
(1.79936) 
-57.34878 
(2.891106) 
-93.84565*** 
(2.561744) 
Decile 9 [259] [245] [747] 
Gross income -25.23191*** 
(4.236139) 
-13.49674** 
(5.367631) 
-26.02982*** 
(6.973035) 
Tax burden 55.45613*** 
(1.894871) 
80.68043*** 
(2.419987) 
119.0846*** 
(3.559187) 
Disposable income -80.68805*** 
(2.649375) 
-94.17716*** 
(3.477807) 
-145.1144*** 
(4.781343) 
Decile 10 [259] [244] [747] 
Gross income 12.43783*** 
(4.419219) 
44.22709*** 
(6.938004) 
1.140478 
(8.886532) 
Tax burden 77.92748*** 
(5.709172) 
80.51482*** 
(7.222469) 
118.0378*** 
(6.519476) 
Disposable income -65.48965*** 
(8.003235) 
-36.28773*** 
(12.40861) 
-116.8974*** 
(10.38797) 
S.E. in parentheses; the number of observation in square brackets; *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis comprises three pieces of empirical work on labour supply and policy simulation. All essays 
are based on Thailand as a developing country with some serious economic concerns, namely, slow 
economic growth, which is closely related to the middle-income trap, and high income inequality. They 
have happened in many countries and become global issues interested by international organisations 
such as World Bank. Nonetheless, the number of studies investigating labour supply in developing 
countries are very limited. This thesis takes this opportunity to investigate labour supply in Thailand 
with policy simulation using the microsimulation technique to fulfil the body of the literature. 
The first essay presented in Chapter 2 focuses on labour supply at the extensive margin in Thailand. 
The dataset covers four periods (2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015) of cross-sectional data from the HSES. 
The structural binary probit model is applied to overcome the selection bias due to unobserved wages 
of non-workers. The two-stage Heckman selection model is adopted to yield predicted wages for the 
whole sample. The model covers a comprehensive list of factors such as individual and household 
characteristics. In general, the results are consistent with the existing literature. Some unconventional 
results are found because of socio-economic differences across countries.  
One of the focused factors is a dummy variable which captures the effect of the agricultural sector as 
a proxy of the informal sector on labour force participation since it plays an important role in the 
labour market in many developing countries. The results reveal that if a household has any farming 
business, females are less likely to participate in the formal labour market.   
Another main focus is whether the set of income restructuring policies (i.e., increases in minimum 
wages, monthly salaries, and rice prices) influence labour supply at the extensive margin. The results 
imply that the policies negatively affect labour force participation for both genders. There are possible 
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reasons why increases in minimum wages affect labour force participation negatively. First, the 
policies decreased the labour demand since increases minimum wages imply higher production costs. 
Second, the policy has a low rate of compliance owing to ineffective law enforcement. Third, most 
people earning minimum wages are already active in the market. An increase in monthly salary for 
workers with a university degree in the public sector does not really affect the labour force 
participation because the salary is not the key factor in working as public servants in Thailand; other 
factors (e.g., health care benefits) overcome the monthly salary. In addition, the policy does not spill 
over to the private sector because people graduated from a university are oversupply (the largest 
group of unemployed people are those with a university degree). The rice-pledging scheme, in which 
the government pledges rice at over the market price, also affects the formal labour market negatively 
since people consider farming income as (unearned) household income.  
The final focused factor in Chapter 2 is the debt constraints. Besides housing debt, this study also 
includes two new types of debt, i.e., educational and consumption debts into a study focusing labour 
force participation. The results suggest that the amount of debts overall increase the possibility of 
being active in the formal labour market for both genders; however, the degrees of changes are 
different across genders. The housing influences labour force participation of males more than that of 
females; however, other types of debt show the opposite results.  
Chapter 3 investigates different discrete hours labour supply models to find the preferred models for 
individual and family labour supply. A recent dataset (HSES) is adopted in the estimation to explore 
recent labour supply decisions in Thailand. Whilst the predicted hourly wages are obtained using the 
two-stage Heckman selection model similar to the previous chapter, household disposable income at 
each hours alternative are calculated using tax-benefit rules. Four models of individual labour supply 
and six models of household labour supply are estimated; they are different in the degree of flexibility, 
such as incorporation of observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity. All models include a 
fixed cost variable capturing a working status of each individual; incorporation of the fixed cost into a 
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model help prevent under-predicted and over-predicted results at some hours alternatives as 
suggested by previous empirical studies.  
Overall, the estimation provides the results which are consistent with the theoretical predictions and 
existing empirical studies. Some criteria are applied to select the preferred model at each labour 
supply level; they include the proportion of negative marginal utility of income, the proportion of the 
sample satisfying the quasi-concave condition, the proportion of the observations satisfying the 
monotonicity condition, the log-likelihood ratio test, and the consistency between individual and 
household labour supply levels. Regarding individual labour supply, this chapter estimates models for 
males and females separately. The results suggest that the most flexible model is preferred for both 
genders. In terms of the household labour supply, the sample includes married couples with and 
without children. The results indicate that the most flexible model is also preferred for household 
labour supply. This model includes a new variable capturing the fixed costs when both partners are 
working to the existing literature; the results indicate that the variable is statistically significant for 
family labour supply. People living in the capital city has more fixed costs in working than others living 
outside; however, the fixed costs are reduced if both partners decide to be active in the market.  
This chapter also performs robustness checks for the preferred models. Overall, the results show that 
the preferred model are robust and provide consistent results across different checks. The results also 
suggest that the preferred models fit the most recent datasets (2013 and 2015) best.  
The final empirical study in this thesis, Chapter 4, explores the effects of different simulated policies 
through the labour supply models estimated in the Chapter 3. This chapter adopts the arithmetical 
model (personal income tax rules) and behavioural model (estimation results of the preferred models 
for year 2013 and 2015) from Chapter 3 for microsimulation analysis. It covers labour supply response 
as well as pecuniary factors, namely, gross income, tax burden, and disposable income. Additionally, 
a winner-loser analysis is carried out by identifying the number of households which gains disposable 
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income as a result of the simulated policy. This chapter also investigates macroeconomic impacts 
including poverty and income redistribution.  
Before policy simulation, labour supply elasticities of gross wages are estimated. The results are 
consistent with most previous studies from developed countries. Female labour supply is found to be 
more elastic than male labour supply in general. This chapter focuses three different policy reforms. 
First, this chapter simulates the perfect compliance rate of the national minimum wage to investigate 
the effect of the national minimum wage introduced in 2012. The results of this hypothetical policy 
indicates that the policy implication is very important in improving the living standard of poor people 
as well as ameliorating income inequality in Thailand. The next policy simulation is a part of the actual 
tax rule adjustment in 2017. The results reveal that the policy reform affects mainly the tax burden 
(i.e., the amount of personal income tax paid decrease for all types of households). Nevertheless, it 
does not significantly impact poverty and income inequality. The last policy simulation is the personal 
income tax package recently proposed by the sub-committee, under the Thai law reforming 
committee, in September 2018. The results of this counterfactual policy suggest that in general, the 
package affects labour supply and gross income negatively; it also increases tax burdens on average. 
As a result, the disposable income of most households decreases drastically. The main cause is the 
changes in tax brackets and tax rates. In addition, the policy is found to intensify the poverty and to 
possibly expand the income gap between the both ends of the income distribution. 
5.2 Policy implications, limitations, and future research 
The results in Chapter 2 provide further understanding of labour force participation in Thailand as a 
developing country. The results indicate that an increase in wage rates promotes labour force 
participation whilst an increase in unearned income has the opposite effect. Base on the findings, the 
government may consider issuing a policy to reallocate labour force across sectors by increasing wage 
rates in preferred sectors. For example, if the government aims to allocate labour force from the 
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covered sector to the formal sector, it can raise wage rates in the formal labour market; people will 
participate in a better paying market. This implication can be also applied for reallocating labour force 
across industries (e.g., automotive part manufacturing, tourism, and software development) by 
increasing wages in specific industries. On the other hand, the government needs to be cautious in 
introducing any welfare program which affects unearned income because it may discourage people 
from working. The significance of the informal sector on labour supply at the extensive margin reminds 
policy makers to form a policy that possibly affects the formal market with caution. For example, the 
rice-pledging scheme, which raise the rice prices by at least 50 percent, may partially explicate why 
the income restructure policy package generally has a negative effect on the probability of labour 
force participation. An amount of household debts is positively related to labour force participation. 
Nevertheless, the excessive amount of debt constraints can make a decline in workforce productivity 
if non-workers with serious indebtedness need to take any job regardless their skills and job 
requirements. The government needs to be more careful when the household debts increase 
excessively.  
The future research could be improved by focusing on two following aspects. First, variables for 
financial obligation are possible to have econometric problems including sample selection, 
unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity bias (Atalay et al., 2016). Some econometric techniques 
(e.g. instrumental variables and a structural binary probit model) could be applied to deal with these 
possible problems. Second, the first empirical essay focuses mainly on the formal labour market. A 
multinomial choice model can be applied to investigate the occupational choices (i.e., workers, own-
accounts, business owners, farmers, non-participant, and etc.); this will help a researcher to 
understand the whole labour market from a broader perspective.  
The key contribution of Chapter 3 is focusing on the academic applications. This chapter is one of the 
most comprehensive studies regarding labour supply in a developing country. In fact, this essay 
investigates individual and household labour supply models and covers a large spectrum in terms of 
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model flexibility. The most flexible model is preferred for individual and household levels. This implies 
that labour supply decision is highly complicated; it also requires a lot of computational capacity to 
estimate the flexible model. The estimation results of models allow one to simulate interested policy 
reforms to investigate the effects on the economy as shown in the final empirical chapter. 
Nonetheless, policy makers can directly adopt the results as labour supply behaviour for policy 
implications. For example, regarding household labour supply, the large proportion of the fixed costs 
for people living in the capital city is possibly the transportation costs. The traffic congestion in 
Bangkok is one of the worst cities around the world35. Investment in public transportation can help 
reduce the transportation costs (pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms) which, in turn, increase labour 
supply in general. Another example of policy implications can be drawn from effects of having a young 
children on income and leisure. Households with young children requires more income and both males 
and females are likely to sacrifice their leisure hours for hours worked. The government may improve 
the child care system in order to facilitate labour supply behaviour response affected by a policy. An 
appropriate child care system possibly reduce working fixed costs.   
Regarding possibilities for future research, Chapter 3 focusing on labour supply in a developing can be 
improved to some extents. Comprehensive datasets could make some improvements for labour 
supply research in the future as the HSES has some drawbacks for labour supply studies. For example, 
it does not provide some certain income types at an individual level and it provides total amounts of 
incomes rather than detailed information for each sub-category. In addition, information on 
allowances and exemptions is missing from the HSES. If the questionnaire was more consistent with 
income tax rules and regulations, the calculated disposable income would be more realistic. The HSES 
also collects data on a cross-sectional basis. Panel data provides the possibility to study dynamic labour 
                                                            
35 According to INRIX, Bangkok is ranked the 15th of the world’s worst traffic congestion cities in 2017.  
 251 
 
supply which would allow the investigation of labour supply behaviour in multiple periods because 
people do not make a once-and-for-all decision for labour supply.   
Chapter 3 covers various models with different degrees of flexibility and the result of preferred models 
imply that the labour supply decision is vastly complicated. Nonetheless, it does not incorporate 
correlations between arguments (e.g. income and leisure) into any model. Previous studies such as 
those by Creedy et al. (2002), Duncan and Harris (2002), and Kabátek et al. (2014) allow correlations 
between arguments and find significant results. Including the correlations can improve the labour 
supply models of developing countries in the future. One can also consider to incorporate some 
interesting factors (e.g., health status and debt constraints) into a discrete hours labour supply model. 
For example, Duncan et al. (2013) include physical and mental statuses as observed characteristics 
into a discrete hours labour supply of sole parents in Australia.  
The empirical study in Chapter 3 mainly aims to investigate labour supply behaviour of people 
assumed to select whether to work or not and how many hours they want to supply. However, the 
models do not account for the effects of labour demand. A researcher may also consider including the 
labour demand effects into the analysis. Peichl and Siegloch (2012) show that incorporation of labour 
demand effects can offset the positive labour supply effect by about 25 percent. Löffler et al. (2014a) 
estimate labour supply and demand separately; the demand side model accounts for possible 
restrictions because of labour demand as well as identifies the partial equilibrium of the labour market 
after the reactions of labour supply.  
The final essay adopts labour supply behaviour in the previous chapter to explore the effects of 
individual policy. The results provide some important policy implications. First, the policy 
implementation is very important for policy effectiveness. Second, the policy related to tax-benefit 
rules does not affect everyone; for example, in Thailand, many people do not pay personal income tax 
because their taxable income is lower than the tax threshold. Third, increases in allowances can be 
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effective if the total amount is large enough; this indicates why policy simulation is important for the 
policy formation process. Finally, the results show that any policy related to income and personal 
income tax has impacts on labour supply and financial factors. It is crucial that the policy makers need 
to consider the effects of a policy thoughtfully before issuing it. In addition, adjustment of tax brackets 
and rates cause a large change in labour supply and pecuniary factors (gross incomes, tax burdens, 
and disposable incomes) to most people; a policy affecting the tax structure requires very cautious 
consideration.  
One limitation of the microsimulation is linked with the limitation in Chapter 3. In point of fact, the 
simulation in Chapter 4 focus only on the supply side of the labour market. Future research may 
consider incorporating labour demand and price effects into the policy simulation since they may 
offset a significant proportion of the labour supply effect as found in Peichl and Siegloch (2012) and 
Löffler et al. (2014a).  
In Chapter 4, three main policies are simulated to analyse the effects on economic issues. Other 
interesting policies can be simulated in the future research in order to find a proper set of policies to 
alleviate economic concerns. A set of policies, which help improve household income for the entire 
distribution or the large part of the distribution, should be taken into consideration. These policies will 
help reduce the poverty rate as well as preventing a middle income country from the middle-income 
trap situation.  
Future work may consider simulating a policy package which aims to specifically mitigate the income 
inequality concern. Whilst the minimum wage with effective implementation can increase the 
household income of people at the bottom part of the distribution, having another policy which 
targets to increase the tax burden of the top end of the distribution will be an effective policy 
combination for helping improve income equality in an economy. 
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